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1.  Introduction
The main function of  any constitutional court is  to protect an institutional 
integrity of a  state based on principles of democracy and rule of  law and con-
stitutionally granted rights. When performing these tasks, courts do  no oper-
ate in isolation. In the 21st century the globalisation tendencies are stronger than 
ever. The practice of national constitutional courts has been equally affected. As 
guardians of national constitutions, when conducting the control over the consti-
tutionality of legal acts issued within a given legal system, they can no longer rely 
solely on a national law and ignore the international context. The universal fun-
damental values like democracy, the protection of basic human rights and free-
doms, and the application of fundamental principles of law are protected not only 
at a  national constitutional level, but also by international law both universal-
ly and regionally. In Europe, two legal regimes are of special importance in this 
regard: first, the system of  the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR or the Convention) whose 
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provisions are interpreted and applied by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The second regime binding upon the Member States of the European 
Union is based on the Treaties of the European Union (the Treaty on the Europe-
an Union TEU) and the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
and  by the  Charter of  the Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, whose 
uniform interpretation and application is ensured by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (the CJEU). The two treaty-based regimes, constituted in a na-
tional like way by written meta-norms or codified secondary rules and  based 
on normative foundations similar to state constitutions, are recognised by aca-
demia as constitutional legal orders.1 The constitutional courts of each of these 
systems, the ECtHR and the CJEU respectively, exercise compulsory jurisdiction 
over disputes that arise in the respective legal regimes as organs responsible for 
authoritative interpretation of the constitution and for preservation of coherence 
of a given legal systems. The courts’ authority to interpret and apply the regimes’ 
laws is final.2 
The legal reality of  overlapping constitutional orders, both special regimes 
of international law and national constitutional orders, can be explained through 
the  lens of  constitutional pluralism. The  concept has emerged in  the context 
of discussions about relations between legal orders in a complex, partly overlap-
ping and not necessarily hierarchical legal reality. The notion identifies the phe-
nomenon of  a  plurality of  constitutional sources, which creates a  context for 
potential constitutional conflicts between different constitutional orders to be 
solved in a non-hierarchical manner. Such context affects the role of all nation-
al courts and  the character of  adjudication.3 Specifically, constitutional courts 
do not only apply international law but act as guardians of constitutional orders 
holding a position of ultimate authority within it. As such, the courts are con-
fronted with other constitutional orders whose provisions are applicable within 
their scope of jurisdictions. Due to a  special position of  constitutional courts 
and  their engagement in  exchange of  views and  concepts with other courts 
(both international and foreign national) the area of their practice seems to be 
the most useful one for a research aiming at exploration of the role of judicial di-
alogue in a pluralistic legal reality. In such reality, undoubtedly, judicial activity 
cannot be reduced to a mechanical application of law in the form of judicial syl-
logism. For this reason in recent years the role of judges has become increasingly 
relevant. Judicial dialogue understood as a reference to a foreign (international 
1 See: A.S. Stone Sweet, H. Keller, ‘The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders’, [in:] 
H. Keller, A.S. Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights. The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems (Oxford University Press 2008), p. 3. 
2 Cf. A. Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism and  International Regimes’ (2009) 
16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, p. 621.
3 See: M.P. Maduro, ‘Contrapuntal Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in  Action’, [in:] 
N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2003), p. 501; M. Cartabia, ‘Europe 
and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review, p. 5.
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or national) case law in  constitutional interpretation4 is  the main mechanism 
of coexistence of the highest courts in a legal constellation constructed in a het-
erarchical manner.
The aim of this contribution is to explore a phenomenon of judicial dialogue 
of the CEE constitutional courts from the point of view of constitutional plural-
ism. We will examine whether these courts act as international courts responsible 
for effective application of  international rule of  law and  its development within 
the ‘global community of courts’ through engagement in judicial dialogue, as de-
scribed by A.-M. Slaughter.5 After a short review of the concept of constitutional 
pluralism the  practice of  CEE constitutional courts will be examined. First, we 
will identify interlocutors of CEE constitutional courts and then the phenomenon 
of judicial dialogue in specific fields of law will be discussed. The last part is de-
voted to limits of judicial dialogue visible against the background of the identified 
and analysed case law. 
2. The Concept of Constitutional Pluralism
2.1. From Dualism to Pluralism – a Conceptual Framework
Legal pluralism is commonly recognised as a new idea of the end of the 20th 
century. The Kelsian monistic concept of unity of international and municipal law 
has by now been recognised as inadequate for description of mutual relations be-
tween international and national law.6 At the  same time, the dualistic approach 
may be recognised as an intellectual basis for the concept of legal pluralism with 
regard to autonomous natures of national and international legal orders.7 The du-
4 Cf. V. Perju, ‘Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, and Migrations’, [in:] M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2012), 
p. 1304.
5 See: A.-M. Slaughter, ‘A  Global Community of  Courts’ (2003) 4 Harvard International Law 
Journal, p. 191.
6 Cf. A. Bogdandy von, ‘Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relationship be-
tween international and domestic constitutional law’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Con-
stitutional Law, p.  397; J. Nijman, A. Nollkaemper, ‘Beyond Divide’, [in:] idem (eds), New 
Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford University Press 
2007), p. 341; G. Ulfstein, ‘The International Judiciary’, [in:] J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein 
(eds), The Constitutionalisation of  International Law (Oxford University Press 2009), p. 142. 
However opposite position by P. Allott, The Emerging Universal Legal System in New Perspec-
tives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford University Press 2007).
7 The dualist or pluralist view on the relationship between domestic and international law was 
presented by H. Triepel and then developed inter alia by D. Anzilotti. See: R. Collins, ‘Classical 
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alistic concept of  a  relation between international and  national law is  based on 
the presumption of autonomy of both systems. Such autonomy is related to the fact 
that the norms of legal orders in question have various addressees and the con-
sequent divergent relations require different form of regulations.8 However, this 
does not mean that international law is deprived of any domestic significance. On 
the contrary, national courts as State organs fulfil a crucial function in execution 
of international obligations by a State.9 Since, on the one hand, international law 
is addressed to States and regulates their relations, and, on the other hand, national 
law governs relations within a State territory and is addressed to subjects under its 
jurisdiction, international law has been recognised as applicable by national judges 
as far as they are authorised to do so by a national legal order, usually, through na-
tional constitutional provisions. Thus, dualism, as defined by G. Gaja, is not a sin-
gle concept but rather a set of concepts based on common grounds. According to 
this author, 
[t]he main feature of  dualism appears to be that international law and  municipal laws 
are viewed as separate legal systems, which may be defined as self-contained, because within 
each system the only existing rules are those that are part of the system. Rules which are not 
created within the system may nevertheless be relevant for the system if they are referred to 
by a rule included in the system.10
legal positivism in  international law revisited’, [in:] J. Kammerhofer, J. D’Aspremont (eds), 
International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Oxford University Press 2014), p. 24.
8 D. Ancillotti, argued, that international and  municipal law “are enacted by different wills: 
international law stems from the  collective will of  several States, while rules of  municipal 
law are always the expression of the will of a State, or better of the will belonging to a State, 
if one does not wish to prejudge the well-known controversy on the binding nature of cus-
tom, which many jurists consider as law which is not State law, while nobody doubts that it 
belongs to municipal law. […] if norms of  international law only regulate relations among 
States, and give rights and duties only to States, it is impossible that disputes governed by 
international law ever come as such before national judicial authorities. One could therefore 
state that on principle these authorities never take a decision which is  immediately based 
on a rule of international law.” Quotation after G. Gaja, ‘Positivism and Dualism in Dionisio 
Anzilotti’ (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law, p. 123.
9 As D. Ancilotti further pointed out “norms of  international law do  not have any intrinsic 
or necessary inadequacy for being observed and applied by national courts. Courts are State 
organs and  everybody knows that implementation –  taking the  word in  its wide meaning 
– of international law may only take place through these organs. The State is certainly no fic-
tion, but is  nevertheless an abstraction, as it is  a  collective body represented as a  unity 
– it is a collective will, which is shaped and expressed by one or several individual wills, an 
activity that requires and sets forth a sum of individual activities. Thus, the State expresses 
its will and acts through those to which these functions pertain and which we call its organs. 
So also rights and duties that international law gives to a State may be exerted and respec-
tively accomplished only through its organs.” Quotation after: ibidem, p. 123.
10 G. Gaja, ‘Dualism: A Review’, [in:] J. Nijman, A. Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Di-
vide between National and International Law (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 53.
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The development of  international law, and  especially the  adoption of  inter-
national instruments aiming at conferral of rights upon individuals and creation 
of international self-contained regimes equipped with judicial bodies having juris-
diction to adjudicate in cases of individual rights on the one hand and phenome-
non of the so-called “globalisation of national constitutions”11 on the other, ques-
tions a relationship between international law (or special regimes of international 
law) and national legal orders. 
The above question of relationship between international law and national law 
is currently explored by academia through the  lens of  legal pluralism. It  is con-
ceived of as a landscape of overlapping and interacting cycles of international, Eu-
ropean and national legal orders.12 The notion of legal pluralism was defined for 
the first time in regard to the EU as a reaction to the judgement of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court. N. MacCormick thus wrote: 
The most appropriate analysis of the relations of legal systems is pluralistic rather than mo-
nistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical. The legal system of Member States and their 
common legal system of EC law are distinct but interacting systems of law, and hierarchical 
relationships of validity within criteria of validity proper to distinct systems do not add up to 
any sort of all-purpose superiority of one system over another.13
Both dualism and legal pluralism are based on autonomy of legal orders. In case 
of dualism clear distinction was made between effectiveness of international law 
in municipal legal orders and international responsibility for performance of inter-
national obligations. There is no hierarchy between international and national law 
or between international tribunals and national courts. Even if the aim of inter-
national norm is to confer rights upon individuals, such obligation is enforceable 
under international law exclusively at the international level.14 The concept of legal 
pluralism presupposes that there exist overlapping legal orders, thus a particular 
situation can be governed by norms belonging to different legal systems. Thus 
constitutional pluralism, born within autonomous, directly applicable normative 
system of the EU,15 is understood as a plurality of institutional normative orders, 
11 A. Peters, ‘The Globalization of  State Constitutions’, [in:] J. Nijman, A. Nollkaemper, New 
Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford University Press 
2007), p. 251.
12 Since the article is focused on role of national constitutional courts the question of relations 
between regimes of international law and general international law is not discussed. 
13 N. MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995), p. 1, European Law Journal, p. 259.
14 As the International Court of Justice held in La Grand the international obligation of the duty 
to notify defendants of their right to consular assistance “can be carried out in various ways. 
The choice of means must be left to the United States” Germany v United States of America 
(ICJ, 27 June 2001), para. 125. See also: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Mexico v United 
States of America (ICJ, 31 March 2004), para. 141. 
15 R. Barents, ‘The Precedence of  EU Law from the  Perspective of  Constitutional Pluralism’ 
(2009), p. 5; European Constitutional Law Review, p. 421; Priban I., ‘Asking the Sovereignty 
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each with a functioning constitution conceived of as a body of higher-order norms 
establishing and conditioning relevant governmental powers.16 The EU legal order 
makes its own independent constitutional claims, which exist alongside the con-
tinuing claims of states.17 
The debate on constitutional pluralism started but did not end with the EU. 
The concept of constitutionalisation of international law understood as “the pro-
cess of  (re)organization and  (re-)allocation of  competence among the  subjects 
of the international legal order, which shapes the international community, its val-
ue system and enforcement”18 and even the idea of creation of “global constitution-
al community”19 further exposes the understanding of constitutional law and blurs 
the direct link between constitutional law and the nation state. The constitutional 
claim of international law is based mainly on developments of the end of the 20th 
century and the beginning of 21st century. Namely, the recognition of jus cogens 
norms and erga omnes obligations under international law provoked the discus-
sion concerning internal hierarchy of international law, public law analogies and, 
in consequence, the proclamation on a constitutional nature of  the internation-
al legal order as a normative system based on common values of the internatio-
nal community.20 
The specific manifestation of the constitutionalisation of international law is the 
expansion of international human rights, which are perceived by some authors as 
Question in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio-Legal The-
ories of Constitutional Power Operations’ (2015) 28 Ratio Juris, p. 33.
16 Although commonly used the idea as such remains Problematic. See: M. Avbelj, J. Komárek, 
‘Four Visions of  Constitutional Pluralism’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review, 
p. 524; N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002), p. 65, Modern Law Review, 
p. 317; N. Walker, ‘Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the European Union’, [in:] 
M. Laughlin, N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Consti-
tutional Form (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 247. Some authors distinguish between legal 
and constitutionalism and pluralism e.g. N. Krisch, points out that “[t]he contest between 
constitutionalism and pluralism has so far largely lacked a common basis – pluralists have 
typically made their case on analytical grounds, while constitutionalists have mostly turned 
to the normative sphere. So whereas pluralism seems to provide a strong (though contested) 
interpretation of the current, disorderly state of post-national law, constitutionalism – if not 
yet realized today – appears as the more attractive vision for the future.” N. Krisch, ‘The case 
for pluralism in  post-national law’, [in:] G. de Búrca, J.H.H. Weiler, The  Worlds of  European 
Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2011), p. 203.
17 N. Walker (n. 17), p. 337.
18 E. de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly, p. 51. 
19 A. Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’, [in:] J. Klabbers, A. Peters, 
G. Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalisation of International Law (Oxford University Press 2009), 
p. 153.
20 Cf. E. de Wet  (n. 19), pp. 57–63; J. Klabbers, T. Piiparinen, ‘Normative Pluralism: An Explora-
tion’, [in:] iidem (eds), Normative Pluralism and International Law: Exploring Global Govern-
ance (Cambridge University Press 2013), p. 13. 
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international constitutional rights.21 The universality of human rights is, however, 
questioned.22 Thus although human rights constitute fundamental value of inter-
national law, pluralistic interaction took place predominantly in case of a specific 
treaty based regimes.23 The ECHR is the most prominent example. The jurispru-
dence of the ECtHR interpreting specific human rights on the basis of the concept 
of the Convention as a living instrument strongly influences also the development 
of national constitutional rights. 
2.2. Institutional Dimension of the Constitutional Pluralism 
– the Role of Judicial Dialogue
In the legal environment described above it is impossible to avoid conflicts 
arising between European, international, or national political and legal institu-
tions. Since there is no hierarchy between competing legal orders each of them 
is based on its own secondary rules (if one was to use Hart’s terminology).24 
The  existence of  multiple poles of  constitutionalism equipped with an ulti-
mate judicial body results in jurisdictional competition between international 
courts (in our case mainly the CJEU and the ECtHR) and national constitu-
tional courts. Both constitutional and international courts perceive their own 
basic documents (national constitutions, on the one hand, and  international 
treaties, on the other) as supreme law and claim ultimate authority to inter-
pret them. Such judicial or interpretative competition distinguishes constitu-
tional courts form other national courts. While all other national judges face 
the problem of multiple loyalties and dual or multiple preliminarily since they 
belong to plural legal orders,25 constitutional courts are, first of  all, guardi-
ans of national constitutions. By definition, therefore, their main task covers 
authoritative interpretation of  the constitution and  thus also the  preserva-
tion of the coherence of the legal order. Nevertheless, even when preforming 
the role of servants of the constitution, they are faced with authority of inter-
national courts carrying out exactly the  same function within treaty-based 
regimes. Since national constitutions, directly or indirectly, insert internation-
21 A. Peters (n. 12), p. 167.
22 See: R.A. Macdonald, ‘Pluralistic Human Rights? Universal Human Wrongs?’, [in:] R. Provost, 
C. Sheppard (eds), Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (Springer 2013), p. 15.
23 However one must agree that fragmentation of  international law on human rights can be 
seen as the way of development of universal human rights law: “it is through fragmentation 
that human rights can aspire to universality.” C.I. Fuentes, R. Provost, S.G. Walker, ‘E Pluribus 
Unum – Bhinneka Tunggal Ika? Universal Human Rights and the Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law’, [in:] R. Provost, C. Sheppard (eds), Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Plural-
ism (Springer 2013), p. 38.
24 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press 1997).
25 See more: G. Martinico, ‘Multiple loyalties and dual preliminarity: The pains of being judge 
in a multilevel legal order’ (2012) 10 I-CON 871.
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al and  European law into national legal orders26 constitutional judges must 
determine not only the  position of  international and  European legal orders 
within national system but also their own relation with international courts. 
In both so-called monistic and dualistic states international law is applicable 
(in the broad meaning of the term including any form of invocability) within 
the limits determined by a national constitution as interpreted by a particular 
constitutional court. It means that regardless of whether a given legal system 
is called ‘monistic’ or not, in fact the constitutional courts act always as dualis-
tic or pluralistic since even in so called ‘monistic’ states a national constitution 
is perceived as a means of general incorporation of international law to domes-
tic legal order. At the same time a constitution as the supreme law of a land es-
tablishes limits for effectiveness of international law within a domestic system. 
The difference between those two, as it was already indicated, lays in the fact 
that in case of dualism, international law as well as decisions of international 
courts are invoked simply to ensure that international obligations of the state 
are fulfilled. In case of constitutional pluralism national and international laws 
are interconnected by common values, which create the platform for dialogue. 
However, it does not mean that in the pluralistic world conflict of legal orders 
is excluded. It is minimalized due to the axiological consistency of legal orders, 
but not fully eliminated. 
The pluralistic approach does not provide a clear answer as to who is to act 
as a final arbiter in case of conflict. In a given case a judge is to employ differ-
ent forms of judicial techniques in order to find the best legal solution. The role 
of a dialogue, especially the dialogue between highest (constitutional) courts can-
not be overestimated in formation of a common understanding of law. The plu-
ralist approaches to the  international legal order claim to preserve space for 
contestation, resistance and innovation, and to encourage tolerance and mutual 
accommodation.27 The relationship between the orders is now horizontal rather 
than vertical, that is to say, heterarchical rather than hierarchical.28 As the result, 
the main institutional relations between legal orders are based on mutual recog-
nition and respect between authorities. 
At the same time, because of globalisation, courts of different states are faced 
with similar legal problems. The increasing availability of foreign judicial de-
cisions and the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation of con-
stitutional courts, at least on the  European level, create a  unique possibility 
of interaction also between national constitutional courts. As the result, both 
vertical and horizontal dialogues have become the main tool of development 
of the international rule of law. It must be noted in that regard that constitu-
tional courts, in contrast to other national courts, operate mainly on matters 
26 See: contribution by Wyrozumska in this volume.
27 See: G. de Búrca, ‘The ECJ and the international legal order: a re-evaluation’, [in:] G. de Búrca, 
J.H.H. Weiler, The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2011), p. 105.
28 N. Walker, op. cit. (n. 17), p. 337.
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of principle. In Habermas’s understanding using a constitutive interpretation 
in  order to deliver acceptable solution of  a  legal problem, do constitutional 
courts not only build up the understanding of a legal order as a “system of rules 
structured by principles”,29 but also develop their own concept of “value juris-
prudence”. 
The legal and  constitutional pluralism require an expansion of  the scope 
of legal arguments to be employed by courts and an increased focus on systemic 
and  teleological reasoning resulting in  increasing contextualization of  judicial 
reasoning.30 The new legal challenges before courts do not require a construc-
tion of new judicial techniques, but rather a recognition that law is a dynamic 
structure and requires the reflexive methodology of adjudication. Constitutional 
courts have a  leading role in  judicial dialogue within pluralistic legal environ-
ment. The parti cipation in a dialogue requires not only sufficient openness for 
arguments of  other interlocutors, but also self-reflection and  self-determina-
tion. This leads to a gradual change of the language. The sovereignty arguments 
are supplemented by constitutional identity ones. Although this term remains 
subjective and  ambiguous,31 it can be considered as a  symbolic barrier where 
the influence of others finishes and self-consideration within a specific commu-
nity starts. 
The resolution of conflicts though dialogue does not necessarily bring a clear-
cut simple solution and requires an on-going process of mutual accommodation. 
The heterarchical nature of legal pluralism entails “specific language of dialogue 
and encounter, give and take, criticism and self-criticism. Dialogue means both 
speaking and  listening, and  that process reveals both common understandings 
and real differences. Dialogue does not mean everyone at the table will agree with 
one another. Pluralism involves the commitment to being at the table – with one’s 
commitments.”32 
In the subsequent parts of  this paper we will explore how the CEE constitu-
tional courts consider their own role in the pluralistic environment and how they 
29 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and De-
mocracy, translated by William Rehg (The MIT Press 1996), pp. 253, 262.
30 M.P. Maduro, ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context 
of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism’, [in:] J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and  Global Governance (Cambridge University Press 
2009), pp. 356, 361. 
31 See: M. Rosenfeld, The  Identity of  the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, 
and Community (Routledge 2010); idem, ‘Is Global Constitutionalism Meaningful or Desira-
ble?’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law, p. 177; A. Śledzińska-Simon, ‘Consti-
tutional identity in 3D: A model of individual, relational, and collective self and its application 
in Poland’ (2015) 13 I-CON 124. 
32 K. Lachmayer, ‘The Possibility of  International Constitutional Law. A  Pluralistic Approach 
towards Constitutional Claw and  Constitutional Comparison’, [in:] P. Riberi, K. Lachmayer 
(eds), Philosophical or Political Foundation of Constitutional Law? Perspectives in Conflict (No-
mos Publishing 2014), p. 283.
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interact with other international and foreign courts. We will search for the posi-
tion at the discussion table the CEE courts take and the commitments they will 
bring to it. 
3.  Judicial Dialogue in Practice of the CEE 
Constitutional Courts 
3.1. The Actors of Judicial Dialogue
In multi-centric or poly-contextual environment of  European human rights 
protection system it is desirable that constitutional courts of all States parties to 
the Convention consider, directly or indirectly, the case law of the ECtHR. Simi-
larly the jurisprudence of the CJEU is significant not only for the Member States 
of the EU, but to all the States parties to the ECHR because of interactions between 
both international courts. In addition, case law of foreign domestic courts may be 
relevant, if it contributes to legal evolution of human rights protection standard or 
principles of democratic state based on rule of law. 
The aim of this part of the paper is to explore the scope of judicial dialogue 
in  CEE in  both institutional terms and  so taking into consideration both in-
ternational and  cross-national aspects of  it. We will analyse how and  why 
constitutional courts of  Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia 
and  Ukraine enter into conversation with other courts, and  how they build 
court-to-court relations. 
3.1.1. The Dialogue with the European Court of Human Rights
The ECHR is  the most frequently referred to international court in the CEE 
States. The ECtHR is an international treaty binding upon these states. Its formal 
position in national legal orders is determined by national constitutions.33 Since 
the relation of national constitutional courts and the ECtHR are based simulta-
neously on the international treaty and national regulations, this kind of dialogue 
is described in literature as a vertical34 or a mandatory one.35 
Different factors influence implementation of  the ECHR and of the case 
law of the ECtHR, in domestic legal orders. The Venice Commission identified 
33 See: contribution by Wyrozumska in this volume. 
34 See: A.-M. Slaughter, ‘A  Typology on Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 University 
of Richmond Law Review, p. 99.
35 See: M. Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press 
2013), p. 21.
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a  range of  them. From the  domestic perspective what matters are: the  con-
ceptualization of the relation between international and domestic legal orders 
and  international law, a  position of  human rights treaties within domestic 
legal orders’ hierarchy, direct and indirect effect and the interpretation claus-
es in domestic constitutions and legislation enabling the reception of human 
rights treaties and decisions of monitoring bodies into the domestic legal or-
der (legal possibility of  reopening the  procedure after the  ECtHR decision 
indicating the violation of the Convention).36 Another identified factor is the 
position of human rights instruments related to their specific aim. They are to 
ensure the effective protection of human rights, which means that main ben-
eficiaries of  human rights treaties are  not states but individuals.37 It  is also 
important to notice that the  Protocol 11 to the  ECHR ensures compliance 
with the  obligations arising from the  Convention under individual applica-
tions subject solely to the  exhaustion of  domestic remedies, which includes 
the constitutional complaint lodged before the constitutional court if appli-
cable. Thus the decision of a constitutional court can be subject to review by 
the ECHR.38 The position of the ECHR within the ECtHR system is also vital. 
According to Art. 32 ECHR, the ECtHR poses exclusive and final jurisdiction 
with regard to interpretation of  the Convention. In  line with Art.  46 States 
are to abide by the final judgments of the ECtHR.39 On that basis the ECtHR 
has developed specific powers to give maximum effect to its case law, like pi-
lot judgments procedure, which encourages domestic constitutional courts to 
consider the practice of the Court in a systemic manner. Finally, in CEE States 
all national constitutions in question have been adopted with the perspective 
of accession to the European Convention thus there is a strong focus on con-
formity or even unity of constitutionally granted rights with those provided 
for by the Convention. Human rights and rule of law standards were ‘re-im-
ported’ from international law into the  legal orders of  CEE States.40 In  the 
transformation period, the interpretation of national constitutions in the light 
36 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Report on the Im-
plementation of International Human Rights Treaties in Domestic Law and the Role of Courts 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 100th plenary session (Rome, 10–11 October 2014) 
on the basis of comments by Ms. Veronika Bílková (Member, Czech Republic), Ms. Anne Pe-
ters (Substitute Member, Germany), Mr. Pieter van Dijk (Expert, The  Netherlands), Study 
No. 690/2012 (Strasbourg, 8 December 2014), p. 5.
37 Ibidem, p. 17.
38 Cf. A. Voßkuhle, ‘Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts. Der Europäis-
che Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review, p. 175.
39 See: European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Report On 
The Implementation of International Human Rights Treaties in Domestic Law and the Role 
of Courts, Study No. 690/2012, CDL-AD(2014)036 (Strasbourg, 8 December 2014).
40 See: A. Peters, ‘Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law’ 
(2009) 3 Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law, p. 170. 
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of  the ECtHR seemed to be treated as a proof of  systemic changes in CEE41 
and was to confirm the belonging of the CEE states to the community of dem-
ocratic states based on the rule of law. All of the above factors lead to the rec-
ognition of the case law of the ECtHR as an indicator of the common Europe-
an standard of protection of human rights and, as such, also as the substantive 
source of constitutional values.42
In the Czech Republic before 2001, international human rights treaties, as an 
only category of incorporated international treaties, had been granted a status 
equal to the  Constitution within the  Czech legal order.43 After the  2001 Eu-
ro-amendment of the Constitution44 the incorporation clause was extended to 
all ratified and promulgated international treaties and treaties on human rights 
were deleted form the formal definition of  the constitutional order.45 Howev-
er, the  Czech Constitutional Court declared in  2002 that human rights trea-
ties ratified prior to the  constitutional amendment would not be affected by 
the change in the regulation and sustained the ‘constitutional law quality’ grant-
ed to the ECHR by the legal system of the Czech Republic.46 In the judgment 
41 Cf. R. Prochazka, Mission Accomplished. On Founding Constitutional Adjudication in Central 
Europe (Central European University Press 2002), p. 17; A. Czarnota, M. Krygier, W. Sadurski 
(eds), Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement for the Rule 
of  Law, Democracy and  Constitutionalism in  Post-Communist Legal Orders, Constitutional 
Evolution in  Central and  Eastern Europe: Expansion and  Integration into the  EU (Springer 
2006); L. Hammer, F. Emmert (eds), The  European Convention on Human Rights and  Fun-
damental Freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe (Eleven International Publishing 2012). 
It  is worth notice that although Lithuania has ratified the  ECHR in  2000 already in  1991 
the Reconstituent Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania made an official statement that “it 
will respect and  honestly fulfill all the  obligations established by the  European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950”, 
Declaration of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on the Obligations of the Republic 
of  Lithuania arising from the  Convention for the  Protection of  Human Rights and  Funda-
mental Rights of  4 November 1950, 5 October 1991, 17/94 on the  confidentiality of  legal 
counselling (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 18 November 1994), quotation after A. Čepas, 
‘Preface’, [in:] Human Rights in Lithuania (NAUJOS SISTEMOS 2005). See also: judgements 
of Polish Constitutional Court K 1/92 (Polish Constitutional Court, 20 October 1992). If not 
indicated otherwise translations of the judgments of the Polish Constitutional Court comes 
from the website of the Court <http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/> accessed between March 2012 
and May 2016. 
42 Cf. M. de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe (Hart Publishing 2015) 229.
43 See: detailed analysis P. Mikeš, ‘Czech Courts and International Law’ (2011) 2 Czech Yearbook 
of International Law, p. 289.
44 Constitutional Act 395/2001 Coll. 
45 See: P. Štruma, ‘Human Rights in a New EU Member State: The Czech Example’, [in:] R. Arnold 
(ed.), Universalism of Human Rights (Springer 2013), p. 357.
46 The  Constitutional Court held that: “[t]he inadmissibility od  changing the  substantive 
requirements of  a  democratic state based on the  rule of  law also contains an instruc-
tion to the  Constitutional Court, that no amendment to the  Constitution can be inter-
preted in such a way that it would result in limiting an already achieved procedural lev-
el of  protection for fundamental rights and  freedoms […]. The  guarantee of  a  general 
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of 11 November 2006 the Court confirmed a special position of international 
human rights treaties, and  stressed that the case law of  the ECHR as the au-
thoritative interpretation of the ECtHR must be taken into account by all state 
organs.47 
After 2010 amendment of  the Hungarian Constitution, the  Constitutional 
Court in the judgment of 12 July 2011 stressed the importance of international 
agreements on human rights as a minimum standard of protection and empha-
sised its own obligation of due consideration of case law of the Strasbourg court 
stemming from pacta sunt servanda principle.48 The Court applied a clearly du-
incorporation norm within the Constitution, and the rejection thereby of dualistic con-
cept of  the relationship between international and  domestic law, cannot be interpret-
ed to mean that ratified and  promulgated international agreements on human rights 
and  fundamental freedoms are  removed as a  reference point for the  purpose of  the 
evaluation of  domestic law by the  Constitutional Court with derogative effect. There-
fore, the  scope of  the concept of  constitutional order cannot be interpreted only with 
regard to Art. 112(1) of the Constitution, but also in view of Art. 1(2) of the Constitution 
and ratified and promulgated international agreements on human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms must be included within it.” Judgement Pl. ÚS 36/01 (Czech Constitutional 
Court, 25 June 2001). See also judgements: I. ÚS 752/02 (Czech Constitutional Court, 
15 April 2003) and Pl. ÚS 44/02 (Czech Constitutional Court, 24 June 2003). If not indi-
cated otherwise translations of judgments of the Czech Constitutional Court come from 
the website of the Court <http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/> (access: between March 
2014 and May 2016).
47 I. ÚS 310/05 (Czech Constitutional Court, 11 November 2006). The Court held that: “[t]he 
immediate applicability of  international treaties also includes the  obligation of  Czech 
courts and other public authorities to take into account the interpretation of these trea-
ties by international tribunals as authorities called upon to pronounce authoritatively on 
the interpretation of international treaties. This of course also applies to the interpreta-
tion of the ECHR by the ECtHR. The relevance of the ECtHR jurisprudence achieved con-
stitutional law quality in the Czech Republic. ECtHR decisions are for the Czech Republic 
and for public authorities on its territory binding in an individual case, which also comes 
from Art. 46(1) of the ECHR. […] For the reasons mentioned above, however, have pub-
lic authorities a general duty to take into account the interpretation of the ECHR carried 
out by the  ECtHR. […] Public authorities, in  the first place then the  courts, are  there-
fore obliged to take into account the case law of the ECtHR as well as in the cases where 
decisions concerned the  Czech Republic as well as in  the cases that concerned anoth-
er Member State of  the ECHR when these cases were, by its nature, significant also for 
the interpretation of the ECHR in the Czech context” (translation after Mikeš P., ‘Country 
Report Czech Republic’ 10. In  2010 the  Czech Constitutional Court repeated this state-
ment and not only included broad analysis of the ECtHR case law into argumentation but 
also pointed out that there is an obligation of any national court of the Czech Republic to 
consider practice of the European Court. Otherwise “courts ignorance or lack of knowl-
edge may lead to the State liability of violation of the Convention”, II. ÚS 862/10 (Czech 
Constitutional Court, 19 May 2010).
48 Case 61/2011 (Constitutional Court of Hungary, 12 July 2011): “There are some fundamen-
tal rights the essential content of which is formulated in the same manner in the Constitu-
tion and as in an international treaty (e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights). In such cases, the level of protection 
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alistic approach towards the Convention as an incorporated international trea-
ty. The Court used this reasoning in subsequent decisions where the Court em-
ployed formula to justify consideration of the decisions of ECtHR in subsequent 
judgements: 
in the course of examining the petition, the Constitutional Court took account of the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights […]. Hungary as a state party joined the Con-
vention on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms promulgated in Act 
XXXI of 1993 […], therefore the Constitutional Court applies as the minimum requirements 
of  protecting rights in  the course of  elaborating the  Hungarian constitutional standards 
the aspects found in the judicial practice of ECHR on the interpretation of the Convention.49 
It means that due to the incorporation of the ECHR into Hungarian legal order, 
the Court recognises the Convention as a part of constitutional standard of protec-
tion of human rights (although the minimal one) and the case law of the ECtHR 
is considered as a part of the Convention.50 
The Lithuanian Constitutional Court in 1995 in case concerning ratification 
of the ECHR, stated that the Convention
is a peculiar source of international law, the purpose of which is different from that of many 
other acts of international law. This purpose is universal, i.e. to strive for universal and effec-
tive recognition of the rights declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to 
achieve that they were observed while protecting and further implementing human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. With respect to its purpose, the Convention performs the same 
function as the constitutional guarantees for human rights, because the Constitution estab-
lishes the guarantees in a state and the Convention – on the international scale. That is why 
it is very significant to evaluate and establish the relation between the Convention and the 
Constitution.51 
of  fundamental rights guaranteed by the  Constitutional Court cannot be in  any case low-
er than the level of the international protection namely that of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights. Consequent of  the principle of  pacta sunt servanda the  Constitutional Court 
is bound to follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the level of protection of fundamental 
rights which is thereby defined, even if such a turn could not be deduced necessarily from 
its’ own ‘precedent-decisions’” translation after Kovács P., ‘International Law in the Recent 
Jurisprudence of  the Hungarian Constitutional Court: Opening of  a  New Tendency?’, [in:] 
A. Seibert-Fohr, M.E. Villiger (eds), Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – Effects 
and Implementation (Nomos 2014), p. 251.
49 Hungarian Constitutional Court cases: 1/2013 (I. 7.) AB, 22/2013 (VII. 19.) AB, 7/2014 (III. 7.) 
AB.
50 See: detailed discussion by N. Chronowski, T. Drinóczi, I. Ernszt, ‘Hungary’, [in:] D. Shelton 
(ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems. Incorporation, Transformation and Per-
suasion (Oxford University Press 2011), p. 278.
51 Case 22/94 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 24 January 1995) on the Convention for the Pro-
tection of  Human Rights and  Fundamental Freedoms, para. 23. If not indicated otherwise 
translations of  judgments of  the Lithuanian Constitutional Court come from the  website 
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The Court stressed that the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania is based on 
the principle of primacy of the Constitution and that the conflict situation is pos-
sible in following circumstances: firstly, if the Constitution established a complete 
and  final list of  rights and  freedoms and  the Convention set forth some other 
rights and freedoms; secondly, the Constitution prohibited some actions and the 
Convention defined them as one or another right or freedom; thirdly, some pro-
vision of the Convention could not be applied in the legal system of the Republic 
of Lithuania because it was not consistent with some provision of the Constitution. 
However, the Court noticed that neither the Constitution nor the Convention con-
tain a complete and final list of human rights and freedoms and that consistent 
interpretation should be the main tool to avoid conflict. The Court stressed that 
the interpretation of the compatibility (relation) of the norms of the Constitution and the 
Convention must be semantic, logical and not only literal. Literal interpretation of human 
rights alone is not acceptable for the nature of the protection of human rights. […] The lit-
eral interpretation of legal norms when applied as the only way of interpretation is not ac-
ceptable because while interpreting the contents of a legal norm not the particular wording 
of a certain rule is most significant, but the fact that the text should provide understanding 
beyond doubt that the instruction is given to certain subjects under certain conditions to 
act in an appropriate way.
The Court thus indicated necessity of employment of dynamic interpretation 
of human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if the wording of the provi-
sion protecting the analogous right differs in the Constitution and in the ECHR, 
the provisions should be interpreted harmoniously. Consequently, “the provisions 
of  the Convention, which define human rights and  freedoms, may be applied 
along with the constitutional provisions provided they do not contradict the lat-
ter.”52 In 2000 the Lithuanian Constitutional Court expressly recognized the EC-
tHR’s case law as a source in construction of law. The Lithuanian Constitutional 
Court held that “the jurisprudence of  the European Court of Human Rights as 
a source of construction of law is also important to construction and applicability 
of Lithuanian law.”53 
Thus, the Constitutional Court’s case law granted the status of an authoritative 
source of interpretation of law, first, to the Convention, and, later, to the jurispru-
dence formed by the ECtHR.54 
of  the Court <http://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/rulings-conclusions-decisions/171/y2016> 
(access: between March 2014 and May 2016).
52 Ibidem. See also: case 11/99 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 7 January 1999).
53 Case 12/99-27/99-29/99-1/2000-2/2000 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 8 May 2000).
54 Cf. Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, National Report XVIth Congress of the 
Conference of European Constitutional Courts “Cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Eu-
rope – Current Situation and Perspectives”, Vilnius 2013, 13. See also: case 26/2014–4/2015 
(Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 9 July 2015) on the compliance of certain provisions of the 
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In 2012 the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and the ECtHR did not see eye to 
eye in the context of Paksas case55 analysed in depth below (Section II.4). The Lith-
uanian Court decided in that case that “even though the jurisprudence of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, as a source for construction of law, is important 
also for construction and  application of  Lithuanian law, the  jurisdiction of  the 
said Court does not replace the powers of  the Constitutional Court to officially 
construe the  Constitution.” The  Court delimited the  scope of  own competence 
and powers of the ECtHR and held that:
in itself the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights may not serve as the consti-
tutional basis for reinterpretation (correction) of  the official constitutional doctrine (pro-
visions thereof) if such reinterpretation, in  the absence of  corresponding amendments to 
the Constitution, changed the overall constitutional regulation (inter alia the integrity of the 
constitutional institutes –  impeachment, the oath and electoral right) in essence, also if it 
disturbed the system of the values entrenched in the Constitution and diminished the guar-
antees of protection of the superiority of the Constitution in the legal system. 
The Polish Constitutional Court also found that the  ECtHR plays an essen-
tial role in determining a standard catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms 
in a democratic state.56 According to the Court: 
special role of  the European Convention stems from the  fact that states-parties to 
the  Convention not only obliged themselves to observe a  catalogue of  rights and  fun-
damental freedoms included in the Convention but also to comply with the  judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights which adjudicates on the basis of the Convention 
and the Protocols that supplement it. The Court’s judicial decisions determine the nor-
mative contents of  rights and  fundamental freedoms that are  formulated in  a  compact 
way, which is understandable, in the Convention and the Protocols. The judicial decisions 
of the European Court determine common normative contents of rights and fundamental 
freedoms the regulation of which (also by constitutions) sometimes significantly differs 
in various states.57 
rules on the amounts and payment of remuneration to advocates for the provision and coor-
dination of secondary legal aid and detailed discussion of the case law by Kuzborska.  
55 Case 8/2012 (Constitutional Court of Lithuania, 22 May 2012).
56 See inter alia Polish Constitutional Court cases: SK 29/04 (6 December 2004), para. VIII.2.; 
SK 52/08 (9 June 2010), para. III.7.3.2.
57 Case U  10/07 (Polish Constitutional Court, 2 December 2009), para. V.3.2. See also: Case 
SK  32/14 (Polish Constitutional Court, 22 September 2015). The  Court resolved question 
of constitutionality of provisions of Polish Code of Civil Procedure precluding possibility of re-
opening of the case in consequence of the ECtHR’s decision on infringement of Art. 6 of the 
ECHR. The Court held that according to the Art. 91(1) of the Polish Constitution the ECHR 
possesses special legal status. It is part of the Polish legal order and is directly applicable. 
It is an act of higher legal value than statutes. The content of the Convention is determined 
by its text as interpreted by the ECtHR. Constitutional status of the Convention covers not 
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This means that the Polish Constitution recognizes significance of the ECHR 
not only as an international treaty but also as an emanation of common European 
standards (at least at a minimal level) of human rights protection. 
It must be also noted that, according to their scope of jurisdiction the Polish 
and the Czech Constitutional Courts decide about conformity of national law not 
only with the Constitution but also with international treaties. In cases concerning 
the ECHR the courts interpret the ECHR in the light of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR. Significantly, in any case the examination of conformity of national pro-
visions with the ECHR is connected with examination of their consistency with 
a parallel constitutional norm. The fact that the result of the Court’s review as to 
the conformity with both acts is usually exactly the same proves that even if there 
are two formally separate criteria of legality of national norm they are perceived by 
the Court as substantively identical.58
In the Russian Federation the ECtHR’s judgements are recognised as part of le-
gal system of the state on the basis of Art. 15(4) of the Constitution.59 According 
to the Federal Law on ratification of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Protocols thereto Russia rec-
ognises the Convention as an integral part of its legal system. The Constitutional 
Court plays an important role in development of human rights protection in con-
formity with European standards as established by the Convention and case law 
of the ECtHR. In 2001, shortly after the accession of Russia to the ECHR, the Con-
stitutional Court stated in Burdov that the Convention
is ratified by the  Russian Federation and  is in  force in  all its territory and, consequently, 
forms part of  the domestic legal system. Furthermore, the  Russian Federation accepted 
only provisions concerning rights and freedoms but also other provisions of the Convention 
including Art. 6, which obliges state-parties to respect final decision of the ECtHR in any case 
to which they are parties. This obligation includes prohibition of challenging the infringe-
ment of subjective rights decided by the ECtHR and duty of any positive action in order to 
implement the judgment.
58 See e.g.: as to Art.  8 of  the ECHR: K 39/12 (Polish Constitutional Court, 20 January 2015), 
K 23/11 (Polish Constitutional Court, 30 July 2014), I. ÚS 2482/13 (Czech Constitutional Court, 
26 May 2014), Pl. ÚS 24/11 (Czech Constitutional Court, 20 December 2011); as to Art.  10 
of the ECHR K 28/13 (Polish Constitutional Court, 21 September 2015); as to Art. 11 of the 
ECHR: K 5/15 (Polish Constitutional Court, 17 November 2015), K 44/12 (Polish Constitutional 
Court, 18 September 2014); as to Art. 7 (1), Art. 8 and Art. 18 of  the ECHR: K 54/07 (Polish 
Constitutional Court, 23 June 2009); as to Art. 6 of the ECHR: P 26/11 (Polish Constitutional 
Court, 15 October 2013), K 6/13 (Polish Constitutional Court, 11 March 2014), K 47/15 (Polish 
Constitutional Court, 9 March 2016), K 19/11 (Polish Constitutional Court, 3 June 2014), 3 ÚS 
1136/13 (Czech Constitutional Court, 27 October 2015); as to Art. 4(1) and (2) and Art. 5(1): II. 
ÚS 3626/13 (Czech Constitutional Court, 16 December 2015).
59 Russian constitutional Court cases: 4-П (4 February 1996), 1-П ( 25 January 2001), 2-П (5 Feb-
ruary 2007), see also: A.L. Burkov, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights 
on Russian Law. Legislation and  Application in  1996–2006 (ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart 2007), 
<http://sutyajnik.ru/documents/4237.pdf> (access: between March 2014 and May 2016).
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the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and undertook to render its law-en-
forcement practice, including judicial, in full conformity with the obligations flowing from 
the participation in the Convention and the Protocols thereto.60 
The Constitutional Court also emphasized that the provisions of the Civil Code 
of the Russian Federation in that case must “be considered and applied in consis-
tent normative unity with the exigencies of the Convention.”61
In 2007 the Constitutional Court developed the above concept, however, made 
the reservation in regard to the scope of jurisdiction of the ECtHR. The Russian 
Constitutional Court held that62 
[b]y ratifying the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, the Russian Federation recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights as obligatory in questions concerning the interpretation and application of the Con-
vention and Protocols to it in cases of alleged violation by the Russian Federation of provi-
sions of the mentioned instruments. Thereby, like the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights – to the extent that they interpret the substance of the rights and freedoms provided 
for by the Convention, relying on the generally recognized principles and norms of  inter-
national law, including the  right to access to court and  fair justice –  are an integral part 
of the legal system of the Russian Federation. That is why they shall be taken into account 
by the federal legislator in regulating social relations and by the law-enforcement authorities 
in applying the respective norms of the law.63 
The reference to “generally recognised principles and norms of  international 
law” seems to determine both the basis of incorporation of the ECHR into Russian 
legal order through Art. 15 of the Constitution and limits of applicability of case 
law of the ECtHR under the Russian Constitution.64 At the same time, the Con-
stitutional Court softens the effectiveness of the ECtHR’s case law by indication 
that it must be taken into account while in the previous decision an obligation to 
ensure full conformity of the national law with the ECHR and case law of ECtHR 
was declared.65 In the discussed case the Court abstained from recognition of chal-
lenged provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on supervisory review,66 although 
60 Case 1-П (Russian Constitutional Court, 25 January 2001), para. 6.
61 Ibidem.
62 Case 2-П (n. 60).
63 Ibidem, para. 2.1.
64 See: detailed discussion K. Koroteev, S. Golubok, ‘Judgment of  the Russian Constitutional 
Court on Supervisory Review in Civil Proceedings: Denial of Justice, Denial of Europe’ (2007) 
7 Human Rights Law Review, p. 619.
65 Ibidem, p. 624.
66 Supervisory review (‘nadzor’) is a form of extraordinary appeal against a final judicial decision 
inherited by Russia and other former communist states from Soviet law. This procedure had 
been based on the assumption that prosecutors and higher courts supervise the activities 
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there was no doubt that they are  contrary to the  right of  a  fair trial. Similarly, 
the above-mentioned reservation was used by the Russian Constitutional Court 
in the one of the most recent decisions discussed in Section III. 4. to deny execu-
tion of the decisions of the ECtHR because of their inconformity with the Russian 
Constitution and international law.
The position of  case law of  the ECtHR in  the Ukrainian legal order is  de-
termined by the  Constitution and  Art.  17 of  the Law of  Ukraine on Execution 
of Judgments and Application of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which stipulates the obligatory application of the Convention, as interpret-
ed by the ECtHR, as the source of law. These should be taken into consideration 
by all judges of Ukraine, including those of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. 
Although the Ukrainian Constitutional Court frequently invokes the ECHR in its 
decisions,67 references to case law of the ECtHR are rather rare. Yet, in the last years 
the frequency of references has been increasing.68 The reluctance of the Ukrain-
ian judges to invoke ‘external’ sources can be explained by the judicial tradition. 
However, in some cases the implicit influence of the ECtHR practice is evident. 
The death penalty case69 may serve as a flagship example. Even though the Con-
stitutional Court avoided making direct reference to findings of the ECtHR with 
regard to the non-conformity of death penalty as a type of punishment to the pro-
hibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment provided for in Art. 3 of the 
ECHR, the content of the Ukrainian decision is manifestly inspired by the ECtHR 
judgment in Soering v United Kingdom.70
3.1.2. The Dialogue with the CJEU
The dialogue with the CJEU concerns mainly Member States of the EU. In prac-
tice of  the Russian and  the Ukrainian Constitutional Court the  case law of  the 
CJEU does not constitute a point of reference.71 
of lower courts and constitutes a means by which final decisions that are res judicata may be 
overturned on request of governmental authorities. Ibidem, p. 622.
67 See i.a.: cases indicated in Constitutional Court of Ukraine, National Report XVIth Congress 
of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts “Cooperation of Constitutional Courts 
in Europe – Current Situation and Perspectives”, Kyiv 2013: 9-rp/97 (Ukrainian Constitution-
al Court, 25 December 1997) case prior to accession of  Ukraine to the  ECHR; 19-rp/2004 
(Ukrainian Constitutional Court, 1 December 2004); 6-rp/2007 (Ukrainian Constitutional, 
Court 9 July 2007); 2-rp/2008 (Ukrainian Constitutional Court, 29 January 2008); 20-rp/2008 
(Ukrainian Constitutional Court, 8 October 2008); 5-rp/2012 (Ukrainian Constitutional Court, 
13 March 2012).
68 See i.a. Ukrainian Constitutional Court cases: 8-rp/2010 (11 March 2010); 17-rp/2010 (29 June 
2010); 1-rp/2012 (18 January 2012); 10-rp/2012 (18 January 2012).
69 Case 11-rp/99 (Ukrainian Constitutional Court, 29 December 1999).
70 Soering v United Kingdom, App. no. 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989).
71 Cf. Constitutional Court of Ukraine, National Report XVIth Congress, (n. 68) 13, Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation, National Report XVIth Congress of the Conference of Euro-
pean Constitutional Courts “Cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe – Current Situa-
tion and Perspectives” (Vienna 2014) 23.
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Within the EU legal order the CJEU has exclusive jurisdiction to decide about 
validity of secondary law and to deliver a  legally binding interpretation of EU 
law norms. One must emphasize that the  concept of  the ‘autonomous nature’ 
of the EU (or the former ‘Community’) legal order was developed as the result 
of the judicial dialogue between national courts and the CJEU. The judicial di-
alogue with constitutional and the highest courts of the Member States started 
after the formulation of, firstly, the two main principles governing the applica-
tion of today’s EU law in national legal orders such as the direct effect72 and the 
supremacy73 of EU law and, secondly, proclamation of auto-referential, complete 
nature of EU. Importantly, human rights protection must be considered as an in-
herent part of the EU legal order.74 All the above-mentioned legal concepts were 
formulated by the  CJEU in  response to inspiring (or even provocative) ques-
tions of ordinary courts. As the result, the position of the CJEU within the legal 
system of  the Union has become comparable to the position of  constitutional 
courts within national systems. Thus, ordinary courts became a part of the sys-
tem of the judicial protection of the EU. In consequence, the powers of consti-
tutional and highest courts have somewhat eroded. For instance, the landmark 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft judgment aimed at the limitation of the review 
of constitutionality of acts of EU institutions by the German Federal Construc-
tional Court. In  response the  German Constitutional Court75 as well as other 
constitutional courts of the Member States76 accepted the autonomy and prima-
cy of  EU law, yet, not unconditionally. They determined red lines preserving 
their own position and  supremacy of  national constitutions in  court-to-court 
relation with the CJEU.77 
Despite the fact that the CEE constitutional courts enter into the dialogue with 
the CJEU at a specific stage of development of EU law and in the situation when 
constitutional courts of the ‘old’ Union had already established their relations with 
the CJEU, they not only build up their own, constitutionally based approaches, but 
also actively participate in further developments at the EU level. When doing so, 
72 26/62 NV Algemene Transport – en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos (CJEU, 5 Febru-
ary 1963). 
73 6/64 Costa v ENEL (CJEU, 15 July 1965).
74 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH (CJEU, 17 December 1970). 
75 See: direct answer in  Internationale Handesgesellschaft GmbH (Solange I) BvL 52/71 (Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court, 29 May 1974) and  its development in  Re Wünsche Han-
delsgesellchaft (Solange II) 2 BvR 197/83 (German Federal Constitutional Court, 22 October 
1986); Brunner v the European Union Treaty (German Federal Constitutional Court, 12 Octo-
ber 2013). 
76 See: Frontini v  Ministero delle Finanze 183/73 (Italian Constitutional Court, 27 December 
1973); S.p.a. Granital v  Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato 170 (Italian Constitution-
al Court, 8 June 1984); Administration des Douanes v Societe ‘Cafes Jacques Vebre’ et SARL 
Wiegel et Cie (8 January 1971).
77 See more: M. Claes, The National Courts Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publish-
ing 2006). 
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they refer to experiences of other courts, however, within the framework of  the 
national CEE constitutions. 
Specific constitutional determinants have been affecting the position of CEE 
constitutional courts towards EU law. First, the strong sovereignty concerns must 
be taken into account as the challenge for constitutional courts to explain preser-
vation of (newly recovered) independence with the process of the European inte-
gration. Secondly, the constitutional courts of new democracies had to build up 
their own position in the system.78 The two factors are clearly visible in the juris-
prudence of all the courts subject to our analysis. 
The Czech Constitutional Court in  the first significant case concerning EU 
law, Sugar Quotas III,79 based its legal argumentation on distinction of EU Trea-
ties form other international agreements on the  basis of  Art.  10a of  the Czech 
Constitution authorising delegation of state powers on international organisation. 
The Court held that 
[d]irect applicability in national law and applicational precedence of a regulation follows 
from Community law doctrine itself, as it has emerged from the case law of  the ECJ. If 
membership in  the EC brings with it a  certain limitation on the  powers of  the nation-
al organs in  favour of  Community organs, one of  the manifestations of  such limitation 
must necessarily also be a restriction on Member States’ freedom to determine the effect 
of Community law in their national legal orders. Art. 10a of the Constitution of the Czech 
Republic thus operates in  both directions: it forms the  normative basis for the  transfer 
of powers and is simultaneously that provision of the Czech Constitution which opens up 
the national legal order to the operation of Community law, including rules relating to its 
effects within the legal order of the Czech Republic. The Constitutional Court is of the view 
that – as concerns the operation of Community law in the national law – such approach 
must be adopted as would not permanently fix doctrine as to the effects of Community 
law in  the national legal order. A different approach would, after all, not correspond to 
the fact that the very doctrine of the effects that Community acts call forth in national law 
has gone through and  is still undergoing a dynamic development. This conception also 
best ensures that which was already mentioned, that is, the conditionality of the transfer 
of certain powers.
The Czech Constitutional Court turned out to be the most open among dis-
cussed courts. The reasoning seems to reflect a pluralistic approach since the Court 
recognised not only the autonomy of EU law in terms of its adoption and validity 
but also found a legal basis for its applicability in the Czech Republic. The Con-
stitutional Court found that since the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, 
78 Cf. W. Sadurski, ‘“Solange, chapter 3”: Constitutional Courts in Central Europe – Democracy 
– European Union’ (2006) 40 EUI Working Paper LAW. 
79 Case Pl. ÚS 50/04 (Czech Constitutional Court, 8 March 2006). Cf. A. Albi, ‘Supremacy of EC 
Law in new Member States. Bringing Parliaments into the Equation of “Cooperative Constitu-
tionalism”’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review, p. 25.
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a substantive change in the Czech constitutional order took place, and in conse-
quence it is obliged to “interpret Czech constitutional law in  the context of  the 
principles of the Community [EU] law.”80 
The Court reviewed regulation on sugar quotas under national constitutional 
law, however, interpreted it in light of general principles of Union law as defined 
in the CJEU’s case law. In subsequent decision Arrest Warrant81 it did so in exten-
sive manner and interpreted the Czech Constitution in the light of the EU frame-
work decision. The Court based its decision on Art. 1(2) of the Constitution of the 
Czech Republic in  connection with the  principle of  sincere cooperation (now 
Art. 4(3) TEU, former Art. 10 TEEC) and formulated a constitutional principle,82 
according to which 
the domestic legal enactments, including the constitution, should be interpreted in con-
formity with the principles of European integration and cooperation between Commu-
nity and Member State organs. If the Constitution, of which the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and  Basic Freedoms forms a  part, can be interpreted in  several manners, only 
certain of which lead to the attainment of an obligation which the Czech Republic un-
dertook in  connection with its membership in  the EU, then an interpretation must be 
selected which supports carrying out of that obligation, and not an interpretation which 
precludes it.83
However, already in  Sugar Quotas III, the  Czech Constitutional Court ex-
pressed certain reservations in  relation to the  CJEU’s doctrine of  precedence 
of Union law over national constitutional law. The Court did so with reference 
to the  case law of  other European courts. It  indicated decisions of  the Italian 
Constitutional Court,84 the German Federal Constitutional Court,85 the Supreme 
Court of  Ireland,86 the Supreme Court of Denmark87 and  found that “all above 
80 The Czech Constitutional Court found that “[a]lthough the Constitutional Court’s referential 
framework has remained, even after 1 May 2004, the norms of the Czech Republic’s consti-
tutional order, the Constitutional Court cannot entirely overlook the impact of Community 
law on the formation, application, and interpretation of national law, all the more so in a field 
of law where the creation, operation, and aim of its provisions is immediately bound up with 
Community law. In other words, in this field the Constitutional Court interprets constitution-
al law taking into account the principles arising from Community law”, para. VI.A.
81 European Arrest Warrant Pl. ÚS 66/04 (Czech Constitutional Court, 3 May 2006).
82 See: K. Wójtowicz, Constitutional Courts and European Union Law (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 
2014) 87.
83 Para. VIII.61.
84 Frontini v  Ministero delle Finanze 183/73 (27 December 1973) and  Fragd v  Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato 232/1989 (Italian Constitutional Court, 21 April 1989).
85 Re Wünsche Handelsgesellchaft (Solange II) 2 BvR 197/83 (n. 76); Brunner v the European Un-
ion Treaty 2 BvR 2134 and 2159/92 (12 October 1993).
86 Society for the  Protection of  Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v  Grogan (Irish Supreme Court, 
19 December 1989) and Attorney General v X (Irish Supreme Court, 5 March 1992).
87 Carlsen and Others v Rasmussen I-361/1997 (Danish Supreme Court, 6 April 1998).
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courts have never entirely acquiesced in the doctrine of the absolute precedence 
of Community law over the entirety of constitutional law but they retained a cer-
tain reservation to interpret principles such as the  democratic law-based state 
and the protection of fundamental rights.”88 The Court noticed the significance 
of  judicial dialogue in  that regard for the  development of  EU law. Elaborating 
its own position towards Union law, the Court based its findings on the concept 
of conditional conferral of powers under the Czech Constitution and held that 
this conditionality is  manifested in  the formal plane concerning the  power at-
tribute of state sovereignty itself, and the substantive component of the exercise 
of state powers. Consequently conferral has its limits and may persist as long as 
delegated powers are exercised in a manner that is compatible with the preserva-
tion of the foundations of state sovereignty of the Czech Republic, and in a man-
ner which does not threaten the very essence of the substantive democratic state 
based on the rule of law.89 
In subsequent judgements the  Czech Constitutional Court became even 
more protective as regards its own position toward EU law. In Treaty of Lisbon I90 
the Constitutional Court held that it possesses a power to review whether any act 
adopted by Union bodies exceeded the powers that the Czech Republic transferred 
to the EU pursuant to Art. 10a of the Constitution. However, the Constitutional 
Court assumed that such review would be possible in exceptional cases such as 
in particular, “abandoning the identity of values and exceeding of the scope of con-
ferred competences.”91 The Court further explained that
the supreme protector of  Czech constitutionality, including against possible excesses by 
Union bodies or European law. […] If European bodies interpreted or developed EU law 
in a manner that would jeopardize the foundations of materially understood constitutionality 
88 Para. VI.A.
89 “Constitutional Court’s view, this conferral of a part of its powers is naturally a conditional 
conferral, as the original bearer of sovereignty, as well as the powers flowing therefrom, still 
remains the  Czech Republic, whose sovereignty is  still founded upon Art.  1(1) of  the Con-
stitution of  the Czech Republic. In  the Constitutional Court’s view, the  conditional nature 
of the delegation of these powers is manifested on two planes: the formal and the substan-
tive plane. The first of these planes concerns the power attributes of state sovereignty itself, 
the second plane concerns the substantive component of the exercise of state power. In oth-
er words, the delegation of a part of the powers of national organs may persist only so long as 
these powers are exercised in a manner that is compatible with the preservation of the foun-
dations of state sovereignty of the Czech Republic, and in a manner which does not threaten 
the very essence of the substantive law-based state. In such determination the Constitution-
al Court is called upon to protect constitutionalism (Art. 83 of the Constitution of the Czech 
Republic). According to Art. 9(2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the essential at-
tributes of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, remain beyond the reach of the 
Constituent Assembly itself.” Case Pl. ÚS 50/04 (n. 80), para. VI.A-3.
90 Lisbon Treaty I Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Czech Constitutional Court, 26 November 2008) repeated in Lis-
bon Treaty II Pl. ÚS 29/09 (Czech Constitutional Court, 12 June 2010). 
91 See: para. 120 Lisbon Treaty I Pl. ÚS 19/08. 
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and the essential requirements of a democratic, law-based state that are, under the Constitu-
tion of the Czech Republic, seen as inviolable (Art. 9(2) of the Constitution) such legal acts 
could not be binding in the Czech Republic.92 
This statement constitutes proclamation of constitutional identity clause con-
ceived of as a red line demarcating the influence of the EU constitutional order 
on the  Czech system. It  was repeated and  applied by the  Czech Constitutional 
Court in the most controversial Slovak Pensions decision (discussed in point III.4), 
in which the Czech Constitutional Court adopted a dualistic rather than a plural-
istic approach towards EU law.
The above described position of  the Czech Constitutional Court shows, 
that the initial Euro-enthusiasm and openness to EU law has been replaced by 
a more preservative attitude, however, there are examples of judgments in which 
the Czech Constitutional Court in the course of examination of constitutional-
ity of national implementing measures shaped constitutional standard follow-
ing the doctrine established by the CJEU.93 Although the Czech Constitution-
al Court accepted exclusive jurisdiction of  the CJEU as to the  interpretation 
and the control of validity of Union law,94 it was quite sceptic towards its own 
classification as a court or tribunal in the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. At the same 
time, the Czech Constitutional Court instructed other courts on the obligation 
to refer to the CJEU for interpretation of EU law95 and inspired by the German 
92 See: para. 215 Lisbon Treaty I Pl. ÚS 19/08. 
93 Case Pl. ÚS 36/05 (Czech Constitutional Court, 16 January 2007) the  Constitutional Court 
inferred, on the basis of case law of the CJEU cases: C-229/00 Commission v Finland (12 June 
2003), and C-424/99 Commission v Austria (27 November 2001), that interference with the right 
to fair process was also involved in the case on hand. “The way in which the European Court 
of Justice construes the principles corresponding to the fundamental rights and freedoms 
necessarily has repercussions when domestic law and  its conformity with constitutionally 
protected rights are construed. Art. 1 of the Charter bestows special protection upon funda-
mental rights. If then that Court concluded that the decision on the inclusion of medicinal 
preparations into the  list of  medications covered by public health insurance funds results 
in  an interference with the  rights of  their producers and  distributors and, for that reason, 
it is necessary to see to it that the principles of fair process are consistently observed, then 
the  Constitutional Court must take this line of  argument into account when interpreting 
Art. 36(1) or (2) of the Charter”, paras 40–41 of the judgment. 
94 “The Constitutional Court held that it is not competent to assess the validity of Community 
law norms. Such questions fall within the exclusive competence of the European Court of Jus-
tice. In terms of Community law as it has been expounded by the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter ‘ECJ’), Community law norms enjoy application precedence over the legal order 
of Member States of the EC. According to the case law of the ECJ, where a matter is regulated 
solely by EU law, it takes precedence and cannot be contested by means of referential criteria 
laid down by national law, not even on the constitutional level.”
95 See Czech Constitutional Court cases: III. ÚS 2738/07 (24 July 2008); I. ÚS 2553/07 (15 Febru-
ary 2010).
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Constitutional Court96 recognised failure of this obligation as a violation of the 
right to a fair trial.97 In the subsequent judgment, in order to strengthen the argu-
mentation, the Court referred to the decision of the ECtHR in Ullens de Schooten 
et Rezabek v Belgium98 in which the Strasbourg Court found that Art. 6(1) ECHR 
places national courts under the obligation to provide rationale for any decision 
by which they refuse to submit a preliminary query. It means that in any case 
a refusal must be duly reasoned.99 The last decision illustrates not only the extent 
of judicial dialogue on EU law in the Czech Republic but also the cross-fertiliza-
tion of different legal systems, both European (international) and national, with 
regard to performance of obligations stemming from Treaties, on which the Eu-
ropean Union is founded. 
Whilst the Czech Constitutional Court’s attitude towards EU law may be de-
scribed as enthusiastic but cautious, the attitude of the Hungarian Constitution-
al Court towards EU law and the CJEU is not clear. The tactics of the Constitu-
tional Court is to avoid confrontation. Shortly after the accession of Hungary to 
the EU the Constitutional Court examined the case concerning constitutionality 
of national legislation implementing EU regulations in the light of the principle 
of  legal certainty.100 The  Court refused to consider the  case as based on Union 
law since it recognised that the EU regulations in question specified obligations 
for the new Member States rather than for their citizens, and that the provisions 
of the challenged national law did not qualify as a translation or publication of the 
regulations of the Union, as they implemented the aims of the regulations by using 
the means of Hungarian law. The recognition of the case as a purely internal one 
gave rise to the controversial outcome: the principle of legal certainty as a compo-
nent of the democratic State prevailed over Hungary’s obligations stemming from 
its participation in the European Union.101 
In subsequent decisions the Hungarian Constitutional Court developed a doc-
trine, according to which EU treaties and their amending treaties are not interna-
tional treaties from the perspective of jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.102 
The Constitutional Court found that “these treaties are primary sources of Com-
96 The Czech Constitutional Court referred to case BvR 2419/06 (German Federal Constitutional 
Court, 6 May 2008).
97 Case II. ÚS 1009/08 (Czech Constitutional Court, 8 January 2009).
98 Ullens de Schooten et Rezabek v Belgium, App. nos 3989/07 and 38353/07 (ECHR, 20 Septem-
ber 2011).
99 See: case II. US 1685/11 (Czech Constitutional Court, 30 November 2011), para. 18 quotation 
after Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, National Report XVIth Congress of the Con-
ference of European Constitutional Courts “Cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe 
– Current Situation and Perspectives” (25 September 2013) (English version of the judgment 
unavailable).
100 Case 17/2004 (V. 25.) AB IV. 1. (Hungarian Constitutional Court).
101 Cf. W. Sadurski (n. 79), p. 15.
102 See inter alia: 053/E/2005, 72/2006 (XII. 15.), 32/2008 (III. 12.), 61/2008 (IV. 29.), 76/2008 
(V. 29.), 61/B/2005, 281/B/2007.
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munity law and  the directives are  secondary sources of  Community law. They 
form part of  the national legislation, since Hungary is  the Member State of  the 
EU”103 and  that “despite its international law origin the Community legal order 
is a sui generis legal order.”104 Thus the Constitutional Court consequently recog-
nises that Union law lays outside its jurisdiction. However, it recognised its own 
jurisdiction in the proceeding aiming at an a priori constitutional review of an in-
ternational treaty. It means that in opinion of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
amending treaties before the entry into force have in Hungary the status of a con-
cluded international agreement. Once the treaties enter into force, they become 
a part of an autonomous legal order and, as such, a part of the Hungarian law.105 
That’s how the Hungarian Constitutional Court determined its own relation with 
the CJEU in Lisbon Treaty.106 The Court confirmed that “the authentic interpre-
tation of the EU treaties and other EU-norms falls under the competence of the 
European Court of Justice.” As a consequence, it recognised also its own obligation 
under Art. 267 TFEU to refer to the CJEU preliminary questions concerning EU 
law. However, in this particular case, with regard to the interpretation of current 
Art. 50 TEU, the Hungarian Court applied acte clair doctrine as formulated by 
the CJEU and found that the wording of the provision makes it clear that no state 
can be obliged to uphold its membership in  the European Union, if it does not 
want to do so. This reasoning was used by the Constitutional Court as a confirma-
tion of the fact that the membership in the EU does not influence the sovereignty 
of the state. 
In Lisbon Treaty the Hungarian Constitutional Court, inspired by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, also signalled an intention to perform an a  prio-
ri control of constitutionality of amending European treaties only in exceptional 
cases and recognised own jurisdiction to conduct ultra vires review with respect 
to the protection of the limits of the powers conferred by Hungary upon the EU as 
well as constitutional identity.107 Such approach has been confirmed by the Court 
in the judgment concerning fiscal compact.108
The Polish Constitutional Court accepted supremacy of EU law and position 
of  the CJEU already in  Accession Treaty.109 The  Court recognised autonomous 
103 Case 1053/E/2005 (Hungarian Constitutional Court). 
104 See: case 87/2008 (VI. 18.) AB (Hungarian Constitutional Court).
105 Case 32/2008 (III. 12.) (Hungarian Constitutional Court).
106 Decision 143/2010 (VII. 14.) AB (Hungarian Constitutional Court) on the  constitutionality 
of  the Act of  promulgation of  the Lisbon Treaty (Hungarian Constitutional Court, 12 July 
2010). Press release: <http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0143_2010.pdf> (access: between 
March 2014 and May 2016).
107 A.F. Tatham, ‘“Keeping Faith” The  Trials and  Tribulations of  the Hungarian Constitution-
al Court in Following its European Vocation’, [in:] M. Bobek (ed.), Central European Judges 
Under the European Influence. The Transformative Power of the EU Revisited (Hart Publishing 
2015), p. 349.
108 22/12 (V. 11.) AB.
109 Case K 18/04 (Polish Constitutional Court, 11 May 2006), para. III.2.2.
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Union legal order, as a part of international legal order based on Polish internal 
hierarchical principles, as an element of Polish legal order. According to the Court 
the concept and model of European law created a new situation, wherein, within each Mem-
ber State, autonomous legal orders co-exist and are simultaneously operative. Their interac-
tion may not be completely described by the traditional concepts of monism and dualism 
regarding the relationship between domestic law and international law. The existence of the 
relative autonomy of both, national and Community, legal orders in no way signifies an ab-
sence of interaction between them.110
The Court noticed that a potential possibility of a collision between regula-
tions of Union law and the Constitution is not excluded. However, in most cases 
such collision may be resolved by a ‘sympathetic to European law’ interpreta-
tion of domestic law (including the Constitution).111 In the same case the Polish 
Constitutional Court established limits of the principle of interpretation of do-
mestic law in a manner ‘sympathetic to European law’ and stressed that in no 
event may it lead to results contradicting the explicit wording of constitutional 
norms or being irreconcilable with the  minimum guarantees included in  the 
Constitution. In particular, the norms of the Constitution within the field of in-
dividual rights and freedoms indicate a minimum and unsurpassable threshold, 
which may not be lowered or questioned as a result of the introduction of Com-
munity provisions. 
The above-described limitations were applied by the Court already in Arrest 
Warrant I112 rendered few weeks before the Accession Treaty. The Constitutional 
Court noticed the obligation to assume an interpretation of national provisions 
consistent with Union law but decided that in case of obvious constitutional ban 
of extradition of Polish citizens, such interpretation is impossible. However, in the 
same case the  Court used the  possibility to maintain the  legally binding force 
of unconstitutional provisions. The Court justified such decision by Art. 9 of the 
Constitution, according to which the Republic of Poland respects international law 
binding upon it. The Court found that this provision 
is not only a grandiose declaration addressed to the international community, but also an 
obligation of state bodies, including the government, the parliament and the courts, to ob-
serve international law, which is binding for the Republic of Poland. Apart from introduc-
ing appropriate changes in  the national legal order, the  implementation of  this obligation 
110 See: para. III.6.2. 
111 See also: case Kp 3/08 (Polish Constitutional Court, 18 February 2009) concerning prelimi-
nary ruling procedure in the third pillar of the EU, para. III.4.2, European Arrest Warrant II SK 
26/08 (Polish Constitutional Court, 5 October 2010), para. III.2.4, and Lisbon Treaty K 32/09 
(Polish Constitutional Court, 24 November 2010), para. III.3.2.
112 Case P 1/05 (Polish Constitutional Court, Court 27 April 2005).
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may require the public administration bodies to undertake specific actions within the scope 
of their assigned competencies.113 
As a result, in the specific case addressed to the Constitutional Court and in 
pending and  future cases before Polish courts, during the  time of  maintenance 
of legal force of an unconstitutional provision, the Constitutional Court granted 
priority to obligation to surrender stemming from the Framework Decision, be-
fore a constitutional ban of extradition of Polish nationals.114 This concession was 
granted, however, on the basis of the Constitution of Poland. 
The Court noticed also that an irreconcilable inconsistency between a con-
stitutional norm and a norm of Union law is possible. In such case a contradic-
tion could not be eliminated through an interpretation, which would respect 
the mutual autonomy of European and national laws. According to Polish Con-
stitutional Court 
such a collision may in no event be resolved by assuming the supremacy of a Community 
norm over a  constitutional norm. Furthermore, it may not lead to the  situation whereby 
a constitutional norm loses its binding force and is substituted by a Community norm, nor 
may it lead to an application of the constitutional norm restricted to areas beyond the scope 
of Community law regulation. In such an event the Nation as the sovereign, or a State au-
thority organ authorised by the Constitution to represent the Nation, would need to decide 
on: amending the Constitution; or causing modifications within Community provisions; or, 
ultimately, on Poland’s withdrawal from the European Union.115 
In Accession Treaty the Constitutional Court also answered the question on 
its relation with the CJEU. The Court did not support the applicants’ submis-
sions as regards the  alleged inconsistency between the  scope of  competence 
of the CJEU, as defined by the Treaties and the principle of sovereignty of Po-
land, the supremacy of its Constitution in the Polish legal system and the spe-
cific legal status of the Constitutional Court. According to the Court, the CJEU 
is an authorised guard of the correct understanding of the Treaties, but it is not 
the only one. The interpretation of Union law delivered by the CJEU should be 
113 See: para. III.5.5 of the judgment P 1/05.
114 See more: K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, ‘Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal, p. 1355. According to 
M. Safjan, “in this judgement an ideal balance between on the one hand, the requirements 
stemming from the clear constitutional rule which forbade extradition of Polish citizen and, 
on the  other hand, the  requirements of  the European framework decision on EAW, was 
struck” so in consequence two goals were achieved – preservation of supremacy of the Con-
stitution and effectiveness of Union law. See: M. Safjan, ‘Central & Eastern European Consti-
tutional Courts Facing New Challenges – Ten Years of Experience’, [in:] M. Bobek (ed.), Central 
European Judges Under the European Influence. The Transformative Power of the EU Revisited 
(Hart Publishing 2015) 375.
115 See: para. III.6.3 of the judgment K 18/04.
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performed within the scope of competence and functions conferred thereupon 
by the Member States and should respect the principle of mutual loyalty of Un-
ion and Member States authorities.116 The above statement reflects a pluralistic 
expectation of mutual trust and understanding in the course of conducting a di-
alogue. The Polish Constitutional Court thus intentionally entered into a heter-
archical cooperative relation with the CJEU. The above attitude was confirmed 
in  the subsequent judgements117 and  supplemented by the  refusal to examine 
the conformity of Polish law with Union law. According to the Constitutional 
Court, in line with Art. 91 of the Constitution, it is for ordinary courts to decide 
on the inapplicability of a conflicting provision, if necessary, in cooperation with 
the  CJEU in  the preliminary ruling procedure.118 At the  same time, the  Con-
stitutional Court recognized its own jurisdiction to examine constitutionality 
of  Union ‘normative acts’, and, in  particular, regulations.119 The  Court clearly 
distinguished the  control of  constitutionality of  any normative act applicable 
within the Polish legal system from the examination of validity of acts of EU in-
stitutions performed exclusively by the CJEU. It must be noticed that the reason-
ing of the Polish Court in crucial aspects of the case was based on the case law 
of the CJEU examining the conformity of the Regulation with the right of a fair 
trial. In part it was based on case law of the ECtHR, presuming axiological con-
vergence between constitutional traditions of  Member States of  the European 
Union, the  European Convention on Human Rights and  the Charter of  Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union.120 Importantly, after a careful analysis 
116 K. Wójtowicz (n. 83), p. 90.
117 Polish Constitutional Court cases: Kp 3/08 (18 February 2009), K 32/09 (n. 112), SK 45/09 (No-
vember 2011) and K 33/12 (23 June 2013).
118 See: case P 37/05 (Polish Constitutional Court, 19 December 2006).
119 According to Art.  79(1) of  the Polish Constitution, a  constitutional complaint may be sub-
mitted to the  Constitutional Court for it to determine “the conformity to the  Constitution 
of a statute or another normative act”, upon which basis a court or organ of public adminis-
tration has made a final decision on a complainant’s freedoms or rights or on his/her obli-
gations specified in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court determined that regulations 
defined in  Art.  188 TFEU as interpreted by the  CJEU are  ‘another normative acts’ within 
the meaning of Art. 79(1) of the Constitution. See: paras III.1.2-III.1.5.
120 The Constitutional Court stated that “[t]he extensive catalogue of rights, freedoms and prin-
ciples included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights stems, to a large extent, from the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the par-
ties to the  Convention also include the  Republic of  Poland. Pursuant to Art.  52(3) and  (4) 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in so far as this Charter contains rights which corre-
spond to rights guaranteed by the Convention, the meaning and scope of those rights shall 
be the  same as those laid down by the  said Convention. This provision shall not prevent 
Union law providing more extensive protection. In so far as this Charter recognises funda-
mental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions. By contrast, on the basis 
of Art. 53 of the Charter, nothing in the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields 
of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which 
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of conformity of  the regulation in question with the right to a  fair trial as es-
tablished in both Polish and Union legal orders121 the Court declared that since 
there is no doubt as to the conformity of the challenged Regulation with the EU 
primary law, taking into account the Foto-Frost doctrine,122 there was no need to 
refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.123 This statement clearly 
indicates that in case of a doubt concerning the validity of a regulation the Court 
will refer the preliminary question to the CJEU in the future. It must be stressed 
that in  contrast to the Czech or the German Constitutional Court,124 the Pol-
ish Constitutional Court does examine exclusively normative acts, and  does 
not possess jurisdiction to control constitutionality of acts of application of law. 
It means that the Polish Constitutional Court is not entitled under Polish law to 
control constitutionality of the CJEU’s judgements.125 The recognition of its own 
jurisdiction to control constitutionality of  normative Union acts was the  only 
one possibility for the Court to preserve its own position of the guardian of the 
Constitution in the field of EU law.
In Lisbon treaty the Polish Constitutional Court also formulated for the  first 
time the  concept of  constitutional identity as the boundary for inclusion of  in-
ternational law and obligations streaming from it into constitutional order of the 
State. When doing so, the Court analysed decisions of the courts of other Mem-
ber States concerning Lisbon Treaty,126 and noticed that although they varied due 
to different constitutional requirements of  admissibility as regards challenging 
the Treaty, the constitutional courts share the position that the view that 
the constitution is of fundamental significance as it reflects and guarantees the state’s sover-
eignty at the present stage of European integration, and also that the constitutional judiciary 
plays a unique role as regards the protection of constitutional identity of the Member States, 
which at the same time determines the treaty identity of the European Union.127 
the Union or all the Member States are party, including the Convention, and by the Member 
States’ constitutions.”
121 See: para. 6.4 of the judgment. 
122 FotoFrost C-314/85 (CJEU, 22 October 1987).
123 Para. III.8.1. 
124 The court invoked judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany to confirm ex-
ceptional nature of the control of constitutionality of acts of EU institutions. 
125 It must be reminded that Solange doctrine concerns this kind of control of constitutionality 
see also Honeywell (Mangold) 2 BvR 2661/06 (German Federal Constitutional Court, 6 July 
2010).
126 The  Constitutional Court referred to cases: 143/2010 (Hungarian Constitutional Court); 
2007–560 DC (French Constitutional Council, 20 December 2007); 2 BvE 2/08 (German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court, 30 June 2009); Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Czech Constitutional Court) (n. 91); 
2008-35-01 (Latvian Constitutional Court, 7 April 2009), paras III.3.2-III.3.7.
127 The  Court indicated that the  position constitutes part of  “European constitutional tradi-
tions”, para. III.3.8. 
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The Constitutional Court thus placed constitutional identity as an inherent 
element of a pluralistic constitutional constellation. Declaring that the common 
position described above constitutes “a vital part of European constitutional tra-
ditions”, it suggested that constitutional identity should be treated as the  main 
point of reference in relations between constitutional orders of the Member States 
and the constitutional order of the EU. 
The Lithuanian Constitutional Court based its approach towards EU law on 
paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Act on Membership of the Republic of Lithua-
nia in the European Union, according to which the norms of the European Union 
law shall be a constituent part of  the legal system of  the Republic of Lithuania. 
Whenever this provision concerns the founding Treaties of the European Union, 
the norms of the European Union law shall be applied directly. In an event of a col-
lision of  legal norms, European Union law shall have supremacy over the  laws 
and other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania. According to the Constitutional 
Court, the above provision constitutes a collision clause for all EU law. However, 
the Court made a reservation as to the relation between EU law and the Lithuanian 
law.128 The Constitutional Court stressed that “the constitution also consolidates 
the principle that in cases where a national legal act (save the Constitution itself, 
it goes without saying) establishes a legal regulation conflicting with the legal reg-
ulation set down in an international treaty, the international treaty should be ap-
plied.”129 As the result, the Court recognised that “the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
as a source of construction of law is also important to construction and application 
of Lithuanian law.”130 
Potentially, an important element of  cooperation between constitutional 
courts and the CJEU should be a preliminary reference procedure.131 Without 
entering into a deep discussion as to what constitutes this procedure and what 
is  its role in  judicial dialogue, it must be noted that the  CEE constitution-
al courts, similarly to their counterparts form other Member States, avoid 
a  direct dialogue with the  CJEU, however, duly consider the  case law of  the 
CJEU.132 The  Lithuanian Constitutional Court made the  first preliminary 
128 Case 17/02-24/02-06/03-22/04 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 14 March 2006).
129 Case 13/2010-140/2010 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 22 December 2011). 
130 Lithuanian Constitutional Court cases: 30/03 (21 December 2006); 47/04 (4 December 2008) 
on the Compliance of paragraph 2 of Art. 15 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Electricity 
(wording of 1 July 2004) with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 33/06 (27 March 
2009) on the Law on Trade Marks 7/04–8/04 (27 March 2009) on state secrets and official se-
crets, para. 15. 
131 More about preliminary ruling procedure and judicial dialogue in CEE see: Czaplińska in this 
volume; T. de la Mare, C. Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution 
and Stasis’, [in:] P. Craig, G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 
2011), p. 363.
132 Cf. G. Martinico, ‘Judging in the Multilateral Legal Order: Exploring the Techniques of “Hidden 
Dialogue”’ (2010) 21 King’s Law Journal, p. 257.
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reference to the CJEU133 in 2007. The Czech and the Hungarian Constitutional 
Courts, although recognized themselves as ‘courts’ in the meaning of Art. 267 
TFEU, constantly avoid to use the preliminary ruling procedure.134 The Polish 
Constitutional Court after a long time and a number of declarations135 finally 
decided to ask the Luxemburg Court to decide on validity of the Union direc-
tive in 2015.136
3.1.3. The Dialogue with Other International Courts
The judicial dialogue of the CEE constitutional courts with other international 
courts concerns mainly human rights protection and  so involves references to 
decisions of  the International Commission of  Human Rights (rare and  mainly 
supporting the  adopted reasoning).137 Only exceptionally, the  Czech Constitu-
tional Court dissented from decisions of  the Human Rights Committee.138 De-
cisions of other international courts are rarely invoked by constitutional courts, 
since, due to the scope of their jurisdiction, they do not apply often international 
law. The most experienced in this field are the Russian and the Ukrainian Con-
stitutional Courts, however, although their decisions are  broadly reasoned by 
international acts (both political and legal) there is no reference to the case law 
of  international courts.139 The practice of  the Polish Constitutional Court does 
133 Case 47/04 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 8 May 2007) on the  application to the  Court 
of Justice of European Communities for a preliminary ruling. 
134 See: case Pl. ÚS 154/08 (Czech Constitutional Court, 30 June 2008). 
135 See especially: case SK 45/09 (n. 118). See: detailed analysis K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, ‘Sending 
Smoke Signals to Luxembourg – the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in Dialogue with ECJ’, [in:] 
M. Claes, M. de Visser, P. Popelier, C. Van de Heyning (eds), Constitutional Conversation in Eu-
rope. Actors, Topics and Procedures (Intersentia Publishing Ltd. 2012), p. 131.
136 Case K 61/13 (Polish Constitutional Court, 7 July 2015).
137 See i.a.: Pl. ÚS 37/04 (Czech Constitutional Court, 26 April 2006); 2/2014 (Lithuanian Constitu-
tional Court, 4 November 2015); 10/2015 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 20 October 2015); 
P 29/09 (Polish Constitutional Court, 18 November 2010); 12-П/2016 (Russian constitutional 
Court, 19 April 2016).
138 See: Pl. ÚS 33/96 (Czech Constitutional Court, 4 June 1997); Pl. ÚS 45/97 (Czech Constitu-
tional Court, 25 March 1998); Pl. ÚS 15/02 (Czech Constitutional Court, 21 January 2003) dis-
cussed by Wyrozumska.
139 See especially last cases concerning Crimea: 6-П/2014 (Russian Constitutional Court, 
19 March 2014); 2-rp/2014 (Ukrainian Constitutional Court, 14 March 2014). What is sig-
nificant there is  obvious contradiction between findings of  both courts resulting from 
different interpretation of  the general principles of  international law, namely right to 
self-determination of people and territorial integrity of state. In case of the Russian con-
stitutional Court it must be noticed that after amendment of the Constitution of the Rus-
sian Federation also its interpretation of general international law was changed in regard 
to relation between above-mentioned principles of  international law. See decision on 
unconstitutionality of  proposed referendum on independence in  Tatarstan of  1993 dis-
cussed by G.  Danilenko, ‘Implementation of  International Law in  Russia and  Other CIS 
States’ (1998) <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/danilenk.pdf> (access: between 
March 2014 and May 2016). 
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not include judicial dialogue on international law with other international courts. 
The Czech Republic invocation of the International Court of Justice’s Nottebohm140 
to establish significance of international law in regard to recognition of citizen-
ship141 must be noticed. The practice of Lithuanian and Hungarian constitutional 
courts delivers interesting examples of judicial dialogue with international courts 
on international law. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court in the decision of 2003142 denied to accept 
the  judgments of  the ICJ as a  source of constitutional obligation for Hungarian 
authorities. The  case originated in  the ICJ decision in  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros.143 
A member of the Hungarian Parliament submitted a constitutional complaint on 
the  legislative omission through failure of  implementation of  the ICJ decision. 
The Constitutional Court held that the judgment of the ICJ cannot be considered 
as “a generally recognized principle of international law” or compared to incorpo-
rated international treaties. The Court held that 
[e]ven though the proceedings of the International Court are based on the consent of the 
countries involved acknowledging the jurisdiction, as contained in an international treaty, 
the judgment is not a norm, not a contract, but the resolution of a specific dispute, even if 
some of its statements gain theoretical content or the value of a precedent. The International 
Court has no jurisdiction to annul an internal legal norm, to oblige the participating states to 
create law. The International Court cannot oblige the state to create law even if the state can 
only fulfil the obligation contained in the judgment by creating law.144 
As a consequence, the Court declared the lack of jurisdiction to decide about 
an obligation of  the Parliament or the  Government to enact internal law or to 
conclude a treaty. 
The position of the Hungarian Constitutional Court is coherently dualistic. We 
must observe at this point that the discussed approach to decisions of the ECtHR 
is based on recognition of the ECHR as an incorporated international agreement, 
which forms a part of the Hungarian legal order. The Constitutional Court recog-
nises legally the binding force of the Convention but not of the Strasbourg Court 
decisions, which are solely to be taken into account in the process of interpreta-
tion of  Hungarian law. The  dualistic approach made it impossible to recognise 
decisions of  international courts as sources of  obligations if such an obligation 
is not envisaged in incorporated international treaty. However, it does not mean 
that the case law of  international courts other than the ECtHR cannot be taken 
140 Nottebohm Lichtenstein v Guatemala (ICJ, 6 April 1955).
141 Case Pl. ÚS 9/94 (Czech Constitutional Court, 13 September 1994) on the State power to grant 
citizenship under international law.
142 Case 988/E/2000 (Hungarian Constitutional Court, 7 October 2003).
143 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v Slovakia (ICJ, 25 September 1997).
144 See: para. 3.3.
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into account by Hungarian courts in the process of interpretation and application 
of international law.145 
The most prominent example of  judicial dialogue in  application of  interna-
tional law is the decision of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court in Genocide.146 
The case concerned the constitutionality of the Lithuanian Criminal Code, which 
retroactively provide for a criminal liability for genocide. The claimants argued 
that the  Lithuanian law establishes a  broader corpus delicti of  genocide com-
pared to that provided for in the international treaties in force to which Lithuania 
is a party. Furthermore, the claimants sustained that the retroactive effect of the 
national law is contrary to nullum crimen sine lege principle. The Court began its 
reasoning from Art. 135(1) of the Constitution and confirmed its former finding 
that in line with this provision the Republic of Lithuania 
is obliged to follow the universally recognised principles and norms of  international law; 
the said provision consolidates the constitutional principle of respect for international law, 
i.e. the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which means the  imperative of  fulfilling in good 
faith the obligations assumed by the Republic of Lithuania under international law, inter alia, 
international treaties. 
The Court added that “the constitutional principle of pacta sunt servanda also 
means the imperative of fulfilling in good faith the international obligations arising 
from the universally recognised norms of international law (general international 
law) that prohibit international crimes.” It means that, in contrast to the Hungar-
ian Constitution, the Constitution of Lithuania incorporates whole internation-
al law including not only international treaties but also general principles of law 
and customary international law into the Lithuanian legal order.
In the next part of  the judgement the Court recognized prohibition of gen-
ocide and  other international crimes as jus cogens norms of  international law. 
When doing so the Court carefully analysed international acts and judicial de-
cisions. The  Court referred to case law of  the ICJ147 as well as to the  decision 
of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Kayishema and Ruzindana.148 
International case law was also broadly invoked to define the content of prohi-
bition of genocide as an international customary law rule. The Court started its 
145 Cf. N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós, ‘Judicial Dialogue or National Monologue? The International 
Law and Hungarian Courts’ (2013) 1 ELTE Law Journal, p. 26. 
146 Case 31/2011-40/2011-42/2011-46/2011-9/2012-25/2012 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 
18 March 2014).
147 The Court referred to Advisory Opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on Genocide (ICJ, 
28 May 1951); Armed activities on the territory of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v Rwanda (ICJ, 3 February 2006); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (ICJ, 26 Feb-
ruary 2007) and Jurisdictional Immunity of States Germany v Italy Greece intervening (3 Febru-
ary 2012).
148 ICTR-95-1-T Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR, 21 May 1999).
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analysis form the 1948 Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide as reflection of customary law and then carefully an-
alysed national law of several states,149 resolutions of the UN General Assembly, 
resolutions of the UN Security Council establishing international criminal courts 
and interpretation of genocide delivered by the ICJ in Application of the Conven-
tion against Genocide150 as well as the practice of international criminal courts151 
and concluded that 
under universally recognised norms of international law, states are under the obligation to 
adopt national legislation establishing liability for genocide. In the practice of the states con-
cerned, the said obligation may also be understood as certain discretion, while taking account 
of a concrete historical, political, social, and cultural context, to establish, in their national 
law, a broader definition of the crime of genocide than that established under the universally 
recognised norms of international law, inter alia, as the possibility of including, within the re-
spective national law, social and political groups in the definition of genocide.152 
As the  result, the  Constitutional Court adopted a  broad definition of  geno-
cide, shaped to cover crimes committed against Lithuanian residents recognized 
as political opponents during the period of the USSR totalitarian system.153 When 
149 The Court held that “it should be noted that, when defining genocide, besides the groups 
protected under the  Convention Against Genocide, the  national law of  more than twenty 
states additionally incorporates other groups in the respective lists of protected groups (inter 
alia, political groups and various social groups characterised on the basis of social status, 
age, sex, sexual orientation, etc.)”, para. 3.3.
150 See: para. 3.3.4 of the judgment.
151 See: para. 3. The  Constitutional Court invoked decisions of  ICTY: IT-95-10 The  Prosecutor 
v  Jelisić (14 December 1999). IT-98-33 The  Prosecutor v  Krstić (2 August 2001); IT-95-16-T 
The Prosecutor v Kupreškić and Others (14 January 2000); IT-03-66-T The Prosecutor v Limaj 
and Others (November 2005); IT-02-60-T The Prosecutor v Blagojević and Jokić (17 January 
2005) and  ICTR cases: ICTR-95-1-T Kayishema and  Ruzindana (21 May 1999); ICTR-96-4-T 
The Prosecutor v Akayesu (2 September 1998); ICTR-97-20 The Prosecutor v Semanza (15 May 
2003); ICTR-95-54A-T The Prosecutor v Kamuhanda (22 January 2004).
152 See: para. 3.7 of the judgment.
153 “Thus, with consideration of such an international and historical context, inter alia, the afore-
said ideology of the totalitarian communist regime of the USSR upon which the extermina-
tion of entire groups of people was grounded, the scale of repressions of the USSR against 
residents of the Republic of Lithuania, which was a part of the targeted policy of the exter-
mination of the basis of Lithuania’s political nation and of the targeted policy of the treat-
ment of Lithuanians as an ‘unreliable’ nation, the conclusion should be drawn that, during 
a certain period (in 1941, when mass deportations of Lithuanians to the Soviet Union began 
and non-judicial executions of detained persons were carried out, and in 1944–1953, when 
mass repressions were carried out during the guerrilla war against the occupation of the Re-
public of Lithuania), the crimes perpetrated by the Soviet occupation regime, in case of the 
proof of the existence of a special purpose aimed at destroying, in whole or in part, any na-
tional, ethnic, racial or religious group, might be assessed as genocide as defined according 
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doing so, the Court defined the Geneva Convention term ‘in part’154 as covering 
also a political or social group. Consequently the Court adjudicated positively on 
compatibility with the Lithuanian Constitution of Art. 99 of the Criminal Code, 
which stipulates that actions, aimed at physical destruction, in whole or in part, 
of persons belonging to any national, ethnic, racial, religious, and also social or 
political group.
When resolving the  question of  constitutionality of  retroactive application 
of  a  wider notion of  genocide enshrined in  national law, the  Court found that 
the  norm of  international law abolishing statutory limitations for prosecution 
and punishment of genocide concerns genocide as defined in  the 1948 Geneva 
Convention. However, States may establish abolition of such limitations with ref-
erence to other crimes. 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR considered these findings of the Constitu-
tional Court a mere year later in Vasiliauskas v Lithuania.155 The ECtHR accepted 
that the domestic authorities have discretion to interpret the definition of geno-
cide more broadly than that contained in 1948 Genocide Convention. However, 
such discretion does not permit domestic courts to convict persons accused under 
that broader definition retrospectively. According to the ECtHR, the current de-
velopment of interpretation of term ‘in part’ used in the Geneva Convention was 
unforeseeable in 1953 when the applicant killed Lithuanian partisans156 and thus 
his conviction was contrary to nullum crimen sine lege principle contained in Art. 7 
ECHR. It must be noted that the decision of the ECtHR was taken by 9 votes to 8, 
to the universally recognised norms of international law (inter alia, according to the Conven-
tion Against Genocide)”, para. 6.3.
154 “According to Article 1 of the Convention Against Genocide, genocide means any of the fol-
lowing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group.”
155 Vasiliauskas v  Lithuania, App. no. 35343/05 (ECtHR, 20 October 2015). The  case originated 
in  conviction for genocide of  member of  Soviet security services and  was involved in  the 
killings of Lithuanian partisans under Lithuanian law. The main question to be resolved by 
the ECtHR was conformity of retroactive Lithuanian law with Art. 7 of the Convention. 
156 The ECtHR found that “in 1953 there was no case law by any international tribunal to provide 
a judicial interpretation of the definition of genocide. […] The Court […] considers it reason-
able to find that in 1953 it was foreseeable that the term ‘in part’ contained a requirement as 
to substantiality. […] [H]owever, the Court is mindful of the subsequent development in the 
international case law on the crime of genocide. Half a century after the events for which 
the applicant was convicted, judicial guidance as to the interpretation of the phrase ‘in part’ 
emerged when cases concerning genocide were brought before the ICTY, ICTR and the ICJ. 
In particular […], the intentional destruction of a ‘distinct’ part of the protected group could 
be considered as genocide of  the entire protected group, provided that the  ‘distinct’ part 
was substantial because of the very large number of its members. Furthermore, in addition 
to the numerical size of the targeted part, judicial interpretation confirmed that its ‘prom-
inence’ within the protected group could also be a useful consideration. Be that as it may, 
this interpretation of the phrase ‘in part’ could not have been foreseen by the applicant at 
the relevant time”, para. 176.
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which proves that international definition of genocide is still a subject of interpre-
tative disagreements. Nevertheless, the decision of the Lithuanian Constitutional 
Court must be recognised as an important contribution to the development of in-
ternational law. 
The comparison of the Hungarian and Lithuanian approaches to international 
law also proves that constitutional openness, traditionally called as a monistic ap-
proach, and general incorporation of international law into domestic legal order 
creates favourable circumstances for judicial dialogue.
3.1.4. The Dialogue with Foreign National Courts
The judicial dialogue with foreign courts is deprived of any formal framework 
and is fully voluntary in nature and based on “a common substantive mission such 
as protection of human rights, at national, regional, or international level.”157 Com-
parative argument is thus based on presumption of universality of human rights.158 
Decisions of foreign courts do not constitute binding legal sources, and for that 
reason they are not invoked by the Ukrainian and Russian Constitutional Courts. 
The lack of comparative arguments does not mean that foreign practice and com-
parative methodology is  missing. In  the Russian Constitutional Court there 
is a special unit for study and generalization of a foreign constitutional practice, 
which, whenever it is necessary and usually upon request by a judge repporteur, 
prepares surveys on decisions of foreign constitutional control bodies.159 It means 
that comparative analysis is present yet appears hidden in the practice of the Rus-
sian Constitutional Court. 
The Czech, Hungarian, Lithuanian and Polish Constitutional Courts refer rou-
tinely to foreign national decisions. The  reference to foreign courts takes place 
especially in  ‘problematic’ cases, to draw inspiration for determination of dem-
ocratic standards and proper balance between human rights and other interests. 
Constitutional courts most frequently refer to decisions issued by the  Feder-
al Constitutional Court of Germany which is explained in academia by historic 
and legal cultural affinities, linguistic ability and intellectual stimulus, constitution 
and constitutional jurisdictional formation in the post-Communist era and result-
ing influences on courts’ judicial practice.160 However, references are also made to 
judgements of other national courts, including the CEE ones, especially in cases 
concerning common problems. 
157 As suggested by Anne-Marie Slaughter “[c]ourts may well feel a  particular common bond 
with one another in adjudicating human rights cases […] because such cases engage a core 
judicial function in many countries around the world.” A.-M. Slaughter (n. 35), p. 101. 
158 Ibidem, p. 107.
159 See: Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, National Report XVIth Congress (n. 72), 
p. 38.
160 A.F. Tatham, Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU Membership: The Influ-
ence of the German Model in Hungary and Poland. The Influence of the German Model in Hun-
gary and Poland (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013), p. 5.
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The comparative reasoning may be used to change internal doctrine on par-
ticular legal institution like in  the Czech example concerning the right to com-
pensation for unlawful detention.161 Czech courts have for a  long time rejected 
the  possibility that the  right covers also compensation for immaterial damage. 
The 2006 Constitutional Court’s judgment analyses the decisions of selected na-
tional European courts (Germany, Austria, Greece, Denmark, the  Netherlands) 
and the case law of the ECtHR relating to Art. 5(5) ECHR. It decided that: 
irrespective of  the manner in which the  issues of damages is approached by the domestic 
legislator, case law of the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court, and also the domes-
tic doctrine of civil law, it is necessary, in the area of domestic application of the European 
Convention, to proceed from the notion of damage in the way it is conceptualised by other 
European constitutional and supreme courts, in whose case law is rooted also the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights.162 
The approach of  the Czech Constitutional Court illustrates that the case law 
of foreign courts may be recognised as emanation of a universal or at least a Euro-
pean standard of protection of human rights. At the same time it illustrates inter-
connections between the mandatory dialogue (with the ECtHR) and a non-man-
datory one with foreign courts.163
Constitutional dialogue with international and foreign jurisdictions, especially 
if it results in law-creating argument requires at least a minimal level of familiarity 
with an invoked legal system. Judges can optimally and reasonably use solution 
adopted by others, only if they are able to justify such practice. Otherwise, the po-
sition taken can be questioned and, as a result, prove inefficient before internal 
and external audience. Constitutional judges develop their knowledge on foreign 
law and practice not only by examination of legal sources but also during meetings 
with other judges and on the basis of academic contributions.164 
Constitutional courts usually use comparative argumentation carefully consid-
ering both the circumstances of the case in hands and the level of approximation 
of referred legal systems with their own legal order. Therefore, they make reser-
vations on limits of a comparative method. The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
in  Election Procedure165 made a  general statement with regard to a  reference to 
foreign law suggested by the party to the proceedings. The Court found that: 
161 M. Example after Bobek (n. 36) 156.
162 Case I. ÚS 85/04 (Czech Constitutional Court, 13 July 2006). Translation after M. Bobek, 
op. cit., p. 156.
163 Cf. ibidem, p. 156.
164 M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó, ‘Introduction’, [in:] iidem (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Con-
stitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2012). 
165 Case 1/2013 (I. 7.) AB on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Act on Election Pro-
cedure (Constitutional Court, 4 January 2013).
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[t]he constitutionality of a specific legal institution in another country depends on the con-
stitution of the given state, the fitting into the legal system, and on the historical and political 
background. Therefore, the Constitutional Court – though acknowledging that taking into 
account foreign experiences may help to evaluate certain regulatory solutions –  does not 
consider the example of any foreign country in itself as a determining factor with regard to 
the review of constitutionality (compliance with the Fundamental Law).166 
Similarly, the Polish Constitutional Court held that a comparative reasoning 
(including references to international law and  practice) may be used, however, 
subject to various preconditions, especially if it aims at justification of dynamic 
interpretation of the Constitution. According to the Court: 
there are particular circumstances in which one may resort to non-linguistic methods of le-
gal interpretation […]. The role of those methods is subsidiary to linguistic and logical inter-
pretation, however, even if by means of that method a text is found to be synonymous, its in-
terpreter may sometimes ‘go beyond’ its determined meaning. However, a strong axiological 
substantiation is required which will mainly invoke constitutional values. It is also necessary 
to note that if the Court invokes a foreign internal law it is necessary to determine if the use 
of alien models is adequate to the interpretation of the Polish law. One should be particularly 
careful in „selecting” a legal system which is to be invoked.167 
Interestingly, the Polish Constitutional Court treated in the same way the ECtHR 
case law and that of foreign courts as an emanation of a universal standard in the 
field of human rights protection which should be taken into account and justify 
dynamic interpretation of constitutional provisions. 
The Czech Constitutional Court quite frequently refers to other constitution-
al courts and  especially to the  German Federal Constitutional Court, decisions 
of  which were an undoubted source of  inspiration in  several fundamental cas-
es concerning questions of  Union law, discussed in  other parts of  this paper.168 
Here one must notice the decision of 3 May 2012169 where the jurisprudence of the 
Polish Constitutional Court provided a strong persuasive argument in  formula-
tion of general principles regulating restrictions of judges’ salaries.170 Also in the 
166 Ibidem, III.3.4.
167 Case K 38/07 (Polish Constitutional Court, 3 July 2008), para. III.4. 
168 See also i.a.: reference to the decision of the German Constitutional Court, the Italian Con-
stitutional Court, the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Polish Constitutional Court, the Su-
preme Court of Spain, the Croatian Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States of America in Pl. ÚS 17/11 (Czech Constitutional Court, 15 May 2012) concerning 
photovoltaic power plants part VIII b paras 58–64 of the judgement; reference to the Polish 
Constitutional Court Pl. ÚS 33/11.
169 Case Pl. ÚS. 3/11 (Czech Constitutional Court, 3 May 2012), para. VII.
170 “The following fundamental, general theses regarding the constitutionality of salary restric-
tions on judges arise from the  case law of  the Constitutional Court, as well as from com-
parison with the  case law of  European constitutional courts (see, in  particular, decisions 
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practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court we can find referrals to decisions 
of foreign courts as sources of inspiration for interpretation of constitutional pro-
visions.171 
3.2. The Main Fields of Judicial Dialogue
3.2.1. The Judicial Dialogue on Human Rights Protection
As it was already mentioned, human rights protection constitutes the main 
field of judicial dialogue in the pluralistic legal order. On the one hand, the axi-
ological similarity (nearly identity) of plural legal orders constitutes an essential 
element of  ensuring coherence of  the whole system. When applying nation-
al human rights provisions, constitutional courts refer to international courts’ 
judgments not only on the basis of their legally binding force, but also to de-
termine the European standard of protection. On the other hand, in difficult 
cases, in which there is a problem of proper balance between different rights 
and interests references to international and foreign courts’ decisions strength-
en the legal argumentation and deliver additional legitimization for a particular 
decision. 
3.2.1.1. Searching for a Common Standard of Protection – Consistent 
Interpretation
Consistent interpretation is a well-established method used by national courts 
to avoid conflicts between domestic constitutional law and international and re-
gional human rights law and to achieve conformity with European and interna-
tional standards of human rights protection. Usually, Courts use judicial dialogue 
to bring an (evolving) standard of constitutional protection in line with a Euro-
pean standard stemming from the  ECtHR but also the  CJEU and  foreign case 
law. In case of constitutional courts references to each other’s decisions on human 
rights and judgments of international courts issues seem to be a highly effective 
tool of cross-fertilization.172
When judicial dialogue is  relied on to achieve consistent interpretation 
of domestic and international human rights law in constitutional courts, the for-
eign or international courts’ judgments do  not usually form a  part of  a  le-
gal reasoning in  determination of  the content and  the scope of  an applicable 
norm. These courts use instead international and  foreign material to support 
of the Polish Constitutional Court: P 1/94 (8 November 1994); K 13/94 (14 March 1995); P 1/95 
(11 September 1995); P 8/00 (4 October 2000); K 12/03 (18 February 2004).”
171 Case 1/2013 (I. 7.) AB (n. 166).
172 E. Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law 
by National Courts’ (2008) 5 Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers 4. 
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or supplement their primarily domestic law-based argument.173 In this regard, 
the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court on the retirement age of men 
and women is a good example. The Constitutional Court considered exclusively 
the conformity between national provisions that set a different retirement age 
for men and  women with Art.  32 (non-discrimination) and  Art.  33 (equality 
of men and women) of the Polish Constitution. Regardless of such delimitation 
of  the subject matter of  the judgement, the  Court devoted two separate parts 
in  the judgment to the  discussion of  relevant EU and  international standards 
of protection, including the case law of both the CJEU and the ECHR. In addi-
tion, the Constitutional Court noted explicitly, albeit in an obiter dictum, that 
the  relevant provisions of  domestic law were consistent with these European 
and international standards.174 
Another example of a dialogue that resulted in bringing Polish law in line with 
the ECHR is a case concerning the reorganisation of intelligence services.175 In this 
case, the Constitutional Court held that although it was unnecessary to refer to 
Art. 6 ECHR (since the right of fair trial was enshrined in Art. 45 of the Polish 
Constitution), it was necessary to refer to human rights treaties and the judicial 
practice of  the ECtHR and other international human rights bodies to establish 
the constitutional standard of protection. 
The Russian Constitutional Court considers case law of  the ECtHR when 
interpreting constitutionally granted human rights and especially the right to 
a fair trial.176 For example, in the decision of 15 November 2011 the Constitu-
tional Court referred to the decision of the ECtHR in Gorodnichev v Russia177 
in  examination of  constitutionality of  the decision on discontinuation of  the 
criminal proceeding after death of an accused person challenged by his relatives. 
It is interesting that the referred decision concerning admissibility of applica-
tion to the ECtHR (in the light of its Art. 6) after applicant’s death. The decision 
of the ECtHR was not used as a decisive argument by the Russian Constitution-
al Court. It rather confirmed its own findings and showed due consideration to 
the ECtHR decisions in Russian cases. In  the decision of 5 December 2011178 
173 M. Wendel, ‘Comparative Reasoning and  the Making of  a  Common Constitutional Law 
– The Europe-Decisions of National Constitutional Courts in a Transnational Perspective’ 
(2013) 25 Jean Monnet Working Paper, p. 9; J. Krzemińska, ‘Courts as Comparatists: Ref-
erences to Foreign Law in the Case law of the Polish Constitutional Court’ (2012) 5 Jean 
Monnet Working Paper, p. 49, <www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.> (access: between March 
2014 and May 2016).
174 See: point III.3 under the heading “EU law provisions concerning equal retirement age of men 
and women” and III. 4 under the heading “International law provisions concerning equal re-
tirement age of men and women” K 63/07 (Polish Constitutional Court, 15 July 2009). 
175 Case K 51/07 (Polish Constitutional Court, 27 June 2008), para. III.4.2.
176 See inter alia Russian Constitutional Court cases: 29-П (30 November 2012); 5-П (17 March 
2009); 6-П (25 April 2011); 16-П (14 July 2011).
177 Gorodnichev v Russia, App. no. 32275/03 (ECtHR, 15 November 2007).
178 Case 27-П/2011 (Russian Constitutional Court, 6 December 2011).
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concerning the constitutionality of the provision of the Russian Code of Crim-
inal Procedure providing for home arrest, the  Constitutional Court careful-
ly analysed the case law of  the ECtHR interpreting Art. 5 ECHR to establish 
a proper balance between the right to freedom and a public security interest.179 
Furthermore, it attempted to determine the  essence of  the right to freedom 
in the context of distinction between depravation and limitation of liberty.180 
However, there are also examples, in which case law of  the ECtHR has been 
used as a persuasive authority to alter the scope of human rights protection grant-
ed under domestic law. In Maslov, handed down by the Russian Constitutional 
Court in 2000181 interpretation of domestic law in conformity with the jurispru-
dence of the ECtHR182 resulted in the alteration of the scope of rights of defendants 
in  the Russian Code of  Criminal Procedure. The  Russian Constitutional Court 
stressed the  obligation of  law enforcement agencies to enable detained persons 
to access a defence counsel in the first hours of police questioning, even though 
neither the  Russian Code on Criminal Procedure nor the  Russian Constitution 
contained such an obligation at the time.183 
The practice of the Russian Constitutional Court delivers also an interesting 
example of the use of the ECtHR case law to justify diminishing a constitution-
al standard of  protection.184 It  happened in  the case concerning compensation 
for taking of property by the State under the 2000 Bankruptcy Protection Act.185 
The Court decided that although the Constitution provides for expropriation by 
the State only by means of a  judicial decision provided that “prior and equiva-
lent compensation” is granted, the interpretation of the last condition as a right 
to a full compensation is not justified. As an argument, case law of the ECtHR 
was invoked. The  Constitutional Court concluded that to achieve more social 
justice the amount of compensation must be fair, reasonable and proportionate 
to the public interest. So the Court instrumentally replaced literal meaning of the 
179 Ibidem, para. 2.
180 Ibidem, para. 2.1. See also cases: 30-П (21 December 2011); 6-П/2015 (31 March 2015). 
181 Case 11-П (Russian Constitutional Court, 27 June 2000).
182 ECtHR judgments cited by the  Russian Constitutional Court were Quaranta v  Switzerland, 
App. no. 12744/87 (ECtHR, 24 May 1991) and  Imbrioscia v  Switzerland, App. no. 13972/88 
(ECtHR, 24 November 1993). 
183 For a detailed analysis of case law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation see: 
National Report, Russian Federation, XVI Congress of the Conference of European Constitu-
tional Courts, “Cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe – Current Situation and Per-
spectives”, Vienna, May 2014, <www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-kongress/downloads/landesberi-
chte/LB-Russie-EN.pdf> (access: between March 2014 and May 2016).
184 After A. Trochev, ‘Russia’s Constitutional Spirit: Judge-Made Principles in Theory and Prac-
tice’, [in:] G.B. Smith, R. Sharlet (eds), Russia and its Constitution: Promise and Political Reality 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008), p. 53.
185 See: case 8-П (16 May 2000).
II. The Dialogue of CEE Constitutional Courts… 145
constitutional provision by interpretation “in conformity” with international ob-
ligations of the Russian Federation.186 
Although, as it was pointed out before, for a long time the Ukrainian Con-
stitutional Court was rather reluctant to make explicit references to case law 
of  the ECtHR and  other courts, in  the latest practice the  Court incorporates 
into its legal reasoning the analysis of the European standard of human rights 
protection.187 In the case of 22 April 2014188 the Court interpreted the provisions 
of Ukrainian Code of Civil Procedure deciding whether rulings of courts of first 
instance, which are not explicitly referred to in the Code are subject to a sepa-
rate challenge in an appellate instance. When establishing the content and the 
scope of the right to appeal, the Court referred to the ECtHR judgements to sup-
port the extensive interpretation of domestic procedural law in the light of the 
right to appeal, under which everyone is guaranteed the right to appeal against 
decisions, actions or omissions of public authorities, local authorities, officers 
and employees. A court’s refusal in admitting claims, complaints, issued in ac-
cordance with the procedural law is a violation of the right to a judicial protec-
tion, which, under Art. 64 of the Constitution cannot be restricted. The Court 
stressed that the realization of judicial proceedings on principles defined in the 
Constitution is the constitutional guarantee of everyone’s right to judicial pro-
tection. One of  these principles is  to ensure the  appeal and  the cassation ap-
peal against a court decision, except in cases established by law. In the judgment 
of 8 April 2015189 the Ukrainian Constitutional Court decided on unconstitu-
tionality of the provisions of the Code of Administrative Proceedings of Ukraine, 
according to which a decision of a local general court in its capacity as an ad-
ministrative court in cases concerning decisions, actions or omission of subjects 
of  authority on bringing to administrative liability shall be final and  may not 
be appealed, as it is contrary to the right to access to judgment. In its decision 
the Constitutional Court not only broadly analysed the case law of the ECtHR 
but also invoked the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as 
emanation of the European standard. 
The dialogue with the CJEU may also bring domestic law in line with the Eu-
ropean standard of human rights protection, especially, but not exclusively, in cas-
es concerning measures implementing EU law in a domestic legal system.190 For 
example, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court in its decision of 15 May 2007191 
186 A. Trochev (n. 185), p. 58.
187 See also examples presented by in this volume by T. Tsymbrivskyy. 
188 Case 4-rp/2014 (Ukrainian Constitutional Court, 22 April 2014).
189 Case 3-rp/2015 (Ukrainian Constitutional Court, 8 April 2015).
190 Case: K 41/05 (Polish Constitutional Court, 2 June 2007); K 23/11 (n. 59).
191 Case 7/04–8/04 (n. 131).
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invoked the case law of both the ECtHR192 and the CJEU193 in order to interpret 
the notion of equality of any person before the court in the context of the right 
of the party to disclose information constituting a state secret. There the Court 
confirmed that 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of construction of law 
is  important to construction and  application of  Lithuanian law as well; the  same can be 
said mutatis mutandis as regards the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and the Court of the First Instance of the European Communities.194 
Similarly, the Polish Constitutional Court in its judgment of 20 March 2006195 
referred to the decision of the Court of the First Instance in Interporc II,196 which 
concerned access to documents of European institutions as a proof of an existing 
standard.
The 2009 Polish Constitutional Court judgment197 may be considered as an-
other example of a broad judicial dialogue on human rights protection with both 
the ECtHR and foreign courts. The Court was called upon to adjudicate a challenge 
to the constitutionality of the obligation to fasten seat belts in cars under the Polish 
Road Traffic Act. The applicant had been stopped by the police and fined for not 
fastening his seat belt. The applicant refused to pay the fine on the ground that 
the obligation in question was contrary to the  right of privacy and violated his 
dignity. The Polish Constitutional Court referred to several cases of the ECtHR198 
as well as of national courts199 to strengthen its argumentation concerning the ac-
ceptable scope of limitations to the right to privacy. 
192 Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom, App. nos 39647/98, 40461/98 (ECtHR, 27 October 
2004).
193 Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and  T-405/03  Jose Maria Sison v  Council of  the European 
Union (CJEU, 26 April 2005).
194 Ibidem, para. 15.
195 Case Sk 11/12 (Polish Constitutional Court, 23 October 2012). See also: case K 17/05 (Polish 
Constitutional Court, 20 March 2006).
196 T-92/98 Interporc v Commission (CJEU, 7 December 1999).
197 SK 48/05 (Polish Constitutional Court, 9 July 2009).
198 Among them to ECtHR cases: X v Belgium, App. no. 8707/79 (13 December 1979); Schmautzer 
v Austria, App. no. 15523/89 (10 May 1993); Viel v France, App. no. 41781/98 (14 December 
1999).
199 For example: 1 BvR 1925/80 (German Federal Constitutional Court, 26 January 1982); 1 BvR 
331/85 (German Federal Constitutional Court, 24 July 1986); 1 BvR 74/92 (German Federal 
Constitutional Court, 9 March 1992); Schmautzer B 821/88 (Austrian Constitutional Court, 
27 February 1989); Society v Kohrig 62719–24, 498 N.E. 2d 1158 (US Illinois Supreme Courts, 
1 October 1986); State v Hartog 88–383, 440 N.W. 2d 852 (US Iowa Supreme Court, 17 May 
1989); State v Eckblad 74109–3, 152 Wn. 2d 515, 98 3d 1184 (US Washington Supreme Court, 
14 October 2004). 
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Similarly, the Constitutional Court of Czech Republic in 2005 deciding about 
the scope of the right to judicial review200 referred to the decisions of the Slovak201 
and Polish202 Constitutional Courts, laws of the Netherlands and Lithuania, and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.203 It used these references to support its arguments 
that the right to an effective remedy was broader under the Czech Constitution 
than the protection granted by the ECHR. 
The practice of the Hungarian Court provides also interesting examples of cas-
es resolved in judicial dialogue with international and foreign courts.204 The most 
prominent one is the famous totalitarian symbols saga.205 In 2000 the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court did not find that the prohibition of using and wearing to-
talitarian symbols, including the ‘five-point red star’ unconstitutional. Mr. Vajnai 
who had been punished under this provision for wearing a  five-point red star 
in  public challenged this decision before the  ECtHR.206 In  its judgment Vajnai 
v Hungary, the ECtHR concluded that the applicant’s criminal conviction for sim-
ply having worn a red star had to be considered unnecessary, as it did not respond 
to a  ‘pressing social need’. Furthermore, the  sanction against the  applicant, al-
though relatively light, came under criminal law, entailing serious consequences 
for the applicant. The sanction had therefore not been proportionate to the  le-
gitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Art. 10 ECHR. 
After the judgment of the ECtHR Mr. Vajnai had again been accused of wearing 
the red star in public. The Hungarian Supreme Court submitted a legal question 
to the  Hungarian Constitutional Court. The  Constitutional Court reversed its 
earlier judgment, and  found the  provision unconstitutional. In  coming to this 
conclusion and establishing the proper level of protection, the Hungarian Con-
200 Case Pl. ÚS 11/04 (Czech Constitutional Court, 25 April 2005). 
201 The Czech Constitutional Court referred to the judgment of the Slovak Constitutional Court 
of Pl. ÚS 15/03 (11 February 2004).
202 The Czech Constitutional Court referred to the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court 
K 21/99 (10 May 2000).
203 Among them ECtHR cases: Incal v Turkey, App. no. 41/1997/825/1031 (9 June 1998); Sramek 
v Austria, App. no. 8790/79 (22 October 1989); Pellegrin v France, App. no. 28541/95 (8 Decem-
ber 1999). 
204 See inter alia: 13/2000 (V. 12.) AB on the symbols of the State, 57/2001 (XII. 5.) AB on the right 
of reply, 22/2003 (IV. 28.) AB on euthanasia, 50/2003 (XI. 5.) AB on investigative committees, 
6/2007 (II. 27.) AB on the questions 8 related to the prohibition of the publication of opinion 
poll results, 20/2007 (III. 29.) AB on the radio and TV broadcasting of the sessions of the Par-
liament, 53/2009 (V. 6.) AB on domestic violence and restraining order, para. III.3.4 and cases 
discussed by A. Wyrozumska 48/1998 (XI. 23.) AB; 21/B/2008, 154/2008 (XII. 15.) AB concern-
ing the constitutionality of the Act of 2007 No. CLXXXIV on registered partnerships (Constitu-
tional Court, 15 December 2008).
205 See: case 14/2000 (V. 12.) (Hungarian Constitutional Court, 9 May 2000). Discussed also in 
I. Skomerska-Muchowska, ‘Judicial Dialogue on International Human Rights Law in Poland 
and Eastern Europe’, [in:] A. Müller (ed.), Judicial Dialogue and Human Rights (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press forthcoming).
206 Vajnai v Hungary, App. no. 33629/06 (ECtHR, 8 July 2008).
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stitutional Court not only relied on the ECtHR’s Vajnai judgment, but also re-
ferred to domestic law of Slovakia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, 
Poland and Ukraine, as well as to the decisions of foreign constitutional courts on 
the subject as an important persuasive argument based on similar social and po-
litical situation behind the legal problem at hands.207 The judgment of the ECtHR 
was referred to as a ‘new circumstance’ justifying reopening constitutional proce-
dure concerning an already decided question of constitutionality and one of fac-
tors reflecting social changes. 
Another interesting example of practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
is the case concerning the right to reply to a press statement infringing his (sub-
jective) rights. In this judgment the Court found unconstitutional the amendment 
to the Civil Code. The proposed provision permitted anyone to demand the pub-
lication of their reply in the press, if they felt that their rights had been infringed 
by a  publication. The  law envisaged sanctions, including court-imposed fines, 
against the media in the case of refusal to publish the reply. In the reasoning of the 
decision the Court suggested that the proposed regulation is  inspired by Amer-
ican legal solutions. The Court thus compared European standard of protection 
of freedom of speech with the American one and found certain similarities as far 
as the principles are concerned, however, stressed that there are also significant 
differences as regards admissible restrictions to the freedom of expression and the 
freedom of the press as well as legal remedies for violation of the right in question. 
That is why, in the light of the Hungarian Constitution interpreted in conform-
ity with the ECHR, the proposed regulation did not ensure a proper balance be-
tween conflicting rights and interests. Similarly, in other case concerning freedom 
of speech208 the Hungarian Court also referred not only to the European standard 
as established by the ECtHR but also to the practice of the US Supreme Court.209 
In a sensitive case concerning euthanasia the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
rejected a  constitutional claim concerning conformity of  provisions obliging 
physicians to treat patients that they consider terminally ill with maximum care. 
The right to human dignity granted under Art. 54(1) of the Constitution was un-
derstood as containing the right to end one’s life with dignity. The Constitutional 
Court supported its findings by a broad analysis of both case law and regulations 
in force in European states such as the Netherlands, Belgium, United Kingdom, 
Germany, as well as United States and Australia.210 
207 German Federal Constitutional Court cases: 1 BvR 680/86 (3 April 1990); 1 BvR 204/03 
(23  March 2006); 1 BvR 150/03 (1 June 2006); 2 BvR 2202/08 (18 May 2009); and  74/1958 
(Italian Constitutional Court, judgment, 20 December 1958) were referred in the judgment 
of 19 July 2011 of the Polish Constitutional Court. 
208 Case 7/2014 (III. 7.) AB on the unconstitutionality and the annulment of the text “on the basis 
of acknowledgeable public interest.”
209 Case 57/2001 (XII. 5.) AB, para. 2.2.
210 See: case 22/2003 (IV. 28.), paras 7–8 of the judgment.
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Similarly, judgment of  Lithuanian Constitutional Court of  2011211 must be 
brought to the attention.212 The case concerned the concept of family adopted by 
the legislator who limited its scope solely to relations based on a formal marriage. 
The Lithuanian Constitutional Court carefully analysed case law of the ECtHR213 
as well as national constitutional courts of  Hungary, France and  Germany214 
and found that there is no commonly accepted definition of family. Nevertheless, 
the Court decided that although marriage is one of the bases of the constitutional 
notion of  family on which family relations are  founded, it does not mean that 
the Constitution does not protect families different than those founded on the ba-
sis of  marriage. Such protection may be granted to,  inter alia,  the relationship 
of a man and a woman living together without concluding a marriage; the relation-
ship based on the permanent bonds of emotional affection, reciprocal understand-
ing, responsibility, respect, shared upbringing of children and similar features, as 
well as on the voluntary determination to take on certain rights and responsibili-
ties, which form a basis for the constitutional notion of motherhood, fatherhood 
and childhood.215 
3.2.1.2. Shaping the Standard of Protection Through Judicial Dialogue 
– the Pilot Judgement Procedure and Beyond
The ECtHR sometimes also confirms decisions of constitutional courts con-
cerning incompatibility of national law or practice with human rights. This is true 
especially in cases of systemic violations when executive and legislature are unwill-
ing or unable to ensure proper level of protection. The so-called Bug River claims’ 
cases may serve as an example of such occurrences. 
Following the World War II, the external borders of Poland were changed. And 
so Poland lost a major part of its territory eastwards from the Bug river. Inhabit-
ants of that territory, according to the so-called ‘Republican Agreements’216 have 
been repatriated westwards. The agreements provided for an obligation of evacu-
ated landlords to leave substantial – quantitatively and qualitatively – parts of their 
property in the abandoned territories. The thus lost property was to be compen-
sated by the Republic of Poland. Whilst most of the repatriates were compensated, 
a number of claims remained unsatisfied. In 2002 the Polish Ombudsman chal-
lenged before the  Constitutional Court provisions of  domestic laws restricting 
largely and practically impeding the possibility to compensate these losses as fore-
211 Case 21/2008 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 28 September 2011). 
212 See also: 4/2012–13/2012 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 11 June 2015) on the  transfer 
of a share of the personal income tax to municipal budgets. 
213 See: para. III.2. 
214 See: para. III.3.
215 See: para. III.13.
216 Agreements of  1944 concluded by the  Polish Committee for National Liberation [PKWN] 
and governments of three Soviet republic: Belarusian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian, as well as 
in two treaties of 1945 and 1957 concluded between the governments of Poland and USSR.
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seen by the treaties. The Constitutional Court217 held that the Republican Agree-
ments gave rise to legitimate expectations of the Polish citizens that issues of com-
pensation would be regulated in  domestic law. The  compensatory mechanism 
created for persons deprived of their property as the result of territorial changes, 
led to the establishment of  legitimate expectations of the interested parties, that 
the problem would be ultimately solved in the future in such a way, that interests 
of all subjects, entitled to thus created right, would be taken into consideration. 
The Constitutional Court held that right to credit provided for in Polish regula-
tion is covered by the right to property. In this respect the unjustified limitations 
to realization of  that right destroying the essence of  the right in question made 
the practice illusory. It was not only contrary to Art. 64 of  the Polish Constitu-
tion and Art. 1 of the Protocol 1 to the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR218 but 
also the rule of law (Art. 2 of the Constitution of Poland).219 The Court stressed 
that the unconstitutionality of challenged provisions “arises from the defective le-
gal formulation of the provisions governing the question of compensation, which 
causes an inadmissible systemic dysfunction.” According to the Court, the general 
property right as established by national law cannot be at the same time arbitrar-
ily limited by the State in the way excluding substantial stocks of property from 
the compensation procedure, which de facto paralyses the possibility for benefi-
ciaries to derive any economic advantage from these rights.
The judgement of  the Constitutional Court had not been implemented 
neither by the executive, nor by the legislative. In 2004 Broniowski220 case was 
heard by the  ECtHR, which broadly referred to and  confirmed the  findings 
of the Polish Constitutional Court as well as the related judgement of the Polish 
Supreme Court.221 
217 Case K 33/02 (Polish Constitutional Court, 19 December 2002). 
218 The Court held that “[t]here can be no doubt that the right to credit belongs to the category 
of rights subject to protection under Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”
219 According to the Constitutional Court “[t]he requirement of respect for the principle of main-
taining citizens’ confidence in the State and the law made by it, ensuing from the principle 
of the rule of law (Art. 2 of the Constitution), entails a prohibition on enacting laws that would 
create illusory legal institutions. This principle therefore requires that the obstacles which 
prevent [persons] from benefiting from the right to credit be eliminated from the legal sys-
tem. From the point of view of the confidence principle, in the case of the right to credit it 
is the means of protecting this right that is subject to assessment, rather than its substance. 
The lack of opportunity to benefit from this right, within the framework set out by the leg-
islature, shows that an illusory legal institution has been created, and thereby constitutes 
a violation of Art. 2 of the Constitution.”
220 Broniowski v Poland, App. no. 31443/96 (ECtHR, 22 June 2004). 
221 Case I CK 323/02 (Polish Supreme Court, 21 November 2003) in which the Supreme Court 
regarded the situation obtaining after the entry into force of the Constitutional Court’s judg-
ment, in  particular the  authorities’ practices, to be unacceptable and  contrary to the  rule 
of law.
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The ECtHR fully accepted the Constitutional Court’s conclusions concerning 
the lack of a legitimate aim pursued by Polish law and practice since they were 
based on its direct knowledge of national circumstances.222 The ECtHR also ex-
pressly repeated in the grounds for judgment arguments concerning a violation 
of the rule of law. The ECtHR noticed that the December 2003 Act on the ex-
ercise of  the State Treasury’s powers, the  Law on commercialisation and  pri-
vatisation of  State enterprises and  other statutes “constituted the  culminating 
event of  a  series of  actions and  omissions of  Polish executive and  legislative.” 
The Act deprived the claimant of any further compensation given that his family 
had previously received some kind of  compensation. By imposing limitations 
on the exercise of the right to credit, and applying practices that made it unen-
forceable and unusable, these authorities also destroyed the very essence of his 
right. According to the  ECtHR, the  state of  uncertainty in  which Broniowski 
found himself as a result of the delays and obstructions over the years was in it-
self incompatible with Art. 1 Protocol No. 1 ECHR. The ECtHR then found that 
the violation had originated in a widespread and systemic problem, which had 
resulted from a malfunctioning of Polish legislation and administrative practice 
and  which affected and  remained capable of  affecting a  large number of  per-
sons.223 The  Court concluded that the  facts of  the case showed the  existence 
of a shortcoming, which affected a whole class of individuals. In view of this sys-
temic problem, the Court declared that general measures were called for in the 
execution of the judgement. The ECtHR stated that these measures should in-
clude a scheme, which would offer redress to all persons affected, and not only 
to the applicant. 
In Broniowski judgment the ECtHR used for the first time the pilot judgement 
mechanism.224 It held that Poland must take the general measures necessary to 
remove any obstacle to the implementation of the right to credit of persons af-
fected, or provide equivalent redress, and ordered the State to secure the effec-
tive and expeditious realization of the title in respect of the remaining Bug River 
claimants through legislative and administrative measures and thus avoid repet-
itive violations in a  lengthy series of comparable cases. It must be stressed that 
the finding of systemic violation was essentially based on the previous judgments 
of the Polish Constitutional Court.225 The ECtHR fully respected the role of the 
222 See: Broniowski v Poland, para. 173.
223 Broniowski v Poland, para. 189.
224 See more, [in:] L. Wildhaber, ‘Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems 
on the  National Level’, [in:] R. Wolfrum, U. Deutsch (eds), The  European Court of  Human 
Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: The Problems and Possible Solutions (Springer-Verlag 
2009), p. 69.
225 As noticed by Wildhaber “[t]he Broniowski judgment was particularly well-suited to the pi-
lot-judgment kind of adjudicative approach; the Polish Constitutional Court and the Polish 
government were receptive to that approach; so in essence there was not much resistance”, 
L. Wildhaber, (n. 226), p. 75.
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Constitutional Court as national guardian of human rights. Consequently, even if 
the pilot judgment moved towards a constitutional court-type jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR, since it prescribed general measures to be taken by national authorities, 
due regard to the previous judgement of the Constitutional Court obviously high-
lights subsidiary nature of the ECtHR itself.  
A similar situation occurred in the Polish saga on restriction of  landlords’ 
rights to increase rents resulting in  the Hutten-Czapska ECHR pilot judge-
ment.226 The Polish Constitutional Court examined a number of times the legal 
situation of real-estate owners and decided on unconstitutionality of statutory 
law limiting their property rights read in the light of  the ECHR.227 The  judg-
ments were not respected by the  legislative power. The  situation resulted 
in a number of applications to ECtHR. In Hutten-Czapska the Chamber of the 
Strasbourg Court again decided the case with due regard to findings of the Pol-
ish Constitutional Court and held that the government had failed to set an ad-
equate balance between the  interests of  the landlords and  that of  the tenants 
so as to guarantee an equitable system of landlord rights and as result Poland 
violated Art. 1 of Protocol 1. The judgment of the ECtHR not only contained 
extraordinary long quotations of the Polish Constitutional Court’s findings ful-
ly approved by the ECtHR, but also indicated that “it was incumbent on the Pol-
ish authorities to eliminate, or at least to remedy with the requisite promptness, 
the situation found to have been incompatible with the requirements of the ap-
plicant’s fundamental right of property in line with the Constitutional Court’s 
judgments.”228 The Grand Chamber repeated these arguments in the subsequent 
decision.229 
Both Broniowski and Hutten-Czapska constitute examples of the cooperation 
between the two courts that can be even referred to as a  ‘judicial alliance’230 for 
criticizing the domestic legal framework, and in bringing the legislative and exec-
utive branches of the State in compliance with the standards of rights protection 
226 ECtHR cases: Hutten-Czapska v Poland, App. no. 35014/97 (22 February 2005); Hutten-Czap-
ska v Poland, App. no. 35014/97 (19 June 2006); Hutten-Czapska v Poland, App. no. 35014/97 
(28 April 2008). Detailed analysis Sadurski W., ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionali-
sation of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European 
States to the Council of Europe and the Idea of Pilot Judgments’ (2008) 08 Sydney Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper, p. 15.
227 Case P 11/98 (Polish Constitutional Court, 12 January 2000). The Court referred to following 
decisions of  the ECtHR, as to the existence of  legitimate aim Spadea and Scalabrino v  Ita-
ly, App. no. 12868/87 (28 September 1995), as to the definition of property right Sporrong 
and Lonnroth v Sweden, App. nos 7151/75, 7152/75 (23 September 1982), as to the permis-
sibility of  limitation in  rent system Scollo v  Italy, App. no. 19133/91 (28 September 1995) 
and Velosa Baretto v Portugal, App. no. 18072/91 (21 November 1995). 
228 Judgment of the Chamber of 22 February 2005, para. 187. 
229 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 19 June 2006, para. 223.
230 W. Sadurski (n. 228), p. 22.
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shared by both courts.231 The discussed cases prove that in  some difficult cases 
it is necessary for the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR to act hand in hand 
to ensure a  proper standard of  protection of  human rights. It  must be stressed 
once again that judgments of the ECtHR were based on the findings of the Polish 
Constitutional Court and the dialogue with national judiciary.232 It is suggested by 
some scholars that in these cases the relation between the national constitutional 
court and the ECHR in the two situations of systemic violations took a very specif-
ic dimension. The constitutional court deals with a general constitutional dimen-
sion, while the ECtHR focuses on issues pertaining to a concrete case. However 
the general findings of the Constitutional Court were the main argument of the 
ECtHR justifying ‘systemic’ approach in individual case and prescription of gener-
al measures to be taken by the State. 
Subsequently, the ECtHR continued thus established judicial dialogue in an-
other pilot-judgment based Burdov saga.233 The applicant, a participant of emer-
gency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster, repeatedly sued 
the competent State authorities, seeking payment of social benefits in connection 
with the resulting damage to his health. The Russian courts granted him the rel-
evant payments but a number of their judgments remained unenforced. In 2000 
the applicant lodged a first complaint with the ECtHR about the non-enforcement 
of domestic judicial decisions. In 2002 the Court found violations of Art. 6 ECHR 
and of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.234
It must be noted that in a similar case already in 2001 (so before the decision 
of  the ECtHR in Burdov I) in  the judgment of 25 January 2001,235 the Russian 
Constitutional Court, found the  relevant provision of  the Civil Code incom-
patible with the Constitution in  so far as it provided for special conditions on 
State liability for damage caused by the administration of  justice.236 The Court 
assumed that an individual should be able to obtain compensation for any dam-
age incurred through a violation by a court of his or her right to a fair trial within 
the meaning of Art. 6 ECHR. The Constitutional Court called upon the Parlia-
ment to adopt appropriate legislative measures. Once the Burdov I judgment was 
issued, the Constitutional Court immediately referred to it and declared the law 
concerning social benefits for Chernobyl victims unconstitutional, as the system 
231 W. Sadurski (n. 228), p. 23.
232 L. Wildhaber, ‘Rethinking the European Court of Human Rigths’, [in:] J. Christoffersen, M. Rask 
Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights. Between Law and Politics (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2011), p. 222.
233 Cf. P. Leach, H. Hardman, S. Stephenson, ‘Can the European Court’s Pilot Judgment Proce-
dure Help Resolve Systemic Human Rights Violations? Burdov and the Failure to Implement 
Domestic Court Decisions in Russia’ (2010) 2 Human Rights Law Review, p. 346.
234 See: Burdov v Russia, App. no. 59498/00 (ECtHR, 7 May 2002).
235 Case 1-П (n. 60).
236 The Court found, referring to relevant case law of the ECtHR, that an individual should be 
able to obtain compensation for any damage incurred through a violation by a court of his or 
her right to a fair trial within the meaning of Art. 6 of the Convention.
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thus created lacked clarity and predictability.237 Consequently, in 2004, the Rus-
sian Parliament amended the legislation and introduced a new system of index-
ation of  allowances. However, the  execution procedure reminded problematic. 
And so by force of a judgment of 14 July 2005,238 the Constitutional Court consid-
ered certain provisions governing the special execution procedure to be incom-
patible with the Russian Constitution. Following the judgment, the Russian law 
was changed in that regard. In the meantime, Burdov obtained positive judicial 
decisions. Yet, there was a  significant delay in  their implementation so he had 
applied to the ECtHR for the second time. 
In Burdov II, the ECtHR found it appropriate to apply the pilot-judgment pro-
cedure, given the  recurrent and  persistent nature of  the underlying problems, 
the large number of people affected and the urgent need for a speedy and appro-
priate redress at the domestic level.239 In the statement of reasons the Strasbourg 
Court declared “considerable importance to the findings of  the Russian Consti-
tutional Court, which has invited Parliament since January 2001 to set up a pro-
cedure for compensation of damage arising, inter alia, from excessively lengthy 
proceedings. Of particular importance is  the finding made by reference notably 
to Art. 6 of the Convention that such compensation should not be conditional on 
the establishment of fault.” The above statement confirms that the pilot judgment 
procedure also in this case was based on prior findings of the national Constitu-
tional Court. 
In February 2010 the Russian Constitutional Court issued a decision concern-
ing, inter alia, implementation of ECtHR decisions and the right to a fair trial. This 
judgement can be recognised as a response to Burdov II.240 The Court interpreted 
Art. 46 ECHR in the light of the case law of the ECtHR and when referring to Bur-
dov II stressed that this provision imposes on the respondent State a legal obliga-
tion not only to effect payments to persons concerned as a just satisfaction award-
ed by the ECtHR, but also to take general and, if appropriate, individual measures 
237 Case 11-П (Russian Constitutional Court, 19 June 2002). Cf. P.B. Maggs, O. Schwartz, W. Burn-
ham, Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation (Juris Publishing 2015), p. 394. 
238 Case 8-П (Russian Constitutional Court, 14 July 2005) after P. Leach, H. Hardman, S. Stephen-
son (n. 217), p. 349.
239 Burdov v  Russia II, App. no. 33509/04 (ECtHR, 15 January 2009). The  ECtHR noticed that 
these problems did not affect only Chernobyl victims, as in the present case, but also oth-
er large vulnerable groups of the Russian population: non-enforcement very frequently oc-
curred in  cases concerning the  payment of  pensions, child allowances and  compensation 
for damage sustained during military service or for wrongful prosecution. Approximately 
700 cases concerning similar facts were currently pending and in some instances could lead 
to the Court finding a second set of violations of the Convention in respect of the same ap-
plicants. It was a matter of grave concern that the violations found in the present judgment 
had occurred several years after its first judgment in the applicant’s case, notwithstanding 
Russia’s obligation under Art. 46 to adopt, under the supervision of the Committee of Min-
isters, the necessary remedial and preventive measures. The breaches found thus reflected 
a persistent structural dysfunction and a practice incompatible with the Convention.
240 Case 4-П (26 February 2010).
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to put an end to the violation in the domestic enforcement practice and to redress 
its effects as far as possible. Such measures are to be taken also in respect of other 
persons in a situation comparable to that of an applicant whose right the ECtHR 
found to be violated. Although it is for the respondent State to choose means by 
which the legal obligation based on Art. 46 of the ECHR will be discharged within 
a domestic legal system, such means must be compatible with the conclusions set 
out in  a  relevant judgment of  the ECtHR. The  Constitutional Court added, on 
the basis of the ECtHR case law, that save for cases where errors allegedly made by 
domestic courts in facts and in law could violate the rights and freedoms protected 
by the Convention, it is for the domestic authorities, namely judicial bodies, to de-
cide on interpretation and application of the national legislation.241 The discussed 
decision fully confirmed findings of the ECtHR and called all state authorities for 
effective implementation of decision of ECtHR also in regard to a right to court. 
As the result of the described extensive dialogue between the Russian Constitu-
tional Court and the ECtHR in March 2010 the Federal law on damages for vio-
lation of the right to fair trial within the reasonable time or the right to execution 
of a court ruling within reasonable time was adopted.242 
It must be noticed that the  pilot judgment mechanism, though born as 
a child of judicial dialogue, grew up on the basis of respect between the ECtHR 
241 Para. 2 of the judgment. 
242 In  its Interim Resolution on the  case, in  December 2009, the  Council of  Europe Commit-
tee of  Ministers noted “with satisfaction the  Russian authorities’ prompt and  constructive 
response to the Court’s pilot judgment and to the Committee of Ministers’ Interim Resolu-
tion.” Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution CM/ResDH (2009) 158, Execution of the pi-
lot judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Burdov No. 2 against 
the Russian Federation relative to the failure or serious delay in abiding by final domestic 
judicial decisions delivered against the state and its entities as well as the absence of an ef-
fective remedy, adopted on 3 December 2009. In two inadmissibility decision of 2010 the EC-
tHR held that the applicants were required to exhaust the new domestic remedy, whilst spec-
ifying that it might review its position in the future depending on the Russian courts’ ability 
to establish consistent case law in line with the requirements of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v Russia, App. nos 27451/09 and 60650/09 (EC-
tHR, 23 September 2010)). However in two subsequent judgments of 2012 the Court noted 
with regret that there was still no remedy available in Russia by which to complain of such 
delays where the judicial decisions in question imposed obligations in kind on the Russian 
State. That problem, in the Court’s view, remained unresolved despite the 2010 Federal law 
following the Burdov II judgment. The Court therefore considered that an application before 
it continued to be the only means by which these applicants could assert their rights and ob-
tain effective redress for the clear violations of  their Convention rights (Ilyushkin and Oth-
ers v Russia, App. nos 5734/08, 20420/07, 54342/08, 56997/08, 60129/08, 4561/09, 7738/09, 
11273/09, 11993/09, 16960/09, 20454/09, 21964/09, 26632/09, 28914/09, 31577/09, 31614/09, 
31685/09, 32395/09, 35053/09, 36327/09, 38180/09, 45131/09, 48059/09, 52605/09, 56935/09, 
58034/09, 59761/09, 1048/10 et 1119/10 (ECtHR, 17 April 2012) and Kalinkin and Others v Rus-
sia, App. nos 16967/10, 37115/08, 52141/09, 57394/09, 57400/09, 2437/10, 3102/10, 12850/10, 
13683/10, 19012/10, 19401/10, 20789/10, 22933/10, 25167/10, 26583/10, 26820/10, 26884/10, 
28970/10, 29857/10, 49975/10 et 56205/10 (ECtHR, 17 April 2012).
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as the  authoritative interpreter of  the Convention and  highest national courts 
as guardians of constitutionally granted rights.243 As it was emphasised, judicial 
dialogue has been a crucial element legitimising the law-creating attitude of the 
ECtHR. Once accepted it became an independent tool for resolution of systemic 
violations of the ECtHR or repetitive violation as determined in previous decisions 
of the ECtHR.244
Constitutional courts are supported by the ECtHR in enforcement of funda-
mental rights in other cases. In Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia245 
the ECtHR had to decide about violation of Art. 9 ECHR by legislative and execu-
tive practice, which in the same time was contrary to decision of the Russian Con-
stitutional Court. The Russian Court found application of dissolution, as a sanction 
against legal entities, imposed on formal grounds as unconstitutional.246 However, 
state organs did not follow the decision and applied dissolutions against religious 
schools without certification. The ECtHR held that such sanction against the ap-
plicant organisation was not necessary in a democratic society and thus contrary 
243 In Varga and others v Hungary, App. nos 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13 
and  64586/13 (ECtHR, 10 March 2015) the  Court relied on several decisions of  Kuria (the 
Supreme Court of  Hungary) and  the decision of  the Constitutional Court (32/2014 (XI. 3.); 
similarly in Rutkowski v Poland, Rutkowski and Others v Poland, App. nos 72287/10, 13927/11 
and 46187/11 (ECtHR, 7 July 2015) the ECtHR broadly referred to the case law of the Polish 
Supreme Court. 
244 Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v Ukraine, App. no. 40450/04 (ECtHR, 15 October 2009). The Court 
invoked as justification of  application pilot judgment procedure extensive dialogue be-
tween the Ukrainian Government and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
Gazsó v Hungary, App. no. 48322/12 (ECtHR, 16 July 2015) and Ananyev and Others v Russia, 
App. nos 42525/07 and 60800/08 (ECtHR, 10 January 2012). 
245 Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia, App. no. 33203/08 (ECtHR, 12 June 2014).
246 Case 14-П (Russian Constitutional Court, 18 July 2003). The case before the Constitution-
al Court originated in  the a  judgment of  the Commercial Court of  the Yaroslavl Region, 
which rejected a prosecutor’s application for a  judicial order requiring the  Islamic Reli-
gious Organisations of Yaroslavl Muslims to discontinue the unlicensed education of fol-
lowers at a Sunday school (madrasa). The Federal Court pointed out that the education 
provided at the  madrasa was not accompanied by a  final evaluation and  certification 
and therefore fell outside the scope of the Education Act. The Constitutional Court stated 
that “The fact that Art. 61(2) of the Civil Code does not contain a specific list of provisions 
whose breach may entail dissolution of a legal entity […] does not imply that this sanction 
can be applied on formal grounds only, in the event of a repeated violation of regulations 
that are binding on legal entities. Taking into account the generally accepted principles 
of legal liability (including the presence of mens rea) and the criteria for restricting rights 
and freedoms enunciated in Art. 55(3) of the Constitution, which are binding both on law-
makers and law enforcement authorities, [Art. 61(2) of the Civil Code] presupposes that 
repeated violations of law, taken in their entirety, must be so gross as to allow the com-
mercial court – having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature 
of violations committed by the legal entity and their consequences – to decide on the dis-
solution of the legal entity as a measure necessary for the protection of rights and lawful 
interests of others.”
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to Art. 9 ECHR interpreted in the light of its Art. 11.247 Another example of con-
structive dialogue between the Russian Constitutional Court and the ECtHR may 
be found in Khmel v Russia.248
The Lithuanian Constitutional Court was also supported by the  ECtHR 
in preservation of adequate level of protection of human rights in Lithuania. In Ra-
manauskas v Lithuania249 the ECtHR confirmed findings of the Lithuanian Court 
in case of 8 May 2000,250 in which the Court ruled that the Operational activities 
act was generally compatible with the Constitution however it also gives interpre-
tation of the Act in conformity not only with the Lithuanian Constitution but also 
with the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR.251 Referring in particular to Teixeira 
de Castro v  Portugal the  Lithuanian  Court emphasised that a  criminal conduct 
simulation model could not be used for the purpose of incitement or provocation 
to commit an offence that had not already been initiated. It further held that this 
investigative technique did not allow officials to incite the commission of an of-
fence by a person who had abandoned plans to commit the offence. In spite of the 
decision Lithuanian authorities used incitement. The  ECtHR in  Ramanauskas 
v Lithuania found that such practice contrary to the judgment of the Constitution-
al Court, violated Art. 6 of the Convention.
Examples of reinterpretation of the Constitution after the judgment of the ECHR 
are also present in the Czech practice. The Constitutional Court after the decision 
in Kohlhofer et Minarik v Czech Republic252 pointed out that minority shareholders 
had to be protected within the light of Strasbourg case law.253 Similarly in regard 
247 The ECtHR referred to the judgment of the Constitutional Court and held that “[t]he sanc-
tion of  dissolution could be applied indiscriminately without regard to the  gravity of  the 
breach in  question […], a  practice which the  Constitutional Court found to be incompati-
ble with the constitutional meaning of the relevant provisions as early as 2003. […] In pro-
nouncing the applicant organisation’s dissolution, the Russian courts did not give heed to 
the case-law of the Constitutional Court or to the relevant Convention standards and their 
decision-making did not include an analysis of  the impact of  the applicant organisation’s 
dissolution on the fundamental rights of Pentecostal believers. As it happened, their judg-
ments put an end to the existence of a long-standing religious organisation and constituted 
a most severe form of interference, which cannot be regarded as proportionate to whatever 
legitimate aims were pursued”, para. 61. See also similar approach of the ECtHR in Khmel 
v Russia, App. no. 20383/04 (ECtHR, 12 December 2013) referring to 86-O (Russian Constitu-
tional Court, 14 July 1998).
248 Khmel v Russia, App. no. 20383/04 (ECtHR, 12 December 2013) referring to 86-O (Russian Con-
stitutional Court, 14 July 1998).
249 Ramanauskas v Lithuania, App. no. 74420/01 (ECtHR, 5 February 2008). 
250 12/99-27/99-29/99-1/2000-2/2000 (n. 52) on operational activity.
251 The  Constitutional Court invoked Klass and  Others v  Germany, App. no. 5029/71 (ECtHR, 
6 September 1978); Kopp v Switzerland, App. no. 23224/94 (ECtHR, 5 March 1998); Teixeira de 
Castro v Portugal, App. no. 44/1997/828/1034 (ECtHR, 9 June 1998).
252 Kohlhofer et Minarik v  Czech Republic, App. nos 32921/03, 28464/04 and  5344/05 (ECtHR, 
15 October 2009).
253 Case Pl. ÚS 14/10 (Czech Constitutional Court, 7 January 2011), para. 46. 
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to decision of ECtHR in Husák v Czech Republic254 concerning right of the accused 
to be heart in case of infringement of personal freedom before a court which makes 
a decision on the limitations of freedom, and this at any time such decision making 
takes place the Constitutional Court found that in principle, there is no reason for 
a child not to have the fundamental right to be heard directly before a court when 
a decision is being passed on restricting their personal freedom whilst an adult has 
such a right in the same circumstances. A relevant reason for denying the right 
of a child to be heard surely occurs when the child is not capable, with respect to 
the level of their development, of forming an opinion and evaluating the bearing 
of the measures relating to them.255
3.2.2. The Dialogue on EU Law
An important field of judicial dialogue in EEC is Union law. As it was already 
mentioned constitutional courts usually refer to foreign judgement to draw in-
spiration. Already in first decisions concerning EU law discussed in former part 
of the paper Polish and Czech Constitutional Courts invoked experience of their 
counterparts form ‘old’ Union. In these cases they did it briefly mainly to justify 
own position within pluralistic system as highest courts of national constitutional 
orders.256 Also the Hungarian Constitutional Court used case law of other courts 
in its decision Lisbon Treaty257 in similar way.
The conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 gave rise new constitutional pro-
ceedings in which Polish and Czech Constitutional Courts, partly voluntary, partly 
provoked by the parties to the proceedings and the content of constitutional claims, 
made an in-depth comparative constitutional judicial analysis.258 The Czech Con-
stitutional Court in Lisbon Treaty I259 expressly declared that it took as inspira-
tion case law of other constitutional courts and considered fundamental especially 
the decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Solange II and the 
Maastricht.260 However, in Lisbon Treaty II the Court was explicitly called by appli-
cants to refer to the decision of the German Constitutional Court in order answer 
to the first question concerning definition of the “substantive limits to the trans-
fer of  powers” under eternity clause contained in  the Czech Constitution.261 
254 Husák v Czech Republic, App. no. 19970/04 (ECtHR, 4 December 2008).
255 Case II. ÚS 1945/08 (Czech Constitutional Court, 2 April 2009).
256 See: especially Polish Accession Treaty decision and Czech Sugar Quotas III decision. 
257 143/2010 (VII. 14.) AB (n. 107).
258 See: broader discussion of Lisbon decisions of Member States Constitutional Courts in Lis-
bon Treaty cases by M. Wendel, ‘Lisbon before the Courts: Comparative Perspective’ (2011) 
7 European Constitutional Law Review, p. 96.
259 Lisbon Treaty I Pl. ÚS 19/08 (n. 91).
260 See: paras 116–118 and 139.
261 According to Art. 9(2) of the Czech constitution, the “substantive requisites of the democratic, 
law-abiding State may not be amended.” According to Art. 1(1), the “Czech Republic is a sov-
ereign, unitary and democratic, law-abiding State, based on respect for the rights and free-
doms of man and citizen.” See: M. Wendel (n. 174), p. 11.
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As noticed by the Court itself, the question was “evidently inspired by the decision 
of  the German Constitutional Court.”262 The Constitutional Court considered it 
impossible to construct this kind of catalogue of non-transferrable powers under 
the Czech Constitution. The Court confirmed its previous findings that establish-
ment of such limits should be left primarily to the legislature, since it is an a priori 
political question. The Court also stressed that concepts of  sovereignty and  the 
rule of  law should be defined on case-by-case basis.263 The Court also dissented 
from the decision of the German Constitutional Court with regard to the interpre-
tation of the principle of democracy. 
In Lisbon Treaty264 the  Polish Constitutional Court carefully analysed de-
cisions of other European Constructional Courts and concluded that “the ju-
risprudence the  constitutional courts of  the Member States share –  as a  vital 
part of European constitutional traditions – the view that the constitution is of 
fundamental significance as it reflects and  guarantees the  state’s sovereignty 
at the  present stage of  European integration, and  also that the  constitutional 
judiciary plays a unique role as regards the protection of constitutional identity 
of  the Member States, which at the  same time determines the  treaty identity 
of  the European Union.” The position of  the Court is  a pluralist one. It  con-
sidered other members of the pluralist legal community to determine its own 
place in the whole system, on the one hand, and to confirm its own constitu-
tional identity in relation to the CJEU and other courts. The subsequent part 
of the judgment stressed that legal solutions elaborated by other constitutional 
courts, even as distinguished as the German Federal Constitutional Court, can-
not be considered suitable for the Polish constitutional framework. The Court 
was asked to determine the  possible scope of  transfer of  powers and  condi-
tions of  their execution under Art.  90 of  the Polish Constitution. The  Court 
held that it is neither its function to specify the content of the statute granting 
consent to ratification of an international agreement, as referred to in Art. 90 
of the Constitution, nor to establish the rules of participation of the parliament 
and  the government in  implementation of  the Treaty of Lisbon.265 The Court 
noticed that applicants’ expectations in this regard were inspired by the judge-
ment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, in which it decided not only 
on the consistency of the Treaty of Lisbon with the German Basic Law but also 
262 See: Lisbon Treaty II (n. 91), para. 110. 
263 The Court noticed that “[t]his does not involve arbitrariness, but, on the contrary, restraint 
and judicial minimalism, which is perceived as a means of limiting the judicial power in fa-
vour of political processes, and which outweighs the requirement of absolute legal certain-
ty […]. The attempt to define the term ‘sovereign, unitary and democratic state governed by 
the rule of law, founded on respect for the rights and freedoms of the man and of citizens’ 
once and for all (as the petitioners, supported by the president, request) would, in contrast, 
be seen as an expression of judicial activism […].”
264 Case K 32/09 (n. 112).
265 Para. III.2.6.
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on constitutionality of some provisions concerning the powers of the Parliament 
with regard to European matters. The Polish Constitutional Court noticed vital 
differences between the  Polish and  the German Constitution, when it comes 
to regulating the systemic foundations of European integration. According to 
the Court, in the Polish constitutional system it is for the drafters of the Polish 
Constitution and the legislator to resolve the problem of democratic legitimacy 
of  the measures provided for in  the Treaty, applied by the  competent bodies 
of the Union. However, in the next part of the judgment the Court determined, 
on the basis of Preamble, Art. 2 (the rule of law) and Art. 8 (supremacy of the 
Constitution) of  the Constitution, the  catalogue of  inalienable competences, 
the Court included the following: decisions specifying the fundamental princi-
ples of the Constitution and decisions concerning the rights of the individual 
which determine the identity of the state, including, in particular, the require-
ment of  protection of  human dignity and  constitutional rights, the  principle 
of  statehood, the principle of democratic governance, the principle of  a  state 
ruled by law, the principle of social justice, the principle of subsidiarity, as well 
as the requirement of ensuring better implementation of constitutional values 
and  the prohibition to confer the  power to amend the  Constitution and  the 
competence to determine competences.266 The statement of  the Court is very 
similar to that of  the German Constitutional Court based on eternity clause 
defined in Art. 79(3) of the German Basic Law.267
The Polish Constitutional Court entered into a dialogue on interpretation of the 
founding treaties also in relation to the ratification of the European Council De-
cision amending Art. 136 TFEU.268 The Court supported its argumentation with 
the CJEU’s decision in Pringle.269 It also analysed the  judgement of  the German 
Federal Constitutional Court270 to determine the nature of the Decision and found, 
following the reasoning of  the two mentioned courts, that the Decision did not 
concern competences vested in the organs of state authority, and therefore it could 
not confer such competences upon an international organisation or an interna-
tional authority.
Judicial dialogue is also present in cases concerning interpretation of obliga-
tions of States under secondary law of the European Union and covers not only 
referrals to the CJEU271 but also to other national courts. The best example of such 
dialogue is  the case law relating to Directive 2006/24/EC of  the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generat-
266 Para. III.2.1.
267 See: para. C.I.2 of the decision of the German Constitutional Court in Lisbon Treaty 2 BvE 2/08 
(German Federal Constitutional Court, 30 June 2009).
268 Case K 33/12 (Polish Constitutional Court, 26 June 2013). 
269 C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland (CJEU, 27 November 2012).
270 Case 2 BvR 1390/12 (German Federal Constitutional Court, 12 September 2012).
271 See inter alia: 13/2013–34/2014 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 29 October 2015) on public 
interest services in the electricity sector, Pl. ÚS 37/04 (n 138) on discrimination.
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ed or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC272 (Data Retention Directive).273 It illustrates not only uni-
versality of rights protected under different constitutional orders, but also interac-
tions between EU law and national law, which are in turn influenced by the ECHR. 
The case concerned compatibility of EU directive as well as national law both im-
plementing the Directive and extending beyond this act with the right of respect 
of privacy and family life. 
The Data Retention Directive as well as the national implementing meas-
ures evoked numerous doubts from the point of view of protection of the right 
to privacy. Consequently constitutional courts of  Member States resolved 
number of  cases concerning constitutionality of  the system established by 
the Directive.274 The Directive constituted also the subject of judicial review by 
the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. within the preliminary ruling procedure 
instigated by the High Court (Ireland) and the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Aus-
tria).275 In the said judgment, the Court ruled that the Data Retention Direc-
tive 2006/24/EC was invalid as it violated Art. 7 (respect for private and family 
life) and Art. 8 (the protection of personal data) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. The CJEU found that the Data Retention Direc-
tive constituted a serious interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed 
in Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter, but it did not adversely affect the essence 
of those rights due to the fact that “Member States are to ensure that appro-
priate technical and  organisational measures are  adopted against accidental 
or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration of  the data.” However, 
the vagueness of the Directive’s text about Member States’ obligation became 
one of the reasons for criticism. Moreover, the court acknowledged the danger 
of imprecise data treatment by electronic providers due to economic concerns, 
and  found that the  safeguards were insufficient.276 According to the  Court, 
272 OJ L 105, 13.04.2006, 54.
273 Data Retention Directive regulated obtaining and storing telecommunications data in EU 
Member States. It contained provisions concerning the obligations of the providers of pub-
licly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
in regard to the retention of  traffic and  location data which are generated or processed 
by them, in order to ensure availability of such data for the purpose of the investigation, 
detection and  prosecution of  serious crime, as defined by each Member State in  its na-
tional law. The  Directive did not address issues related to the  retention and  disclosure 
of the content of communication via ICT networks. Pursuant to its Art. 6, data were to be 
retained for periods of not less than six months and not more than two years from the date 
of the communication.
274 Cf. T. Konstadinides, ‘Destroying Democracy on the Ground of Defending It? The Data Reten-
tion Directive, the Surveillance State and Our Constitutional Ecosystem’ (2011) 36 European 
Law Review, p. 722. 
275 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. (CJEU, 8 April 2014).
276 Para. 66 of the judgement.
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due to the  significance of  means of  electronic communication in  the mod-
ern world, data retained on the  basis of  the Directive in  question provided 
national authorities with additional possibilities to shed light on serious of-
fences. Thus, the  fight against serious crime, in particular against organised 
crime and terrorism, constituted legitimate aim of limitation of fundamental 
rights. Yet, the restriction of rights imposed by the Directive were recognised 
by the CJEU as contrary to the proportionality requirements. It must be no-
ticed that the CJEU based its findings concerning right to privacy on the juris-
prudence of the ECtHR.277
It must be noted that before the CJEU’s judgment in Digital Rights Ireland 
was issued, the Czech national provisions aiming at implementation of the di-
rective were challenged before the Czech Constitutional Court.278 What is sig-
nificant, due to a strict connection of provisions in question with EU law, appli-
cants suggested asking a question to the CJEU about the potential invalidation 
of the Directive. The Constitutional Court found that although it is not com-
petent to interpret acts of EU institutions, since it is an exclusive competence 
of  the CJEU, it was not necessary to refer the  question to the  CJEU because 
national law in question went beyond the purpose of the Directive.279 Howev-
er, it must be noticed that the same provisions of the Directive later annulled 
by the  CJEU, such as obligation of  retention of  data with absolutely no dif-
ferentiation, were also covered by the Constitutional Court review. In that re-
gard the Czech Court argued that the Directive provided sufficient discretion 
to Member States to implement the  measures and  thus, this abstract review 
concerned a review of domestic and not Community legislation. Consequently, 
since there was no question of  EU law being involved, preliminary reference 
was unnecessary. Furthermore, the Czech Court underlined its role as guardi-
an of the Constitution and emphasised that national legislators had to comply 
with domestic constitutional principles when legislating, regardless of whether 
the essence of  the measures originated from an external source. The position 
of the Czech Constitutional Court was inspired by the reasoning of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of  Germany in  similar case280 although not referred to 
in this part of the judgment.
The Czech Constitutional Court then proceeded with examination of the attrib-
utes of the contested legislation. Doing so the Court broadly referred to the case 
law of the ECtHR as well as to the decisions of other constitutional courts281 with 
277 See paras: 35, 47, 54–55 of the judgment.
278 Case Pl. ÚS 24/10 (Czech Constitutional Court, 22 March 2011).
279 See: para. 25 of the judgment. 
280 Cases: 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08 (German Federal Constitutional Court, judg-
ment, 2 March 2010) Data Retention. 
281 The Court referred to 1258 (Romanian Constitutional Court, 8 October 2009); (Supreme Court 
of Bulgaria, 11 December 2008); 65/2009, 78/2009, 82/2009 and 15/2010–22/2010 (Supreme 
Court of Cyprus, 1 February 2011).
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special attention devoted to the German Constitutional Court jurisprudence con-
cerning the content and the scope of the right to privacy.282 The Court also referred 
to the decisions of the CJEU.283 In the conclusion the Constitutional Court found 
the  national law on data retention disproportionate and  thus, unconstitution-
al. The grounds of annulment were very similar to those indicated by the CJEU 
in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd.
It must be noted that in the last obiter dicta, the Czech Constitutional Court 
went back to the Data Retention Directive and called into question the validity 
of the Directive. It noted that there are serious doubts concerning data retention 
as an appropriate and effective measure as well as the necessity of such meas-
ures. In the light of these statements the refusal to refer the preliminary question 
to the CJEU is surprising. The only explanation of resistance of the Czech Court 
is preservation of its own role as a final arbiter in cases concerning domestic law 
and the position of the Constitution as the supreme law. The Court intended to 
avoid the situation in which it would be simply an executive body of a specific 
interpretation of both the directive and fundamental rights protected under EU 
law delivered by the CJEU. At the same time the Constitutional Court did not 
hesitate to support argumentation as to the  interpretation of  respective pro-
vision of  the Constitution with references to foreign and  international courts 
including the CJEU.
The above reasoning proves that court-to-court relation constitutes a very sen-
sitive issue for the Czech Constitutional Court. On the one hand, as the European 
Arrest Warrant and other decisions showed, it can be recognised as Euro-friendly 
and open for interpretation of the Czech Constitution with the due consideration 
to European standards, on the other hand it is  reluctant to use means of direct 
cooperation with the CJEU.284 
The provisions of Polish law implementing the Data Retention Directive were 
challenged before the  Constitutional Court after the  decision of  the CJEU.285 
The Polish Constitutional Court in the statement of reasons firstly broadly analysed 
282 Case BVerfGE 65 (German Federal Constitutional Court, 15 December 1983); BVerfGE 115 
(German Federal Constitutional Court, 4 April 2006); 1 BvR 668/04 (German Federal Consitu-
tional Court, 27 July 2005); 1 BvR 370/07, 1 BvR 595/07 (German Constitutional Court, 27 Feb-
ruary 2008); 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08 (n. 277).
283 The Czech Constitutional Court referred to joint cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus 
Schecke GbR (CJEU, 9 November 2010) as indicating “[t]he necessity to provide, in a manner 
as stringent as possible, the  guarantees and  instruments for protecting the  fundamental 
rights of individual when handling their personal data generated in course of electronic com-
munications.” See: para. 52. 
284 P. Molek, ‘The Czech Constitutional Court and  the Court of  Justice: Between Fascination 
and Securing Autonomy’, [in:] M. Claes, M. de Visser, P. Popelier, C. Van de Heyning (eds), Con-
stitutional Conversation in Europe. Actors, Topics and Procedures (Intersentia Publishing Ltd. 
2012), p. 131.
285 Case K 23/11 (n. 59).
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the case law of the ECtHR with regard to Art. 8 ECHR (right to privacy).286 Sec-
ondly, the  Court referred to the  case law of  the CJEU and  other constitutional 
courts of the Member States.287 In regard to the above mentioned decision of the 
CJEU, the court noticed that although the CJEU’s Digital Rights Ireland decision 
does not directly bind the Constitutional Tribunal in the procedure for the con-
stitutional review of national provisions, “given the fact that there is a functional 
relation between the challenged provisions and the said Directive, and that the lev-
el of  protection of  privacy in  the context of  the storing and  processing of  per-
sonal data is – at least – not lower than the level guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 
of the Charter, the Constitutional Tribunal deems it useful to consider the deci-
sion of the CJEU a background for its own decision in the constitutional review 
of  national provisions on granting access to telecommunications data to police 
forces and state security services.”288 The Constitutional Court also reminded that 
its competence to review the constitutionality of normative acts covers a situation 
where the allegation of unconstitutionality concerns a statute aimed at ensuring 
the effectiveness of EU law in the Polish legal order.289 In subsequent part of the 
judgment the Constitutional Court referred to decisions of other constitutional 
courts290 to determine not only their way of understanding of right to privacy as 
guaranteed by European and national law and the scope of justified and necessary 
limitations in similar situations but also to find out the way of enforcement of the 
judgement of the CJEU.
It is  obvious from the  content of  the judgment, that the  previous judgment 
of  the CJEU was decisive for the  Polish Constitutional Court when evaluating 
the consistency of national provisions directly implementing the Data Retention 
Directive with human rights.291 What is significant is that the Court read the CJEU 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. decision in the light of case law of the ECtHR. 
286 See: para. 2 of the judgement entitled “Selected jurisprudence of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights.”
287 See: para. 3 of the judgement entitled “The retention of telecommunications data in the ju-
risprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and selected constitutional courts 
of EU Member States.”
288 Para. 3.2.3 of the judgment.
289 Case P  1/05 (n. 113), para. III.2.4; Kp 8/09 (Polish Constitutional Court, 3  December  2009), 
para. III.4.
290 13627 (Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria, 11 December 2008); 1258 (Romanian Con-
stitutional Court 8 December 2009); 1 BvR 256/08 (n. 282); Pl. ÚS 24/10 (n. 281); Pl. ÚS 10/2014 
(Slovakian Constitutional Court, 23 April 2014); G 47/2012, G 59/2012, G 62/2012, G 70/2012, 
G 71/2012 (Austrian Constitutional Court, 27 July 2014), 3 July 2014, the Slovenian Constitu-
tional Court.
291 See: paras III.5.3, III.10.3 and III.10.4.3 of the judgement. In the literature the judgment is also 
recognised as the only one example of recognition of unconstitutionality of Polish law be-
cause of its inconsistency with EU law. Such a conclusion seems to be however kind of over 
interpretation of the Euro-friendly approach taken by the Constitutional Court. See: K. Kow-
alik-Bańczyk, ‘Report on Poland’, [in:] G. Martinico, O. Pollicino (eds), The National Treatment 
of the ECHR and EU Law. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective (2010), p. 329.
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3.3. The Limits of Judicial Dialogue – from Sovereignty 
to Constitutional Identity
As it was already mentioned, constitutional pluralism presupposed the exist-
ence of plural ultimate authority responsible for maintenance of coherence of the 
legal system and conformity of  its norms with constitutional foundations. This 
task is performed by constitutional courts, on the one hand, and  international 
courts (the ECtHR and the CJEU), on the other. From the perspective of institu-
tional pluralism it is crucial to determine mutual legal relations between the high-
est courts. The  common values, on which legal orders under consideration 
are based, minimalize the risk of conflict between them in  the process of con-
sistent and mutually sympathetic interpretation. However, the existence of such 
a conflict cannot be excluded and, as it was already mentioned, it is an inherent 
element of the pluralistic environment. The aim of this part of contribution is to 
explore limits of the judicial dialogue established in the practice of constitutional 
courts. We will look mainly at arguments used by courts in cases where they dis-
sented from the decisions of international courts. 
With regard to the CJEU, it must be remembered that the CEE constitution-
al courts reserved to themselves the power to control the protection of individ-
uals’ constitutionally granted rights, over the preservation of limits of powers 
conferred upon EU institutions and over protection of national constitutional 
identity. It  is for each of  the constitutional courts to determine the bounda-
ry conditions. The  relation between national constitutional courts is  deter-
mined by two main legal factors: the position of  international and European 
law in a national legal order and the scope of jurisdiction of the constitutional 
court in question. 
The Czech Slovak pensions saga constitutes a prominent example of difficult 
cooperation including tension between the Constitutional Court and the CJEU. 
It also shows that declared ultimate authority of  the Constitutional Court may 
be successfully questioned though cooperation of  other national courts with 
the CJEU in the preliminary ruling procedure.292 The dialogue between the Czech 
Constitutional Court and  the CJEU was provoked by the  conflict between 
the Czech Supreme Administrative Court and the Czech Constitutional Court. 
292 See: detailed analysis in that regard: J. Komárek, ‘Playing with Matches: The Czech Consti-
tutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU ultra Vires; Judgment 
of 31 January, Pl. ÚS 5/12 Slovak Prensions XVII’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review, 
p. 323; R. Král, ‘Questioning the Recent Challenge of the Czech Constitutional Court to the ECJ’ 
(2013) 19 European Public Law, p. 271; Z. Kühn, ‘Ultra Vires Review and Demise of Constitu-
tional Pluralism. The Czecho-Slovak Pensions Saga, and the Dangers of State Court’s Defiance 
of EU Law’ (2016) 1 Maastricht Journal, p. 183; G. Anagnostaras, ‘Activation of the Ultra Vires 
Review: The Slovak Pensions Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court’ (2013) 14 German 
Law Journal, p. 959; R. Zbíral, ‘A Legal Revolution or Negligible Episode? Court of Justice De-
cision Proclaimed Ultra Vires’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review, p. 1457.
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The case originated in the specific historical legal circumstances connected with 
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the conclusion between the Czech Repub-
lic and the Slovak Republic of an international agreement aimed at coordinating 
matters relating to social security benefits. The criterion chosen for determining 
the  applicable scheme and  the authority with competence to grant such bene-
fits was that of the State of residence of the employer at the time of dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia. Since the adopted solution resulted in differentiation of eco-
nomic situation of Czech citizens based on former employer’s residence, the Con-
stitutional Court, on the basis of Art. 30 of the Czech Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, decided on special subsidiary payment to Czech citizens, residing in the 
Czech Republic conceived of as an additional benefit to pensions provided for 
in Art. 20 of the Czech-Slovak Agreement of 1992.293 The Czech Administrative 
Court disagreed with the law-creating decision and refused to apply Czech law 
as contrary to the Council Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social secu-
rity schemes to employed persons moving within the  Union as interpreted by 
the CJEU.294 The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court was challenged 
subsequently before the  Constitutional Court. There existed a  clear necessity 
to interpret EU law after the  accession of  the Czech Republic and  Slovakia to 
the EU as the Czech-Slovak Agreement became a part of EU law.295 It seemed that 
the Constitutional Court had thus an excellent opportunity to make a reference 
to the CJEU and to submit constitutional arguments to support its own position. 
Instead, the Czech Court based the final decision on its own interpretation of the 
Regulation. In consequence it found Union law inapplicable to the case for tem-
poral reasons and on this ground quashed the decision of the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court.296 
In such a  situation the request for a preliminary ruling concerning the con-
formity of the supplementary payment with EU law was submitted to the CJEU by 
the Supreme Administrative Court.297 Since the reference resulted in suspension 
of other similar proceedings until the judgment of Luxembourg Court was issued, 
the Constitutional Court was granted another opportunity to change its position 
293 The  Czech Constitutional Court in  the first Slovak Pensions case held that Art.  20 of  the 
Czech-Slovak Agreement was contrary to constitutional right to an adequate material secu-
rity in old age. It found that it is necessary to bring the amount of old age benefits of Czech 
citizens granted under Art.  20 of  the Agreement into line with the  amount due to other 
pensioners residing in  the Czech Republic, as required by Czech domestic law, including 
Pl. II. ÚS 405/02 (Czech Constitutional Court, 6 March 2003). In  the subsequent judgment 
the Court found that beneficiaries of the special increment are solely Czech citizens residing 
in the Czech Republic. Pl. II. ÚS 252/04 (Czech Constitutional Court, 25 January 2005).
294 Case 3 Ads 2/2003–112 (Czech Supreme Administrative Court, 26 October 2005).
295 The agreement because it was listed in the third Annex of the Regulation 1408/71 and not list-
ed in the annex as still applicable but interpreted in accordance with the general principles 
of EU law. 
296 Case Pl. ÚS 4/06 (Constitutional Court, 20 March 2007).
297 Case 3 Ads 130/2008 (Czech Supreme Administrative Court, 23 September 2009).
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since the  decision on suspension was challenged before it. The  Constitutional 
Court, however, not only sustained its former findings as to the scope of applica-
tion of the Regulation, but also recognised that in situation when inapplicability 
of EU law was manifest, the referral to the CJEU was inadmissible and contrary to 
the Constitution.298
The Supreme Administrative Court referred to the  CJEU two questions: 
the first one concerning the conformity of conferral of a supplementary payment 
under the judgment of the Constitutional Court with the Regulation, the second 
concerning conformity of requirement of citizenship and residency with the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination as established in the Regulation. What is significant, 
in the conduct of the procedure before the CJEU, the Czech government argued 
against the judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, which means that nation-
al constitutional interests connected with history of the State invoked by the Con-
stitutional Court were not presented to the CJEU. In reaction, the Constitutional 
Court decided to submit its own statement to the CJEU to provide supplementary 
information and arguments for the proceeding, however the CJEU refused to ac-
cept it. 
In C-399/09 Landtová,299 the CJEU had no doubts that the Regulation is ap-
plicable in  the case and decided that the provisions of EU law do not preclude 
a national rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for 
payment of  a  supplement to old age benefit where the  amount of  that benefit, 
granted pursuant to the Czech-Slovak Agreement, is lower than that which would 
have been received if the retirement pension had been calculated in accordance 
with the legal rules of the Czech Republic. However, when answering the second 
question, the CJEU held that supplementary payment granted solely to Czech na-
tionals residing in the territory of the Czech Republic is inconsistent with EU law 
as discriminatory measure, based on precondition of nationality, differentiating 
between Czech nationals and nationals of other Member States. The Court also ex-
plained that EU law does not require depravation of such payment to an individual 
who satisfies the requirements.300 
After the judgment of the CJEU the Supreme Administrative Court issued 
a  rather provocative decision where it stated that since the  judgment of  the 
Constitutional Court was not only contrary to EU law but also violated the duty 
to refer a preliminary question to the CJEU, the Supreme Administrative Court 
is  not bound by the  effective judgement. Paradoxically, the  Administrative 
298 Case III. ÚS 1012/10 (Czech Constitutional Court, 12 August 2010). 
299 C-399/09 Marie Landtová v Česká správa socialního zabezpečení (CJEU, 22 June 2011).
300 The CJEU held: “EU law does not, provided that the general principles of EU law are respect-
ed, preclude measures to re-establish equal treatment by reducing the  advantages of  the 
persons previously favoured” and  added, that “before such measures are  adopted, there 
is no provision of EU law which requires that a category of persons who already benefit from 
supplementary social protection, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, should be 
deprived of it”, ibidem, paras 53–54.
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Court based its findings on previous decisions of  the Constitutional Court, 
in which the Constitutional Court quashed decisions of the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court because of the breach of the constitutional right to lawful judge. 
Moreover, the Supreme Administrative Court pointed out that although it did 
not question the  position of  the Constitutional Court as the  guardian of  the 
Constitution, the  possibility of  recognition of  EU decisions as unconstitu-
tional (according to the case law of the Constitutional Court301) is exceptional 
and possible only if the relevant provisions of EU law violate the material core 
of the Constitution. 
As the result, the Czech Constitutional Court for the first time in the history 
of the EU recognised the ruling of the CJUE to be ultra vires.302 The Court held 
that the “[f]ailure to distinguish the legal relationships arising from the dissolution 
of a state with a uniform social security system from the legal relationships arising 
for social security from the free movement of persons in the European Communi-
ties, or the European Union, is a failure to respect European history, it is comparing 
things that are not comparable.” In consequence, according to the Constitutional 
Court “in that case there were excesses on the part of a European Union body, 
that a situation occurred in which an act by a European body exceeded the pow-
ers that the  Czech Republic transferred to the  European Union under Art.  10a 
of  the Constitution; this exceeded the scope of  the  transferred powers, and was 
ultra vires.”
The position of the Constitutional Court seems to be surprising in the light 
of previous decisions concerning Union law. In the discussed case the Consti-
tutional Court consistently considered it as a  purely internal one since from 
a  national perspective the  main problem was not the  conformity of  the spe-
cial payment with EU law but a  law-creating activity of  the Constitutional 
Court.303 It must be repeated that the decision of the Constitutional Court was 
the sole ground of the supplementary benefit. The Constitutional Court missed 
the question of Union law in the first decision and, to defend its own legal con-
struct, deemed EU law inapplicable. Such false assumption seems to have been 
the main reason for the disagreement. The whole argumentation of  the Court 
is highly emotional and the application of ultra vires concept remains doubtful. 
The position of the Constitutional Court is based on a subjective interpretation 
of  historical facts. At the  same time, not only other Czech courts challenged 
the position of the Constitutional Court but also the Government and the Parlia-
ment304 disagreed. This fact clearly indicates the internal conflict between state 
authorities and judicial bodies. 
301 Case Pl. ÚS 50/04 (Czech Constitutional Court, 8 March 2006) and Pl. ÚS 19/08 (n. 91).
302 Slovak Pensions Pl. ÚS 5/12 (Czech Constitutional Court, 31 January 2012).
303 Cf. J. Komàrek (n. 293), p. 325.
304 Shortly of the judgment of the CJEU the Parliament adopted an act, which prospectively ex-
cluded the possibility of paying the special supplement to everyone with a specific reference 
to the CJEU’s ruling.
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The Constitutional Court accused the CJEU of a lack of good will and cooper-
ation and pointed to “deficiencies concerning the safeguards of a fair trial in the 
proceedings” before the CJEU. For the Constitutional Court it was obvious that 
the CJEU had a  legal possibility to accept its letter.305 However, such possibility 
is not expressly indicated in the Statute of the CJEU. In opposition to the proce-
dural position of the Commission, and State governments and other institutions 
involved in  the procedure before national court, interventions of  a  third party 
is not regulated by the Statute of the CJEU.306 It must be also stressed that the func-
tion of the preliminary ruling procedure is to interpret EU law in circumstances 
of  a  particular case to support the  national court in  application of  that law on 
the one hand and ensure its uniform application in the whole Union on the other. 
That’s why the CJEU is bound by findings of referring court as to the applicable na-
tional law.307 The CJEU does not resolve disputes between state authorities in this 
procedure. If it had accepted the  letter of  the Constitutional Court, the  CJEU 
would have put itself in the position of an arbiter between the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court, the Czech Government and the Constitutional Court. Thanks to 
the fact that it rejected the letter of the Constitutional Court, the CJEU simply per-
formed its function and interpreted the Regulation within the limits of the ques-
tions posed by the referring court. 
It is yet another question whether the Constitutional Court should have made 
its own referral for a preliminary ruling in  the two cases. Although it is obvi-
ous that the Constitutional Court missed this opportunity to resolve the  legal 
problem by means of a direct dialogue with the CJEU, it must be noticed, that 
the main problem was that the Constitutional Court did not consider EU law 
in the first decision conferring a right to supplementary payment. This was an 
original sin on the part of the Constitutional Court. The subsequent argumenta-
tion was only a consequence of this initial omission. For this reason the Consti-
tutional Court sustained that the whole case remains outside the scope of EU law. 
At the same time, the preliminary ruling request of the Supreme Administrative 
Court was not motivated mainly by the care for effectiveness of EU law in the 
Czech Republic, but it was politically motivated and aimed to challenge the posi-
tion of the Constitutional Court. As the result of the provocation by the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the Constitutional Court overreacted and misused ultra 
vires review. Consequently, the decision of the Court has been broadly criticised 
305 The Court indicated that “the ECJ regularly makes use of the institution of amici curiae in pro-
ceedings on preliminary questions, especially in relation to the European Commission. In a situ-
ation where the ECJ was aware that the Czech Republic, as a party to the proceeding, in whose 
name the government acted, expressed in its statement a negative position on the legal opin-
ion of the Constitutional Court, which was the subject matter for evaluation, the ECJ’ statement 
that the Constitutional Court was a ‘third party’ in the case at hand cannot be seen otherwise 
than as abandoning the principle audiatur et altera pars”, para. VII.2. 
306 See: J. Komàrek (n. 293). 
307 C-213/04 Ewald Burtscher (CJEU, 1 December 2005).
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and rejected by other state organs of the Czech Republic including administra-
tive courts. It shows, that in the era of constitutional pluralism, at least within 
the EU, the question of  the court of  last world remains open and that any de-
cision denying authority of the CJEU must be well grounded. It also illustrates 
problem of ‘dual loyalty’ of national courts applying EU law. The last, and un-
fortunately lesser word in the case belonged to the Constitutional Court but its 
argumentative power is rather weak, so the decision should not be recognised as 
a precedent. 
Although the  decision in  Slovak Pensions can hardly be recognised as 
a pre cedent, it has influenced the perception of EU law in the Czech legal or-
der. In the 2014 Report the Constitutional Court presented the following ap-
proach: “[t]he  Constitutional Court believes that the  national constitutional 
order and  EU law are  two different systems and  two reference criteria, each 
of which is used autonomously by a different body. The ambits of  the Court 
of  Justice of  the European Union and  the Constitutional Court thus do  not 
overlap, much as the Constitutional Court (driven by the German Solange doc-
trine) reserved the  right to intervene, should the  European Union overstep 
powers delegated to it by the Czech Republic (acting ultra vires), or should it 
interfere with the material core of the Constitution […]” and concluded that 
“the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is of limited im-
portance to the application practice of the Constitutional Court due to the mu-
tual non-connectedness of the two judicial systems.”308 There is no doubt that 
the  statement was connected with Slovak Pensions decision discussed in  the 
subsequent part of the Report. The Constitutional Court tried to show that it 
was not in the position of competition CJEU basing its argumentation on a du-
alistic approach towards EU law. 
The next example of an Eastern European court, which used dialogue to as-
sert and justify a particular domestic constitutional standard that differs from 
the  solution offered under international human rights law comes from Lith-
uania. It  is the Paksas case of  the Lithuanian Constitutional Court of 25 May 
2012.309 In this case, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court emphasised the need 
to protect the  ‘very constitutional identity’ of  Lithuania when it justified its 
rejection of ECtHR jurisprudence. The case in question concerned the effects 
of the ECtHR judgment Paksas v Lithuania,310 which criticised an earlier 2004 
Constitutional Court’s decision311 concerning consequences of  impeachment 
308 Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (2013) National Report XVIth Congress of the Con-
ference of European Constitutional Courts “Cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe 
– Current Situation and Perspectives” 11.
309 Case 8/2012/05/09/2012 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 22 May 2012).
310 Paksas v Lithuania, App. no. 34932/04 (ECtHR, 6 January 2011). 
311 Case 24/04 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 25 May 2004).
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procedure in  the field of  electoral rights.312 When reviewing this decision, 
the ECtHR found a violation of  the right to vote and  stand in parliamentary 
elections under Art.  3 of  the First Protocol to the  ECHR. In  its subsequent 
decision of 2012, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court questioned the ECtHR’s 
arguments and set out the limits of the legal consequences of the ECtHR judg-
ments in  the Lithuanian legal order based on two arguments. First, the Con-
stitutional Court of  Lithuania pointed to the  subsidiary nature of  the ECHR 
system and stressed its own exclusive competence to interpret the Constitution 
of Lithuania.313 
The Lithuanian Constitutional Court’s second argument related to the need 
to protect the  constitutional identity of  the state. It  observed that there was 
a  close relationship between the  impeachment procedure, breach of  oath 
and electoral rights under the Lithuanian Constitution. It stressed that a change 
of  any of  these three elements would influence the  balance of  the Lithuani-
an constitutional system and  the constitutional values behind this system. 
The  Constitutional Court of  Lithuania declared the  Lithuanian Constitution 
as the supreme law of the land. It further stated that ECtHR judgments might 
not serve as a constitutional basis for the reinterpretation of  the official con-
stitutional doctrine if such reinterpretation, in  the absence of  corresponding 
amendments to the Lithuanian Constitution, affects the essence of the constitu-
tional provision in question. Such reinterpretation based on ECtHR judgments 
could also not be accepted if it unduly interfered with the values entrenched 
in the Lithuanian Constitution and undermined the level of protection of fun-
damental rights offered by it. 
The judgment of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court determined limits of ef-
fectiveness of the decision of the ECtHR, without questioning its legal value. It is 
clear for the Court that the decision is binding upon Lithuania, however, in case 
of conflict between the decision and constitutionally protected values the decision 
cannot be implemented without change of the Constitution. The Court decided 
that the harmonious interpretation of the Constitution has its limits if the consti-
tutional identity of the State is to be ensured. Yet, the Court did not use the term; 
it referred to the  “overall constitutional regulation” and  the “system of  values 
entrenched in  the Constitution” and  stressed its own role as a  guardian of  the 
constitution. The case constitutes an excellent example of a situation of collision 
312 The Lithuanian Constitutional Court held that a person who had been removed from the of-
fice of the president for a gross violation of the Lithuanian Constitution or a breach of oath, 
could never be elected president of the republic or a member of the Seimas (lower chamber 
of Lithuanian Parliament) again, nor could he/she hold an office for which it was necessary to 
take an oath in accordance with the Lithuanian Constitution.
313 “Even though the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, as a source for con-
struction of law, is important also for construction and application of Lithuanian law, the ju-
risdiction of the said Court does not replace the powers of the Constitutional Court to official-
ly construe the Constitution”, para. III.2.
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within a pluralistic system and shows that sometimes resolution of a conflict be-
tween a coexisting legal systems within pluralistic legal order cannot be resolved 
by judges. 
The Russian Constitutional Court adopted different approach towards con-
flicting situation, for the first time in the Markin case concerning paternal leave 
granted in  Russia elusively to female military personnel. After the  judgments 
of the ECtHR314 ascertaining violation of Art. 8 ECHR in which the ECtHR crit-
icised the Russian Constitutional Court’s decision based on the constitutional 
protection of  motherhood and  childhood315 as ‘unconvincing’ and  pointed to 
‘gender prejudices’ in  the decision,316 there was a  strong reaction in  Russia.317 
When Mr. Markin applied for the reopening of his case before a regional court 
in  St.  Petersburg, in  consequence of  the ECtHR’s ruling, the  court referred 
the case to the Russian Constitutional Court as it was faced with the legal ques-
tion of how to reconcile contradicting judgments of the Russian Constitution-
al Court and  the ECtHR. In  its decision, the  Russian Constitutional Court318 
made sure that it left a  backdoor open that would allow it to protect specif-
ic domestic solutions in  the future, in particular solutions that were based on 
314 ECtHR cases: Konstantin Markin v Russia, App. no. 30078/06 (7 October 2010); Konstantin Mar-
kin v Russia, App. no. 30078/06 (22 March 2012).
315 Case 187-О-О (Russian Constitutional Court, 15 January 2009). The Constitutional Court stat-
ed that: “Owing to the specific demands of military service, non-performance of military du-
ties by military personnel en masse must be excluded as it might cause detriment to the pub-
lic interests protected by law. Therefore, the  fact that servicemen under contract are  not 
entitled to parental leave cannot be regarded as a  breach of  their constitutional rights or 
freedoms, including their right to take care of, and bring up, children […]. Moreover, this lim-
itation is justified by the voluntary nature of the military service contract. By granting, on an 
exceptional basis, the right to parental leave to servicewomen only, the legislature took into 
account, firstly, the limited participation of women in military service and, secondly, the spe-
cial social role of women associated with motherhood. [Those considerations] are compati-
ble with Art. 38(1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the legislature’s 
decision cannot be regarded as breaching the principles of equality of human rights and free-
doms or equality of rights of men and women, as guaranteed by Art. 19(2) and (3) of the Con-
stitution of the Russian Federation.” Translation after the ECtHR Konstantin Markin v Russia 
(Grand Chamber), para. 34.
316 See: paras 57–59 of the ECtHR Chamber judgment Konstantin Markin v Russia. 
317 The  President of  the Constitutional Court, Valeri Zorkin claimed that the  ECtHR had not 
shown sufficient respect for Russia’s sovereignty and its legislature, which was better placed 
to solve questions related to national security and determining the scope of individual rights 
in  this context. He further declared that the  interpretation of  the Russian Constitution by 
the Russian Constitutional Court could not automatically be overridden by an interpretation 
of the ECHR offered by the ECtHR. See more: W.E. Pomeranz, ‘Uneasy Partners: Russia and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 3 Human Rights Brief 17; G. Vaypan, ‘Acquiescence 
Affirmed, Its Limits Left Undefined: The Markin Judgment and the Pragmatism of the Rus-
sian Constitutional Court vis-à-vis the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014) 3 Russian Law 
Journal 130. 
318 Case 27-П/2013 (Russian Constitutional Court, 6 December 2013).
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its own interpretation of the Russian Constitution. The Russian Constitutional 
Court ruled that the district court was under an obligation to reopen the pro-
ceedings after the ECtHR had found a violation of the ECHR by Russia. How-
ever, the Court also noted that if a lower court is able to comply with the judg-
ment of the ECtHR only by disregarding an interpretation of the Constitution 
and a  finding of  the constitutionality of an ordinary law by the Russian Con-
stitutional Court that was binding on lower courts, the lower court in question 
is obliged to refer the case to the Russian Constitutional Court. The Constitu-
tional Court will then re-assess its interpretation of  the Russian Constitution 
and/or its finding on the constitutionality of a domestic provision in  the light 
of  the ECtHR judgment. The  Russian Constitutional Court did not indicate 
in detail how it would solve such cases. In the case at hand, the decision on Mr 
Markin’s right to parental leave became redundant because his children attained 
an age that no longer entitled him to parental leave.
In 2015 a  group of  Russian Members of  Parliament challenged before  the 
Russian Constitutional Court the constitutionality of the 1998 Federal Law “On 
Ratification of  the ECHR” and  the 1995 Federal Law “On International Trea-
ties”, alongside with a number of procedural norms. The applicants argued that 
the  system of  the ECHR and contested rules oblige national courts and other 
state bodies to unconditional implementation of  the ECtHR decisions even 
if they are contrary to the Russian Constitution and that such a situation leads to 
a breach of human rights and contradicts the fundamental principles of the con-
stitutional system. The Russian Constitutional Court in the decision of 14 July 
2015319 held that the contested norms do not conflict with the Constitution, how-
ever the reasoning of the Court was based on a very strong sovereignty argument 
supported by the primacy of the Constitution. The Court stressed that any dero-
gation form the obligation to execute ECtHR judgments must remain an exemp-
tion since both the Constitution and the ECHR are based on the shared basic 
values. The Constitutional Court stressed that the system of the ECHR is based 
on the  subsidiarity principle and  that the  protection granted by the  ECtHR 
is essentially complementary to the national mechanism of  judicial protection 
of human rights. It means that the protection must be granted in the first place 
by Russian courts including the Constitutional Court and that the result of the 
judgment of the ECtHR cannot be diminishing the level of protection of a con-
stitutional standard. 
The Court considered ECtHR judgments as an integral part of  the Russian 
legal system however under supremacy of the Constitution. The Court held that 
the Constitution stipulates 
319 Case 21-П/2015 (Russian Constitutional Court, 14 July 2015) unofficial translation by Maria 
Smirnova, <http://transnational-constitution.blogspot.com/2015/08/russian-constitution-
al-court-decision.html> (access: August 2016). Official summary: <http://www.ksrf.ru/en/De-
cision/Judgments/Documents/resume%202015%2021-%D0%9F.pdf> (access: August 2016). 
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“impossibility of implementation in the legal system of international treaties participation 
in which may result in either restriction on rights and freedoms of man and citizen or in vi-
olation of constitutional provisions by encroachment on the foundations of the constitu-
tional system of the Russian Federation. Thus, neither the Convention […] nor the ECtHR 
judgments based on the Convention and containing an assessment of national legislation 
or indicating the need to change any of  its provisions have capacity to cancel the priori-
ty of the Constitution in the Russian legal system.”320 The Court stressed that conclusion 
of  the  international agreement “does not mean repudiation by Russia of  its sovereignty.” 
As a result “in situation when the actual content of the judgment of the ECtHR […] un-
lawfully from constitutional and legal point of view allude to principles and norms of the 
Constitution, Russia may, however as a matter of exemption, depart from her obligations 
when such derogation is  the only way to avoid the  violation of  fundamental principles 
and norms of the Constitution.”321   
The next argument of the Russian Constitutional Court was based on the general 
international law. The Constitutional Court indicated that in a particular situation 
a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR, such that changes the ECHR’s 
meaning and results in a conflict with a national constitution, must be recognised 
as unlawful in the light of general international law and especially the customary 
norms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Constitutional Court 
argued that an international agreement is binding on the State parties only if it 
is interpreted according to the rules of 31(1) VCLT. Thus, if the ECtHR decides to 
deviate from these rules and attribute to the ECHR a meaning contradicting its ob-
ject and purpose or violating peremptory norms of international law, the State par-
ty may refuse to execute the ruling. The Constitutional Court recognised sovereign 
equality as a jus cogens of general international law. The Court invoked Art. 46(1) 
of the Vienna Convention and held that it can be recognised as the basis to block 
the action against the State, which is manifestly contrary to constitutional norms 
of particular importance. The Court explained that the situation of conflict under 
consideration concerns a dynamic interpretation by the ECtHR, which had been 
unforeseeable at the moment of the accession to the Convention. 
The Russian Constitutional Court also referred to the practice of the high-
est courts of European countries: Germany,322 Italy,323 Austria,324 and the United 
Kingdom,325 which also “adhere to the principle of the priority of norms of na-
tional constitutions in the execution of the ECtHR judgments.” This referral to 
foreign courts is  the most obvious example of an instrumental use of  judicial 
320 See: para. 2.2.
321 See: para. 2.2.
322 German Constitutional Court cases: Görgülü 2 BvR 1481/04 (14 October 2004); Solange I 2 BvL 
52/71 (29 May 1974).
323 Italian Constitutional Court cases: 264/12 (19 November 2012); 234/14 (22 October 2014). 
324 Case B 267/86 (Austrian Constitutional Court, 14 October 1987).
325 Case (2013) UKC 63 (The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 16 October 2013).
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dialogue. It must be recalled, that the Russian Constitutional Court usually does 
not refer to other national courts, which means that we have to do  with ex-
ceptional practice aimed at a  specific goal. This aim was to prove that adopt-
ed approach is nothing special within the society of state-parties to the ECHR. 
However an analogy between findings of  the Russian Constitutional Court 
and  courts invoked by it is  doubtful and  misleading. The  main problem dis-
cussed by national highest courts was how the judgement of the ECtHR should 
be implemented in  terms of  direct applicability of  the ECHR and  decisions 
of ECtHR. The courts declaring an international decisions non-executable but 
just with regard to unconstitutionality or legal impossibility for other reasons, 
of given modality of enforcement326 and did not call into question legally bind-
ing force of ECtHR decisions. 
326 The German Federal Constitutional Court in Görgülü, (n. 34) set up constitutional limits of im-
plementation of the judgments of the ECtHR and placed the Convention in German legal or-
der at the level of regular legislation. However the Federal Constitutional Court has never put 
into question legally binding force of the judgments of the ECtHR but converted their direct 
effect. In other words, the German Federal Constitutional Court consider how the judgment 
should be implemented not whether it should be implemented. Moreover, Security detention 
II 2 BvR 233/08 (Federal Constitutional Court, 4 May 2011), the Court held that Fundamental 
Law should be interpreted in the light of the Convention and its development by the ECtHR. 
According to the Court it should be done though transposition of European standard into do-
mestic legal order and held that “It is true that at national level, the European Convention on 
Human Rights ranks below the Basic Law. However, the provisions of the Basic Law are to be 
interpreted in a manner that is open to international law (völkerrechtsfreundlich). At the lev-
el of constitutional law, the text of the Convention and the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights serve as interpretation aids for the determination of the contents and scope 
of the fundamental rights and of rule-of-law principles enshrined in the Basic Law. An inter-
pretation that is open to international law does not require the Basic Law’s statements to be 
schematically aligned with those of the European Convention on Human Rights but requires 
its valuations to be taken on to the extent that this is methodically justifiable and compatible 
with the Basic Law’s standards.” Cf. F. Hoffmeister, ‘Germany: Status of European Convention 
on Human Rights in Domestic Law’ (2006) 4 I-CON 722, 729; A. Seibert-Fohr, M.E. Villiger (eds), 
Judgments of  the European Court of  Human Rights –  Effects and  Implementation (Nomos 
2014), p. 267. In case of the High Court of the United Kingdom the main question concerns 
the limits of obligation of the British courts stemming from the Human Rights Act to “take 
into account Strasbourg case law” “so far as it is possible to do so”, to read and give effect to 
legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. The referred judgement 
thus concerns judicial enforcement of the ECtHR decision and not legally binding force of it 
and general obligation of execution of the judgment. In contrast to the legal consequences 
of the judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court, the exclusion of judicial implementa-
tion of the judgement by the High Court in particular case does not mean that the judgement 
is non-executable at all. The High Court expressly stated that implementation of the judg-
ment belongs to the Parliament. See the discussion concerning problems with implementa-
tion of Hirst: E. Bates, ‘Analysing the Prisoner Voting Saga and the British Challenge to Stras-
bourg’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review, p. 503. Reference to Italian experience seems to 
be missed since in the decision of 2012 the Italian Constitutional Court clearly stated that: 
“when fundamental rights are at issue, respect for international obligations cannot in any 
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The main outcome of above discussed decisions of  the Constitutional Court 
is reservation of the ‘right to object’ in most exceptional cases. The Court declared 
willingness to pursue ‘dialogue and constructive engagement’.327 However, the ar-
gumentation of the Court based on the constitutionally determined state sover-
eignty protected, according to the Court, by the equal sovereignty principle such 
as jus cogens norm of  international law leaves no room for further negotiations 
in a  situation of a conflict. The Court retained the competence to make a  final 
decision as to the implementation of the ECtHR judgements in two kinds of con-
stitutional proceedings: the  review of  the constitutionality of  legislation which 
was found by the  ECtHR contrary to the  Convention (any court reconsidering 
a case on the basis of a decision of the ECtHR is obliged to submit legal question 
to the Constitutional Court)328 and the interpretation of the Constitution in cas-
es brought by the President or the Government of the Russian Federation when 
they consider that implementation of particular decision of the ECtHR can violate 
the Constitution.
As a consequence of the above discussed case and also in response to subse-
quent judgements of the ECtHR especially in Anchugov & Gladkov329 and Yukos330 
the  amendment to the  Federal constitutional law on the  Constitutional Court 
of Russian Federation (‘Amendment’) was adopted in December 2015. The new 
law extended powers of the Constitutional Court and entitled it, upon a request by 
the President or the government, to review a contradiction between the provisions 
of a treaty as interpreted by a treaty body and the provisions of the Constitution, 
and to declare decisions of international courts as ‘unenforceable’. It should be no-
ticed that the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Com-
mission) evaluated the Amendment. The Commission held that it is not against 
international law to empower the Constitutional Court to control the conformity 
with the Constitution of decisions of international bodies. However, it is contrary 
to international law, especially Art. 46 of the ECHR and customary rules stemming 
from Art. 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties of 1969, that 
a negative result of the constitutionality review makes the judgment ‘unenforce-
able’ and prevents the execution of the judgment in any manner in Russia. 
In April 2016 the Russian Constitutional Court, upon request of the Ministry 
of  Justice, resolved another case concerning enforcement of  the decision of  the 
case constitute grounds for a reduction in protection of compared to whose already available 
under national law, but on the contrary may and must constitute an effective instruments 
for expanding such protection.” The constitutional Court also stressed that ordinary courts 
are obliged to verify conformity of national law with the ECHR.
327 The Russian Constitutional Court declared that “in the resolution of such conflicts it is nec-
essary not to seek self-isolation, but proceed from the necessity of dialogue and constructive 
engagement. Only in this way can a truly harmonious relationship between the legal systems 
in Europe be built, based on mutual respect rather than submission.”
328 See: Art. 125(4) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
329 Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia, App. nos 11157/04 and 15162/05 (ECtHR, 4 July 2013).
330 Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia, App. no. 14902/04 (ECtHR, 31 July 2014).
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ECtHR.331 The  case originated in  Anchugov and  Gladkov v  Russia judgment 
in which the ECtHR found that the Russian Constitution, providing for general 
ban depraving prisoners right to vote or to stand for election, violated voting rights 
granted in Protocol 1(3) of the ECHR by Russian law, and Art. 32(3)332 of the Rus-
sian Constitution. Taking into account a possible constitutional dimension of its 
own decision, the ECtHR indicated that “[i]n the present case, it is open to the re-
spondent Government to explore all possible ways in that respect and to decide 
whether their compliance with Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 can be achieved through 
some form of  political process or by interpreting the  Russian Constitution by 
the  competent authorities –  the Russian Constitutional Court in  the first place 
–  in harmony with the Convention in  such a way as to coordinate their effects 
and avoid any conflict between them.” 
The Russian Constitutional Court, using new powers and broadly referring to 
the previous decision of 2015, deemed execution of a judgement in Anchugov and 
Gladkov as to both general and individual measures impossible. Although the Court 
employed in  its argumentation pluralistic vocabulary (mainly judicial dialogue, 
constitutional identity, mutual trust), the outcome of  the judgement is  far from 
being pluralist, since the Court determined that there was a complete impossibil-
ity of execution of the ECtHR decision. The execution was excluded by the Court 
not only in the light of the Russian Constitution, but also from the point of view 
of international public law, especially the norms of the law of treaties. Moreover, 
the findings of the ECtHR with regard to existing European standard were consid-
ered as unjustified in the light of both previous ECtHR decisions and development 
of protection of  right to vote in  the State parties to the ECHR. In consequence 
the Court held that 
[i]n the Judgment in the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia the European Court of Hu-
man Rights attributed to Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention the meaning, implicitly 
contemplating alteration of Art. 32 (Section 3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
to which Russia as a High Contracting Party to the multilateral international treaty, which 
is the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, gave no 
consent during its ratification, so far as assumed (including bearing in mind absence of any 
objections on the part of the Council of Europe) that Art. 32 (Section 3) of the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation and Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention did not contradict 
each other.333
331 Case 12-П/2016 (Russian Constitutional Court, 19 April 2016). See also comments: I. Nuzov, 
Russia’s Constitutional Court Declares Judgment of  the European Court “Impossible” to En-
force (Int’l J. Const. L. Blog 2016), <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/04/russias-constitu-
tional-court-declares-judgment-of-the-european-court-impossible-to-enforce> (access: July 
2016).
332 Art. 32(3) of the Russian Constitution “citizens detained in a detention facility pursuant to 
a sentence imposed by a court’ to vote or to stand for election.”
333 See: para. 4.2.
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This statement means that any further discussion on an imperative ban, ac-
cording to which all convicted persons serving sentence of deprivation of liberty 
defined by the criminal law have no electoral rights with no exception, is impossi-
ble. The Court even denied payment of just satisfaction adjudicated by the ECtHR, 
which means general depravation of any legal force of this decision. The suggested 
possibility of further implementation of the judgment affected by the interpreta-
tion of  terms ‘sentence imposed by the  court’, ‘detained’ and  ‘detention facility’, 
seems to be unsatisfactory in the light of the outcome of the judgment. 
The judgement of the Constitutional Court seems to be a dangerous precedent 
within the system of the ECHR. One must agree that Russia has adopted a policy 
of partial or à la carte compliance.334 It must be noticed that there is a clear posi-
tion that withdrawal from the Convention is not an option. Rather, it is expected 
by the Russian authorities that the European system is to be modified with a due 
regard to the Russian sovereign will determined not in objective way on the basis 
of the content of the ECHR as international treaty binding upon the Russian Fed-
eration but as defined subjectively in the Russian Constitution as interpreted by 
the Russian Constitutional Court.335 It is stressed that 
the question is not validity or invalidity for Russia of an international treaty as a whole, but 
simply of the impossibility to implement its provision in the interpretation attributed to it by 
an authorized intergovernmental body within the framework of consideration of a specific 
case, to the extent to which this interpretation has rendered this provision concrete in such 
a way that it has come into conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation.336 
Valeri Zorkin, the President of the Constitutional Court even pointed out that 
“it is not in the contradiction to the European Court of Human Rights, but, on 
the contrary, it is based on the aspiration to safeguard ourselves from situations, 
334 C. Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and  International Human Rights Tribunals: The  Problem 
of Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2016), p. 113.
335 As the Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland noticed “our states have con-
sistently demonstrated that perceived tensions between the Convention and core constitu-
tional principles can be resolved without open conflict. This is the only way to preserve our 
common, legal pan-European space. The alternative is a blatant challenge to the binding ef-
fect of the European Court’s judgments, which would mark the beginning of the end for our 
unique human rights protection system. I trust that this is not the intention of the Russian 
Federation, nor of any other State or any institution in Europe.” Speech during the conference 
held in  Sankt Petersburg in  2015, <http://www.coe.int/en/web/secretary-general/speech-
es/-/asset_publisher/gFMvl0SKOUrv/content/international-conference-enhancing-na-
tional-mechanisms-for-effective-implementation-of-the-european-convention-on-hu-
man-rights-> (access: May 2016).
336 V. Zorkin, ‘Challenges of Implementation of the Convention on Human Rights’, <http://www.
ksrf.ru/en/News/Documents/Report%20for%2022%20October.docx> (access: June 2016).
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fraught with serious complication of  the relations of  Russia with the  ECtHR 
and with the Council of Europe as a whole. The question regards the situations 
when the ECtHR decisions, intruding into the sphere of the national sovereignty 
of Russia, are  fraught with more substantial violations of  rights of Russian citi-
zens than those, which the Strasbourg Court is objecting to. As a matter of fact, 
the Constitutional Court, which possesses of a large experience of constructive in-
teraction and mutually respectful dialogue with the ECtHR, has taken upon itself 
the burden of settlement of conflicts of this sort.”337 
All the above-mentioned explanations employ pluralistic vocabulary, however, 
the outcome of the judgment is in obvious opposition to the idea. 
4. Concluding Remarks
The CEE Constitutional Courts, just as other European courts, face the au-
thority of international courts. Since constitutions of these states incorporate in-
ternational treaty regimes (by means of a general clause as a part of international 
law like in Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Russia or Ukraine or by specific 
incorporation like in Hungary) authority of the highest courts established within 
this regimes must be taken into account by constitutional courts not only in the 
process of application of international law but also in interpretation of national 
constitutions and other acts of internal law. The ECC constitutional Courts have 
built their own relation with international courts on the basis of  international 
obligations of the State and its constitutional framework. Since in all states under 
consideration there is  a  strong sovereignty dimension in  constitutional provi-
sions connected with supremacy of  the constitution as the  highest law of  the 
land it was necessary to interpret national constitutions with due openness to 
international law and revision of an absolute understanding of state sovereignty. 
Participation in international organisations and undertaking international obli-
gations is seen by the courts as a means of execution of sovereignty, and not as 
its limitation. 
In practice, constitutional courts are in the position to rather avoid conflict with 
the highest courts of other legal orders. They do so through consistent interpreta-
tion of their own constitutions, giving due consideration to the decisions of inter-
national courts and building up the court-to-court relations including own scope 
of jurisdiction under national law. Constitutional courts use judicial dialogue, es-
pecially but not exclusively with the ECtHR and CJEU, to achieve this purpose. 
In  the field of human rights protection the  legally binding nature of  the ECHR 
337 Ibidem.
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is not the only reason of such practice. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is recog-
nized as an indicator of established European standards of protection of human 
rights. That’s why constitutional courts refer to the case law of the ECtHR not only 
when applying the ECHR but also in the process of interpretation of national law. 
For the same reason the constitutional courts in difficult cases broadly refer also 
to practice of foreign courts. Such attitude seems to confirm that courts recognize 
themselves as members of community of judges ensuring, within a pluralistic legal 
community, the effective protection and preservation of universal values. 
The Constitutional Courts of Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland 
clearly distinguish scope of their own jurisdiction from jurisdiction of the ECtHR 
and  the CJEU. While they are  solely responsible for interpretation and applica-
tion of the Constitution including review of constitutionality of any applicable law, 
the European Courts have exclusive power to decide on interpretation of particu-
lar international treaties as well as on violation of treaty obligations. This attitude 
makes the coexistence of different autonomous constitutional orders possible even 
in  conflict situation. However, the  courts proclaimed constitutional identity as 
a boundary beyond which the influence of the external coexisting legal orders on 
their constitutions is not permissible. 
The ECC constitutional Courts preserve their own function as guardians of na-
tional constitutions, which means that also implementation of decisions of inter-
national courts may be subject of  constitutionality review. The  approach of  the 
Czech, Lithuanian, Hungarian and Polish Constitutional Courts is similar to this 
adopted by the CJEU in Kadi.338 All international obligations of a State must be 
performed in conformity with its constitution. However, even if execution of some 
means of the judgment of a European court is impossible in the light of the nation-
al constitution in force, like in Paksas case, it does not mean that it is not possible 
at all. The distinction between (an indirect) control of constitutionality of a deci-
sion of international court and a control of its validity is crucial for constitutional 
pluralism, since it makes dialogue (in the meaning of both speaking and listening) 
possible. It also shows that not only common understandings but also real differ-
ences are possible. It also shows that judicial practice, even based on due mutu-
al respect, is not able to resolve all problems of complex reality of constitutional 
pluralism. Sometimes intervention of other, political, bodies is necessary to avoid 
conflict. As it was indicated at the beginning of the paper, a concept of a dialogue 
does not mean everyone at the table agree with one another and pluralism involves 
the commitment to being at the table – with one’s commitments. Slovak Pensions 
shows that lack of due consideration of the authority of the highest court of other 
legal order and  lack of will to engage in a dialogue at the beginning may result 
in exclusion of participation in further discussion. In case of Russia the argument 
of state sovereignty as jus cogens norm of international law evocable against a treaty 
338 C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council and Commission (CJEU, 3 September 2008).
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obligation shows that perception of international law in Russia differs from other 
CEE states.339 
The practice of the CEE constitutional courts shows also that the line between 
dualism and pluralism is fluent and nuanced. As in case of practices of Western 
European courts one may wonder whether argumentation based on mutual trust, 
friendly coexistence of legal systems and dialogue amounts to the constitutional 
pluralism or is it simply dualism cloaked as pluralism.340
339 It must be emphasised that a strong belief that state sovereignty is the fundamental principle 
in  international law is characteristic for Russian understanding of  international law. In the 
same time, sovereignty is  absolute, indivisible and  cannot be limited. It  leads to critique 
of constitutionalisation of international law and very idea of legal pluralism. L. Mälksoo, Rus-
sian Approaches to International Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 100.
340 Phrase used by A.L. Paulus with regard to the German Federal Constitutional Court in ‘From 
Dualism to Pluralism: The relationship between international law, European law, and domes-
tic law’, [in:] P.H.F. Bekker, R. Dolzer, M. Waibel (eds), Making Transnational Law Work in the 
Global Economy, Essays in Honour of Detlev Vags (Cambridge University Press 2010), p. 134.  
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